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OUTLINES OF EUROPEAN HISTORY

1789-1922

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*THIRD EDITION, REVISED, WITH CHAPTERS ON THE
GREAT WAR AND AFTER*

WITH TWELVE MAPS

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EUROPEAN HISTORY**
WITH MAPS

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PREFACE

THE plan of this little book was suggested mainly by the reiterated demand from teachers for some assistance in dealing with the history of the Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries, and particularly with that of the last forty years. The author has tried to keep before himself the need for simplicity, and has especially attempted to avoid overburdening the narrative with references to unessential persons, places and events. He makes no claim to throw new light upon any part of the subject, but has been content to express the accepted view wherever he has been able to ascertain it.

ROYAL NAVAL COLLEGE,
OSBORNE,
May, 1916.

NOTE TO NEW EDITION

IN response to a general demand, the Introduction has been rewritten so as to cover the age of the French Revolution and Napoleon I, and to show in greater detail how some of the main features of nineteenth-century history were natural developments of the events of that period.

REPTON,
February, 1920.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION, 1789-1795	7
II. NAPOLEON I, 1789-1815	22
III. THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA, 1814-1815	41
IV. FRANCE, 1815-1848	50
V. HOLLAND AND BELGIUM	61
VI. THE GERMAN STATES, 1815-1848	67
VII. ITALY, 1815-1848	79
VIII. RUSSIA AND THE NEAR EAST, 1815-1848	87
IX. SIX MINOR STATES	103
X. REVOLUTION IN FRANCE, 1848-1852	114
XI. REVOLUTION IN AUSTRIA-HUNGARY, 1848-1849	124
XII. REVOLUTION IN GERMANY, 1848-1849	133
XIII. REVOLUTION IN ITALY, 1846-1849	140
XIV. THE SECOND EMPIRE, THE CRIMEAN WAR AND THE • BALKAN STATES, 1852-1867	150
XV. CAVOUR AND THE UNION OF ITALY, 1850-1870	166
XVI. BISMARCK AND THE GERMAN PROBLEM, 1849-1866	179
XVII. BISMARCK AND THE UNION OF GERMANY, 1866-1871	190
XVIII. THE BALKAN STATES, 1870-1893	200
XIX. RUSSIA AND POLAND, 1855-1914	217
XX. THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, 1871-1914	231
XXI. THE GERMAN EMPIRE, 1871-1914	242
XXII. EUROPE IN NORTH AFRICA, AND THE TRIPLE ENTENTE	260
XXIII. THE BALKAN STATES, 1893-1914	274
XXIV. THE GREAT WAR, 1914-1918	300
XXV. THE PEACE OF VERSAILLES, 1919	318
INDEX	330

LIST OF SKETCH-MAPS

	PAGE
I. EUROPE IN 1810	39
II. EUROPE AFTER THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA	49
III. THE GERMAN CONFEDERATION IN 1815	69
IV. THE AUSTRIAN EMPIRE AND ITS RACES, 1815	73
V. TURKEY IN EUROPE AND ITS SUBJECT RACES	92
VI. THE BALKAN STATES, 1815-1885	93
VII. THE UNION OF ITALY	141
VIII. PRUSSIAN AND GERMAN ACQUISITIONS IN 1866 AND 1871	197
IX. EUROPE IN NORTH AFRICA	261
X. THE TREATY OF BUCHAREST, 1913	291
XI. NORTHERN FRANCE AND BELGIUM IN THE GREAT WAR	302
XII. EUROPE AFTER THE PEACE OF VERSAILLES	321

OUTLINES OF EUROPEAN HISTORY

1789-1922

CHAPTER I

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION, 1789-1795

The "Ancien Régime."—The century that witnessed the careers and achievements of Napoleon, Cavour and Bismarck would in any case be an instructive period for historical study, but the interest to us and the importance to mankind of European History since 1789 may be said to rest upon even wider foundations. The nineteenth century has proved an epoch of political and social change scarcely paralleled even by the age of the Renaissance. It is little more than a hundred years since the people of almost every country in Europe were living under vexatious and absurd institutions which were no more than relics of bygone times and of outlived conditions. In many states, Germany and Poland for example, the whole apparatus of mediæval serfdom still existed, and even in France, though men were free to come and go as they pleased, forced labour could be imposed in many districts by landlords upon their tenants, and feudal dues exacted which had their origin in days when the lords were the natural governors and protectors of the people. Everywhere there were orders of nobility claiming by privilege of birth not only a general social superiority, but also a monopoly of lucrative offices in Church and state, and even exemption from taxation.

Above these were kings who in their own eyes were not only the uncontrolled masters of their subjects, but also the owners of their possessions, who of their own authority could imprison whom they pleased without legal proceedings, take of their money as much as they desired, issue edicts which had the force of law, and repress complaints by the use of organised armed forces. Nowhere was there any body representing the people such as the English Parliament, whose duty it was to consider their welfare and to redress their grievances. Except by the use of force they had no hope of ever ridding themselves of oppressive laws and unfair regulations, of securing efficient and uncorrupt administration, or of controlling a wasteful and heartless government. In England our Parliament has always acted to some extent as a safety-valve for the indignation and sufferings of the people. Elsewhere such feelings were so pent up that an explosion was sooner or later inevitable. The eighteenth century had seen not a few enlightened and well-meaning rulers, who had felt the urgency of reform, but the half-heartedness of their efforts and their slowness in overcoming the obstruction of conservative or selfish courtiers had prevented them from really facing the danger. The futility of the "Age of Benevolent Despots" is best realised when their slender achievements are compared with the swift progress made as soon as the flood-gates were opened; and it is with that progress that the history of the nineteenth century is concerned.

The Condition of France in 1789.—Because Revolution first raised its head in France, it has often been imagined that the evils of the "Ancien Régime" were more pronounced there than elsewhere. This was certainly not the case. It is true that in many parts of France the condition of the peasants and working classes was pitiable, and that the statesmen who in previous centuries had deprived the French nobility of many of their powers and duties had left them in possession of rights and privileges vexatious

to the people and ruinous to the country. For instance, in France, as elsewhere, the greater part of the burden of taxation was borne by the classes least able to pay. In addition to forced labour, ill-considered game laws entitled the nobility to keep on their estates vast flocks of pigeons, which ate the peasants' corn; and the nobles as a class certainly showed little care or sympathy for the people in their distress. Yet bad as was the situation in France, it had improved rather than worsened during the years previous to 1789, and the material condition of the poor elsewhere was far less endurable. Thus other reasons must be sought to account for the time and place of the outbreak.

Influences at Work in France.—The first solution of the problem lies in the fact that France, far from being the most primitive and backward state in Europe, was in many ways the most progressive and enlightened. It was because the French peasant was more independent and more wealthy than the German serf that he resented the political and social privileges of his landlord more than the serf objected to his bondage; and in an educated middle class the French working-man found able leaders. For the last fifty years a series of great French writers had been taking the lead in directing the cold light of reasoned criticism upon the evils of the "Ancien Régime." The caustic wit of Voltaire, attacking the gloomy superstition and cruel intolerance of the Church, the unreasonable immunities and unspiritual attitude of the higher clergy, and the follies of the nobles and the court, had steadily undermined the faith of the people in the institutions under which they lived. Montesquieu and Rousseau, deeply impregnated with political ideas developed in England, had insisted that government should exist for the benefit of the governed, had shown that elsewhere there existed methods by which the king was prevented from arbitrarily taxing and imprisoning his subjects, and had argued that no man should have rights and privileges over his fellows merely

by reason of his birth. Rousseau's most famous book opens with the words: "Man is born free, and yet is everywhere to be found in chains," and he went on to foretell the coming of a golden age in which all men should be free and equal, in which the state should be the expression of the will of the people and not of a king reigning by the grace of God, and in which both tyranny and poverty should disappear. Many Frenchmen, too, had played a prominent part in freeing North America from oppression and bad government, and had returned home to spread the tale of the blessings that would necessarily follow the establishment of freedom. Thus it was in France especially that the attention of thinking men was first focused upon the prevailing evils, and when in 1789 the States-General or Parliament of France was summoned, some of its members, adopting the words "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity" as their motto, dreamt that all the ills of France would straightway be healed if only the French people were allowed to create a new government in accordance with their ideas.

The French Finances.—The second reason for the outbreak lay in the peculiar difficulties with which the government of Louis XVI was confronted. Ever since the reign of Louis XIV the French finances had been in a disordered state. The tremendous expenditure which that monarch required to support his gorgeous court, to provide for his vast building schemes, and to maintain his armies in the field, had largely been met by reckless borrowing. This had meant that in future years the expenditure would be increased by the interest due on the debt, and that more money still must be borrowed. The same system continued throughout the reign of Louis XV, for instead of reducing he increased the costliness of his court, and plunged into every European war. Thus the unfortunate Louis XVI, while striving to reduce the extravagance of the court, found himself saddled with an enormous debt, and was compelled to follow the example of his predecessors in keeping all taxation at the highest level, and to go on

borrowing, until, at last, as must eventually happen, no further lenders were forthcoming. Moreover, the students of the new science of Political Economy had opened the eyes of the people to a variety of financial abuses hitherto uncomplainingly endured. In addition to the immunities of the nobles, ill-considered and unfair systems of taxation had been allowed to survive from ancient days which crippled the industry of the country without greatly benefiting the exchequer. For instance, internal tolls and customs were levied upon goods transferred from one district to another, and the government monopoly of the sale of salt was so manipulated that the people of one town might have to pay thirty times as much for their salt as their neighbours in an adjacent district. In 1789 the danger of national bankruptcy, the difficulty of raising money for the ordinary expenses of administration, and the urgent need for the reform of the whole system of taxation were all so pressing that the king, after experimenting with a variety of advisers who one and all were baffled by the magnitude of the problem, took the extreme step of calling to his aid, after a lapse of nearly two centuries, the ancient representative assembly of the French people, the States-General. Privilege and reform were now to meet face to face. Louis was too shortsighted to perceive that the energies of the States-General would not be limited to finance.

The States-General.—The assembly was convened at Versailles in May, and as soon as it met the inevitable conflict began. It was the ancient custom that the three "Estates" should deliberate in separate houses, representing Nobles, Church, and Commons, and that in case of dispute a decision should be reached by a majority not of "heads" but of houses. But it was preposterous, when such subjects were at stake as the abolition of the privileges of the nobles and the Church and the transformation of the government from absolutism to constitutionalism, to expect that the representatives of the privileged orders should be allowed to outvote those of the mass of the nation.

The Commons, therefore, demanded that the three houses should sit together and vote by head, so that their numbers, which were equal to those of the nobles and clergy united, might be effective. The king, who wished his people well, and who, left to himself, might well have led them in the path of honest reform, was induced by his courtiers, and especially by his Austrian queen, Marie Antoinette, to enforce the older system. He presided in person at a joint session of the three orders, to whom he presented a long programme of reforms, and then directed the houses to debate them in separate rooms. The Commons soon found a leader in the Comte de Mirabeau, who, despite his noble birth, had been elected as a representative of the people, and under his advice took up an attitude of defiance to the court. They decided after prolonged debate to proceed with no business until they had been joined by the other orders, and on June 20, finding the door of their regular meeting-place closed against them, they adjourned to a neighbouring building, a tennis court, where they solemnly swore never to separate until they had completed the work that they had set before themselves. Within a few days the king gave way, and at his orders most of the clergy and nobles ended the deadlock by uniting with the commons in joint sessions. This notable victory was a necessary step towards reform, but the conflict had the effect of permanently embittering the relations between the court and the reformers. The king was henceforth regarded by many of the nobles as a traitor to their order, and by the commons as an opponent who, nevertheless, had only to be threatened to give way.

The Fall of the Bastille.—Meanwhile, what was the attitude of the people? The whole country had looked forward with intense anticipation to the meeting of the States-General. It had been foolishly supposed that the immediate result would be the abolition of abuses, the lightening of taxes, and the cheapening of food, the price of which had recently risen owing to a series of bad harvests. But when

Paris saw the assembly beginning an interminable series of debates, and troops, which had been moved to the capital to prevent disorder, gathering round them, they accused king and assembly alike of treachery, and broke into wild rioting, pillaging bakeries, gunshops, and taverns, and murdering all government officials who showed themselves. Amid all this violence the distracted king could not make up his mind to give orders that the troops should fire, and their presence in the capital only enraged the people without terrifying them. On July 14, the report spread that the governor of the Bastille, a strong fortress in the centre of Paris, which had long been used as a political prison, had been ordered to load his guns and turn them upon the city. The mob thereupon marched upon the Bastille, which was defended by a hundred old soldiers acting as jailers, and took it by storm, murdering the defenders and releasing the prisoners.

The symbolism of this striking success was not lost upon France. An ancient monument of despotism, defended by a royal officer, had fallen to the people, infuriated by the denial of their rights. The rising in Paris was therefore followed by others all over the land. The country houses of the nobles were burnt, and many terrible crimes committed in the name of liberty. And when, too late, the king resolved to use the army to check the disorder, it was found that the troops refused to fire, and had been persuaded by the people even to turn upon their officers. Whole regiments mutinied and had to be disbanded.

The "Rights of Man."—During August the Assembly, horrified at these excesses, attacked the task of reform. The privileged classes voted the surrender of their legal rights without a struggle, for the most part because they knew them to be indefensible, but partly perhaps because a defence of them at the moment would only serve to provoke further disorder. Feudal dues, the tithes of the Church, forced labour, the obnoxious game laws, and all exemptions from taxation were abolished. A clean sweep

was made of the old provinces by which France since feudal days had been administered, each with its own laws and methods of taxation, and the country was re-divided into districts of convenient size called departments, in all of which law and taxation were to be uniform. Before the end of the month the famous Declaration of the Rights of Man was completed, a notable document which was subsequently to serve as the foundation of popular government not only in France, but in every corner of the world. Beginning with such fundamental claims as that "Men are born free and remain equal in rights," and that "Law is the expression of the general will," it went on to guarantee the freedom of the subject, liberty of conscience and of the press, representative government, and the responsibility of all public servants to the nation.

The King brought to Paris.—When this declaration was presented to the king for signature, another fatal period of hesitation ensued. Held back by the queen from definitely embracing the popular cause or showing how sincerely he wished his people's good, Louis XVI was suspected of another attempt to end the movement by force. On October 5 further rioting broke out. The condition of the poor of Paris had grown worse instead of better since the first meeting of the States-General, for their food-supply, never too secure, had been affected by the widespread disorders of July and August. Infuriated by the approach of starvation, by rumours that troops were again being assembled, and by the story that the army officers, with the queen's approval, had trampled under foot the new national colours—the Red, White, and Blue—an angry mob including some thousands of women, resolved to march to Versailles, the royal residence, and the centre of the extravagant court life, to show themselves to the king and to demand that something should be done for them. On reaching the palace, they spent the night outside, drinking, and eating the flesh of some horses that they found. In the morning they attacked the palace and slew

some of the guards. The attack was repulsed, but the people refused to return to Paris unless the king accompanied them, for, they said, where the king was, there would bread be plentiful. No refusal was possible, and when they returned, they took with them the king and queen as their prisoners, and the heads of the slaughtered guards as their trophies.

The Undue Influence of Paris.—From that time until their death the king and the royal family were closely watched captives, and the government was carried on in constant fear of further riots, for the people had discovered their power. The States-General, and afterwards the Legislative Assembly which was elected according to the new constitution to replace it, dared not discuss laws that were not agreeable to the populace of the city. Mob orators and journalists urged the people to distrust the king, and excited them to further acts of violence; but most sensible men saw that no real reforms could be effected while this system of mob-rule prevailed. During the next eighteen months many of the original members of the Assembly retired in disgust and despair, and of those that showed greater faith and patriotism, only Mirabeau found a way by which the disorder might be ended. This man, who had at first been an active opponent of the royal party, now saw the peril into which France was rushing, and pressed his advice upon the court. The king must escape from Paris to some less disorderly part of France, must declare his earnest desire to lead in the path of reform, and must appeal to all loyal Frenchmen to support him against the capital and its riotous mobs. "Why should we fear even civil war?" he asked. "It will be the means of saving the king, who will be lost if he remains in Paris." Very likely he was right. At any rate, he foresaw what was coming, but his plan was never tried. He died early in 1791, and immediately afterwards Louis was persuaded by the queen and the nobles to appeal, not to the loyal French provinces against disloyal Paris, but to foreign

countries against France—a most fatal mistake, for it rallied the great mass of Frenchmen, momentarily at least, against the monarchy. On June 21, 1791, the king and queen managed to escape from Paris at midnight, disguised as servants, and fled towards the German frontier, where troops sent by the Emperor Leopold, the queen's brother, were to have met them. They were recognised, however, near Varennes, when only a few miles lay between them and safety, and were forced to return.

France becomes a Republic.—Hitherto the Revolution had been for the most part a constitutional movement towards reform, and something at least had been accomplished. Henceforth it became an attack upon the king, who had alienated his natural supporters and whose only hope lay in foreign interference. Many of the nobles had fled from the country to seek aid abroad, and in 1792, at their invitation and the queen's, an army of Prussians and Austrians marched over the frontier. This was the signal for the most terrible outbreaks of the Revolution. Rather than submit to foreign interference, the people of Paris and other cities determined to raise troops and defy Europe. In every town recruits were enrolled into regiments, and were trained and officered by men of the old royalist army, whom the call to defend their country brought back to discipline. In all, 750,000 men were raised by this levy and were despatched against the invaders. The money to equip and support them was provided by the issue of vast quantities of paper money and by the suppression of the Church, whose lands and property, together with those of the nobles, had been seized and sold. The passage of these troops through Paris was often the sign for riotous outbreaks. On August 10, 1792, some hundreds of men from Marseilles, singing the "Marseillaise," afterwards adopted as the revolutionary song, not only in France but all over Europe, joined in a riot in front of the Tuileries, the palace in which the king was held prisoner, and an attack was made upon it. Its defenders, the king's Swiss

guard, his only trustworthy troops, offered a resistance so sturdy that they were on the point of driving back the rioters, when the king, in a mistaken desire to stop the bloodshed, ordered them to retire. The queen in vain urged him to put himself at their head. The Swiss withdrew from the front of the palace to the gardens behind, but were pursued and butchered almost to the last man. The king and queen fled for refuge to the hall of the Assembly, where they were courteously but coldly received, and later they were lodged in a gloomy tower named the Temple, from which the former was never to come out except for his trial and execution. A month later the Assembly was compelled by the Paris mob, against the wishes of the country as a whole, to declare France a republic.

The Reign of Terror.—Amid such scenes of disorder there arose a few determined and violent men, who were resolved that their ideals of Liberty and Equality should be attained at whatever cost, and who showed the greatest devotion and energy in organising the defence of the country. The first to come to the front was one named Danton, a strange, savage man who showed astonishing ability in bending the wild mob of Paris to his will. The sources of his power were his popularity with the crowd, his conspicuous honesty, and his patriotic courage. He saw that if the invaders were successful, they would soon be joined by throngs of Frenchmen who were disgusted by the excesses of the people and whose sympathies lay with the king. If France, he said, was to be saved from a royalist rising and from a return to the evils of the old form of government, something more was necessary than occasional outbreaks of mob fury. They must go to work systematically to arrest and imprison all who were in any way suspected of favouring the king and his supporters. They must prevent civil war by striking terror into the hearts of their opponents. "To defeat our enemies, gentlemen," he said "and to save the cause of Liberty in France, we must make up

for lack of numbers by our boldness. 'L'audace, encore l'audace, toujours l'audace.'" In this policy of Terror he was supported by Marat, the popular journalist of the day, who before this had made himself notorious by his violence in denouncing the king. He now wrote, "Where is the prison large enough to contain the upper classes? The grave is the only prison. Your armies are of no avail against them. Give me two hundred men armed with daggers, and with them I will revolutionise France." During August, 1792, a house-to-house visit was arranged in Paris, and all who had been connected with the court, or on whom a shadow of suspicion rested, were seized. In this way the prisons were filled to overflowing, when suddenly, on September 2, false reports reached Paris that the defending armies had met with a defeat and that the invaders were advancing to besiege the city. Alarm-guns were fired, and bells rung. Suddenly in the crowded streets resounded the cry, "To the prisons. Let not a single enemy remain to rejoice in our defeats." Organised bands of assassins moved from prison to prison, drove out the inmates, and slew them with swords, axes, and pikes, until over a thousand people had perished. Yet even in this outbreak, as in all the others of the Revolution, the number of those actually concerned in the acts of violence was small. Of 500,000 people in the city the vast majority looked on in a sort of stupor, and when the outbreak had spent itself went back to their ordinary occupations, and reopened their shops and theatres as if nothing remarkable had happened or was likely to happen again.

The Execution of the King.—During the next few months France, now a republic, obeyed the orders of the self-appointed dictators in Paris, who had formed themselves into a committee with unlimited powers, known as the "Committee of Public Safety," and who met to discuss their plans in an informal debating society—the "Jacobin Club." Some districts, such as that of La Vendée, in Brittany, rose in rebellion to save their king and the Church.

but the Committee of Public Safety withdrew troops from the frontiers, and wreaked a terrible vengeance upon the rebels. In Paris all who were "suspected," or who resisted the will of Danton and Marat, were arrested and went through a form of trial before a tribunal of Danton's choosing. Most of them were condemned to die by the guillotine. Similar courts were established by order of the committee in the provincial towns, at Nantes and Lyons for example, where the same horrible scenes were enacted. In January, 1793, the king himself was brought to trial, and in October the queen also. Both were executed on the charge of conspiring with the enemies of France.

Attempts to Stop the Terror.—By this time, however, a cleavage appeared in the ranks of the republicans, some of whom recoiled before the continual bloodshed. The more moderate party, known as the Girondins from the fact that some of their leaders came from the Gironde, renewed the protest that Paris was not France, and that no Parisian committee, or indeed any so irregularly constituted body, had the right to usurp a despotic domination over the nation. Marat thereupon accused them of attempting to bring about a reaction, and hounded the mob against them. On June 2, 1793, an angry crowd demanded their expulsion from the Assembly, all who could not escape being arrested and subsequently executed. Still the vengeance of the people remained unsatisfied, and all who in any way attempted to stay the torrent of blood fell victims. Marat, however, paid for his hideous cruelty by death at the hands of a young woman named Charlotte Corday, whose horror at his wickedness made murder seem no crime. Soon after it was Danton's turn. Up to a point he had supported the bloodshed on the ground that the enemies of the republic could by no other means be held in check, but in 1794 he too decided that the time had come for compromise and peace. One of his principal supporters hitherto had been a sincere but cruel and fanatical republican named Robespierre, who now turned upon him and accused him of undermining

the sacred principles of the Revolution. The tribunal refused to hear Danton's defence or to remember what he had done for the Revolution, and the one truly patriotic spirit among them was dragged to the guillotine shouting that his accusers would soon follow him. And he was right, for Robespierre, who now took his place, excited the jealousy and fear of all by his unmistakable ambition to be their master; and within a few months he too was guillotined.

The Foreign War.—Meanwhile a great change had come over the military situation. In the summer of 1792 the invading Austrians and Prussians had actually threatened Paris, but as time went on the superior enthusiasm and numbers of the revolutionary armies prevailed. Confidence and discipline, at first notably lacking, came with experience, and by the end of the year they had driven the last of the foreigners over the frontier. The horror which was inspired everywhere by the execution of the king ranged all Europe against France. Even the English, many of whom had watched the movement up to that point with sympathetic interest, now joined the coalition against it. But no headway could be made against the well-led French armies. Indeed the chiefs in Paris began now to welcome the idea that the Revolution should assume the character of a war of propaganda—that it was the mission of France to spread the gospel of the Rights of Man throughout Europe. By the end of 1793 the war which had been begun to restore Louis XVI to his throne was being continued as an effort to confine the tide of revolution to the boundaries of France.

The Restoration of Order.—After the fall of Robespierre there were signs that the madness had nearly spent itself. The great mass of Frenchmen, though enthusiastic for political and social reform, had had no share in the Terror. In no danger themselves once the foreign invasion had been repelled, they had watched it with horrified apathy, longing for the restoration of settled conditions. Thus it was well

in accord with the desires of the majority that the governing power now passed into the hands of more moderate men, who formed what was known as the "Directory." Although there were from time to time renewed outbreaks of revolutionary fury, it was found that the worst excesses could always be prevented by calling out the troops. For during the progress of the war with the surrounding nations, now at its height, there had been created an army which in discipline and devotion to its officers has rarely been equalled. On September 22, 1795, the last of the great riots took place; but the mob, endeavouring to destroy the Directory, found itself faced by some 5,000 seasoned troops, led by a determined young officer named Napoleon Bonaparte. Not many minutes elapsed before well-aimed volleys of grapeshot and musketry scattered the rioters and taught them that they were no longer the masters of France.

The ease with which this was accomplished showed very clearly, not only how different the story of the Revolution might have been if Louis XVI had used his soldiers in 1789 with similar resolution, but also how easy it would be for a successful soldier at the head of his troops to put aside the Directory and to make himself master of all. The Revolution in France was likely to end, not in the reign of Liberty which had been its goal, but, like the Great Rebellion in England, in the rule of a single soldier.

CHAPTER II

NAPOLEON I, 1789-1815

IN the last chapter we saw what little success attended the efforts to establish good government in France by means of violence and Terror. We must now turn our attention to the man who, whether we regard him as having ended the Revolution or as having carried its work one stage further, at any rate succeeded just where it had hitherto failed—namely, in establishing stable and orderly government.

Bonaparte during the Revolution.—Napoleon Bonaparte was born of Italian parents in Corsica, a French possession, in 1769. Being intended for the army, he was educated at a military school in France. Little is known of his career previous to 1789 beyond the facts that he obtained a commission in the artillery and that he was a diligent student of his profession. When the Revolution broke out, and as long as it remained a movement likely to produce useful reforms, he was altogether in sympathy with it. From the first, however, his blood boiled when he heard of the violence that was permitted in Paris. "Why don't they sweep them away with cannon?" he asked. When mob rule became the order of the day, he was one of those who saw that no good could come to France that way. Meanwhile numbers of the old French army were flying from the country, and for officers who were willing to serve under a republican government advancement was rapid. Bonaparte became a captain in 1792, and a chance of distinction soon came his way. In 1793 Toulon declared against the rule of the Committee of Public Safety, and an English squadron

was sent to assist the royalists of the town to hold it against the republicans. Bonaparte was appointed to command the artillery of a besieging army. From the opening of the attack his zeal and obvious professional capacity marked him out from his contemporaries, and before the town fell he had practically assumed the command of the whole besieging force.

The First Italian Campaign.—We have already seen how he earned the gratitude of the Directory by his vigorous handling of the Paris mob in 1795. In reward for his services he was appointed at the age of twenty-seven to his first independent command. An army was to be sent into Northern Italy to meet the Austrians, who were attacking France in alliance with England, and Bonaparte was chosen to lead it. In a campaign of two months he defeated the Austrians in a series of brilliant engagements, occupied Milan and Venice, and established a North Italian republic under French protection. Prussia had already made peace. Now Austria was forced to do the same, yielding all her Italian possessions, at the Peace of Campo Formio, and England was left to fight the Revolution single-handed. It was not long before all France was ringing with the fame of the young man to whom victory seemed so inevitable and who in so short a time had done so much for the spread of liberty.

Bonaparte's Mission.—This success seems to have opened out to Bonaparte a prospect of the future that lay before him. "What I have done so far," he declared, "is nothing. I am but at the beginning of my career. Do you suppose that I have won my victories in Italy for the benefit of the Directory? What the French want is not Liberty but Glory, and a leader made illustrious by glorious deeds. Let the Directory attempt to deprive me of my command and they will see who is the master." He not only allowed his imagination to play with the idea of making himself the master of France, but very coolly proceeded first to consider

the exact steps to be taken for that purpose, and then to put his plans into execution. He was not only a dreamer but also a man whose vigorous purpose went far towards making his dreams come true. Throughout his career when once he had calculated the steps most likely to secure success he was not held back from them either by fear of wrong-doing, by regard for friends or by affection for relatives. In his pale face and cold, penetrating eye indecision or pity were never seen. Nations or persons who stood between him and his goal, whether it were the reconstruction of France, or, later, the mastery of Europe, were ruthlessly destroyed. Nevertheless it must not be supposed that, at this stage of his career at least, Bonaparte's principal motives were merely personal. He saw France poor and disorderly, a prey to the ambitious mediocrities who were attempting to rule her, with no system of law, justice or administration. In spite of the brilliant promise of the early days of the Revolution the last eight years had been for the most part years of destruction rather than of construction. He knew that though Frenchmen had aspired to liberty their strongest passion was for a France of which they could be proud, and that they would never be able to hold up their heads before Europe until the memory of the Terror had been extinguished by the recovery of their good name. He was self-confident enough to believe that it was his task to restore his country to her rightful position among the nations. He would make himself supreme for the purpose of clearing away the ruins which the Revolution had left, and, fusing the old France with the new, he hoped to rebuild the state from its foundations. He cared not a straw for theories of government or for the fine phrases and visions of idealist republicans, but aimed rather at law, at discipline, and at the prosperity that comes from settled and efficient government. Before all this, however, he must first make himself acceptable to the nation, and that he proposed to accomplish by appealing to their military instincts.

The Egyptian Expedition.—On his return to Paris after the campaign in Italy, although he was received with general enthusiasm and was already treated by a portion of the army with almost idolatrous adoration, he saw that the country was not yet ready to accept him as a ruler. But he also foresaw that if he and other of the best officers were to withdraw themselves for a time from France, the Directory would soon find itself unable either to protect the frontiers from the European Powers or to keep order at home. • He would then return and play the part of the saviour of France. He therefore persuaded the Directory that the expedition to Egypt would damage England's commerce through the Mediterranean, and he was sent with a considerable army "to drive the English from all their possessions in the East to which he could come." There is evidence also that he dreamed of an attack upon India, or of seizing Constantinople in order to take Europe in the rear.

He sailed from Toulon in the spring of 1798, evaded Nelson's blockading fleet, and in July landed in Egypt. He stormed Alexandria, defeated the Mamelukes, the famous cavalry of Egypt, and took Cairo. Cut off from France by the destruction of the fleet which had brought him, at the Battle of the Nile, he wintered comfortably at Cairo, giving the country a taste of his reforming zeal. In the spring he advanced through Palestine towards Syria. He failed, however, to take Acro, which blocked the road northwards and which was held by the Turks with the assistance of Sir Sidney Smith and a party of English seamen; and after wasting nine weeks before the town, during which his army suffered terribly from disease, he was compelled to return to Egypt. Here he received news that decided him to desert what was left of his army and to hasten back to France. His forecast was coming true. During his absence Austria had re-entered the war with the support of Russia, all that he had won in Italy had been as quickly lost, the allies were on the point of invading France,

La Vendée was again ablaze with royalist revolts, and the Directory had disgraced itself by its incapacity. Narrowly escaping capture by English frigates, Bonaparté, almost alone, landed in France in October, 1799, and, as he had foreseen, he was immediately hailed by all France as a saviour.

The Coup d'Etat and the Consulate.—Now was the time for the conqueror of Italy and of Egypt to play the part of Cromwell. He proceeded to Paris, placed himself at the head of the soldiers there, marched upon the hall in which the Assembly sat, and in spite of cries of "Down with the tyrant!" he drove them out at the point of the bayonet. The members of the Directory were forced to resign, and their place at the head of the government was taken by three self-appointed officials styled "consuls," of whom the second and third soon learnt to take their orders from the first. This Coup d'Etat, which made Bonaparte all-powerful for the next fourteen years, was far from being unpopular with the nation, for it was clear to all by this time that a single ruler of proved vigour and ability was much more likely to establish orderly government in France and to bring the war to a glorious conclusion than the incapable mediocrities whom he had replaced. The logical conclusion of the Revolution seemed to him to be the establishment of a strong executive founded upon popular consent, and he had calculated that his countrymen would support him along his chosen path. The event showed that he had gauged their character aright. The doctrines of the Rights of Man had long since lost their hold. During the Terror, France, dreaming of Liberty and Equality, had been bitterly disillusioned by the sight of republican fanatics in the name of liberty imposing their Utopian ideals upon an unwilling majority by the use of force. The chaos and anarchy into which the country was fast descending shut men's eyes to the good that had been accomplished. The destruction of the Ancien Régime had been an essential preliminary to progress, but to those

who had watched the process it seemed as if the change had been for the worse. The cry of the day was for construction, law, and discipline, even if these meant the sacrifice of the earlier ideals. Bonaparte's action in seizing the reins of power was therefore approved by a plebiscite or popular vote of three millions to fifteen hundred.

Bonaparte as Reformer.—The First Consul now set himself to establish order and good government. The condition of France was such as to dismay the most experienced administrator. The finances had been hopelessly disordered by the unlimited issue of paper money, with the natural result that commercial credit had disappeared and that every sort of business was at a standstill. The state church, which the revolutionaries had set up to take the place of that which they had destroyed, was repugnant to the greater part of the nation, and as the pope had condemned it few clergy could be found to serve it. Ten years of neglect had disorganised all the educational and charitable institutions in the country. The roads were impassable and infested with robbers, the harbours and canals silted up, and the navy ruined. Even the army was dwindling, for though military service had been made compulsory no authority existed that could compel the conscripts to join the ranks. The Revolution had everywhere destroyed both law itself and the respect for it. Above all, the violence of public life had alienated talent and virtue from the service of the country. The local administration as well as the central was everywhere in the hands of second-class revolutionaries whose hands were stained with pillage and corruption if not with blood.

The Bonapartist Constitution.—Few men have ever lived so well fitted as Bonaparte for reducing such a chaos to order. His grasp of technical detail, his capacity for continuous application—he thought little of working eighteen hours at a stretch—his unfailing accuracy in judging the character of subordinates, and his soldierly directness in

getting at once to the heart of the matter in hand, all combined to raise him above all rivals as an administrator. His example inaugurated an age of work in place of an age of debate, a methodical and scientific government founded upon popular consent in place of the violent and irregular tyranny of a faction; and despotic though he always was he gave France a practical degree of freedom and material well-being unknown either under the Ancien Régime or under the Revolution. From the first he ruled as autocrat, suppressing newspapers that criticised his acts, taking up his residence at the Tuileries, and issuing orders that none dared disobey. On the theory that it was the executive government that should be regarded as the true representation of the nation, the elected legislative assembly, though permitted to exist, was not to interfere in any detail of government. It might vote upon the decrees which the master placed before it, but in no case initiate legislation of its own. Robbed of all power, and even of the right of debate, it naturally sank at once into negligible insignificance, especially as its rival, the executive, was beyond all comparison efficient.

Details of Reconstruction.—Realising that religion was necessary to the nation and that France was, in the main, still Catholic in sentiment, Bonaparte effected an elaborate compromise with the pope, whereby the services of the Church were restored at the expense of the state, though this did not imply the restitution of its privileges, its lands, tithes or feudal dues. He drew up an enlightened code of civil and criminal law, so clear and simple that it has since been imitated in many European countries, and put into practice a scheme of national education, not, it is true, providing for the lower classes, but, even so, far ahead of anything of the kind then to be found in Europe. The government of the departments and the collection of taxes was put into the hands of carefully trained officials appointed by the First Consul and sent to Paris to execute his orders. The deepening of canals, the dredging of harbours, and the

making of a national road-system were undertaken by the government for the benefit of commerce. Support and encouragement were given to merchants, manufacturers, and inventors, and, as a means of attracting talent to his service, the famous Legion of Honour was founded, whose ranks were to be filled by men of merit. For liberty as the word had been interpreted in the early days of the Revolution he had no respect; nor did he believe that Frenchmen desired it, but equality in the sense of the equality of opportunity he meant to give them. Rank, promotion, and power were open to all on the qualification of merit and merit only. Lastly, disorder was everywhere checked with a firm hand. The risings in La Vendée were suppressed and their leaders court-martialled and shot. The principle of compulsory military service was, of course, continued, and no stone was left unturned to fill the depleted ranks of the army, the foundation upon which the whole edifice was to be erected.

The Marengo Campaign.—After a few months of strenuous labour at the work of re-organisation, Bonaparte struck again at the Austrians, who were in possession of all North Italy except the town of Genoa. In May, 1800, instead of marching along the usual route into Italy, the coast road by the Mediterranean, he advanced by way of Switzerland and over the Great St. Bernard Pass. His engineer officers pointed out to him the dangers of taking a great army through so difficult a part of the Alps, but admitted that it might be possible. "Enough," he said. "Let us start at once." Though they were too late to save Genoa from capture, the attack was so sudden and the direction taken so unexpected that the French were in possession of Milan and the Plain of Lombardy before the Austrians, whose main object had been the capture of Genoa, realised that the only available line of retreat was being closed to them. In their endeavour to fight their way back they were met by the French to the north of Genoa, at Marengo, and were totally defeated. By this

single blow Bonaparte re-won all that had been lost since his first Italian campaign, and when, a few months later, another French army under Moreau defeated the Austrians again in Bavaria at Hohenlinden, the French triumph was complete. Treaties of peace were signed with Austria at Lunéville (1801) and with England at Amiens (1802).

Imperialist Tendencies.—There now followed a year of uneasy peace, during which the First Consul was free to reserve his labours for the prosperity of his country, but no one saw more clearly than he that once this work was finished there would be no more scope for his energies in France. The French would only tolerate his despotism as long as it was necessary. "I shall regard it as an advantage," he said, "if my neighbours force me to take up my arms again before they are rusted." Moreover, he was beginning now to allow personal ambition to take a higher place in his mind than the welfare of France—to dream of "Europe under a single chief, an emperor who shall have kings as officers and shall make this one King of Italy and that one ruler of Holland." With him to dream of such a thing meant its accomplishment. In 1804, after the war had been renewed, he took the title of "Emperor of the French," thus doing away with the pretence of acting as the servant of the republic; and he actually induced the pope to come to Paris, not to crown him, but to be present at the scene when the new emperor placed the crown upon his own head.

England renews the War.—Meanwhile he was on the verge of a new struggle with England. According to the Treaty of Lunéville he was bound to withdraw the French army which was occupying Holland. This condition, to which the English government attached considerable importance, since the French possession of ports in the North Sea was a serious menace, had not been fulfilled, and the ministers of George III determined to retain the island of Malta, which had been seized in 1800, until France showed a

disposition to fulfil her undertakings. When a remonstrance was addressed to him Bonaparte assumed a defiant attitude. Refusing to give any guarantees on the subject of Holland, he demanded the immediate evacuation of Malta, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Amiens, and declared that the English were determined upon driving him to a new war. Moreover, he was already doing everything in his power to injure our commerce. English goods and English ships were shut out from France, from French colonies, and from countries under French protection by prohibitive customs, duties, and vigorous restrictions of all sorts. When protests were made his only answer was to order a substantial increase in the French military and naval forces. Early in 1803 it had become sufficiently clear that a renewal of the war was inevitable; and to prevent the French from being in a position to choose their own moment for an attack, the English declared war. Russia and Austria were urged to join a new alliance to resist the tyrant who, not content with being the saviour of France, was now becoming a danger to Europe.

Austerlitz.—For some time the Emperor Napoleon, as we must now call him, persisted in the idea of invading England, for it was that country he henceforward regarded as his principal enemy. He assembled an army near Boulogne and collected a great flotilla of flat-bottomed barges for its transportation across the Channel. In 1805, however, the watchfulness of the English admirals outside every French port and his failure to clear the Channel for the crossing of his troops convinced him that the scheme was impossible. Even before the terrible defeat at Trafalgar he had given orders for the army at Boulogne to move against the Austrian force which was threatening his eastern frontier. As at Marengo, he thrust himself by a rapid march between the Austrians and their own country, and forced one of their armies to surrender at Ulm on the Upper Danube. Quickly following up his success, he marched down the Danube, occupied Vienna, and hastened

north-eastwards to meet the advance of the Russians, driving the remnants of the Austrians before him. At Austerlitz, amid ice and snow, the allies were completely overthrown in a terrible struggle known as the "Battle of the Three Emperors," and Austria was forced for a third time to conclude a humiliating peace.

Jena.—Next it was Prussia's turn. Since the close of the Revolution Frederick William III had avoided war with the French, but now he became disturbed by the incursion of their armies into Germany, especially since Napoleon on the way to Austerlitz had seized a number of the smaller German states, some of which looked to Prussia as their protector, and had formed them into the Confederation of the Rhine under his own suzerainty. Confident in the immense military reputation of Prussia, Frederick William decided to take vigorous action and ordered Napoleon to retire behind the Rhine. The answer came promptly, for a quarrel with Frederick was just what Napoleon desired. The French invaded Prussia, totally defeated the famous Prussian army at Jena, south-west of Leipsic, and ten days later entered Berlin in triumph (October, 1806).

The Berlin Decrees.—Napoleon had not forgotten England. Indeed, he regarded this onslaught upon Europe primarily as an indirect means of attacking his principal enemy. From Berlin were issued decrees that proclaimed open war on English commerce—a war which was to cease only with his overthrow. All English goods discovered in France, Italy, Switzerland, Holland, or Germany, and later on in any part of the continent of Europe, were to be seized. Ships carrying such goods, or even touching at British ports, were to be held as prizes of war. Our answer was to blockade as far as possible the whole coast of Europe, to seize all foreign shipping, and to cut off Europe from all communication whatever with other continents. Thus Napoleon's war upon our trade did him more harm than good, for when the European nations saw their commerce

wrecked by English frigates, and the price of all goods which could not be produced in Europe rising to famine levels, they knew on whom the blame for it should rest and began to long for deliverance.

The Treaty of Tilsit.—Leaving Berlin, Napoleon continued the pursuit of Frederick William. A Russian army was slowly advancing to support the Prussians, but after an arduous winter campaign it, too, met with complete defeat, at Friedland. The two emperors, Alexander and Napoleon, now met in a series of interviews at Tilsit, on the Russian frontier of East Prussia. Although the luckless Prussian king was admitted to their conferences he was treated by Napoleon with harsh contempt, and saw that he could expect little mercy. On the other hand, the tsar, like many others, seemed as if awed and mesmerised by Napoleon's magnetic qualities—his ambition, his brilliant conversation, and his gigantic projects. "All my prejudices against him," said Alexander, "disappeared like a dream after an hour's conversation." He acknowledged Napoleon's right to create his brothers Louis, Joseph and Jerome, Kings of Holland, Naples, and Westphalia, the dominions of the last two being carved from the French conquests in Italy and Germany. The tsar so far forgot his recent alliance with England as to agree that the Berlin decrees against English trade should be extended to Russian ports, and even listened to schemes for a joint attack upon the last nation that resisted Napoleon's will. By the Treaty of Tilsit, in a word, Napoleon and Alexander were to divide the Old World between them, one taking the West and the other the East, and all Europe under their leadership was to unite against England;

The Rising in Spain.—After Tilsit Napoleon, now at the summit of his achievements, turned to Spain. In 1808 he overran the country with his troops, awed the king into surrendering the crown, and appointed Joseph Bonaparte to the throne, replacing him in Naples by General Murat.

Portugal, which had always been a faithful ally of England and had kept its ports open to English shipping in defiance of Napoleon's orders, was soon to share the same fate. But now for the first time he was to encounter serious national resistance. Hitherto the people of the countries occupied had accepted his rule with surprising readiness, often regarding him as a deliverer from unjust and oppressive rule and sometimes rejoicing in the efficient government on the French model which he everywhere emplantad. In Spain, however, the peasants rose in general insurrection and maintained amongst their inhospitable mountains a guerilla warfare against which his best troops and generals were powerless.

The War in the Peninsula.—These events at last decided the English to try conclusions with the French on land, and an army was landed in Portugal to protect our one ally and to assist the Spaniards in their resistance. In Napoleon's absence his generals were chased from Portugal, and such encouragement was given to the Spaniards that the emperor thought it necessary to take the field in person. But though he drove Moore back to Corunna he was soon recalled by the news that Austria was preparing again to draw the sword.

The Rise of Nationalism.—In truth, the wonderful tide of his success had begun to ebb. First it had been his ambition to remould France, then to be its master and to conquer in its name. All this he had achieved without a check; but now, when he aspired to impose his will upon the whole continent, there were ominous signs that the nations had learnt a lesson from the successes of the Spanish guerillas and would soon need to be reconquered. The governments of the Ancien Régime had everywhere collapsed before him, and to that extent he could claim to have been the means of spreading the blessings of the Revolution, but now in every country men began to forget the evils from which he had freed them and the material

progress that followed the establishment of his rule. They remembered only that he was a foreign despot, that his conscription was taking their manhood to fight in quarrels that were not theirs, that it was he who had brought upon them the evils of the English blockade, the paralysis of their shipping, and the famine in all goods which Europe could not produce. Austria had already declared war. National risings in which statesmen and poets alike took part were breaking out in Prussia. The tsar was repenting of his promise to close his ports to English ships, and at last saw clearly that Napoleon would not be content with sharing the control of the world with anyone.

Seeing that these things were more vital than the completion of his work in Spain, the emperor dashed eastwards, brought the Austrians to their knees by two more lightning strokes, and forced them to conclude peace. Next he began the preparation of the Grand Army, which was to humble the tsar and complete the subjection of Europe. In all 600,000 men were assembled from the countries under his control, from Germany, Italy, Holland, Switzerland, Poland, and even Austria and Prussia, as well as France.

The Russian Campaign.—In the summer of 1812 began the advance through Poland. "I shall go to Moscow," said Napoleon. "Then Russia will be at my feet, for there is the heart of that Empire." The tsar, who could raise only 350,000 men to oppose the advance, widely distributed his armies over the western part of Russia, and systematically laid waste the country. His plan was simply to retreat and to lead the invader far into hostile and devastated country where neither food nor forage was to be found for so great a host. All the attempts of the French to force on a decisive action failed, until, after two months of desperate marching, they reached a spot a hundred miles from Moscow. Here, at Borodino, the Russians made a stand in defence of the ancient capital, but they were overcome after the bloodiest combat that Napoleon ever fought. Another march through the smoke of burning

villages brought the Grand Army to Moscow, where they imagined there would be food and rest for all. They found the city empty. All stores of food had been burned, and almost all the inhabitants had vanished. Soon after the entry of the French, fires broke out all over the city, some certainly lit by the Russians themselves, and raged for six days, so that a large part of Moscow was little but a heap of ruins. For five weeks Napoleon remained in the city, hoping that the tsar would come to terms. The delay was fatal. Winter was coming on and the question of food-supply and fuel became urgent. The tsar steadfastly refused to consider the question of peace while the French remained on Russian soil, and in October, though far from realising what a disaster lay before him, Napoleon determined on a retreat.


The Retreat from Moscow.—At first the weather was favourable, and rapid progress was made, but before they had gone far the terrible Russian winter set in. The columns lost their roads in the deep snow, and wandered foodless, until by thousands the soldiers dropped exhausted. Bands of Cossacks rode behind them, harrying the rear and destroying foragers and stragglers. In the fierce struggle for food all discipline vanished. Thousands were drowned in trying to cross half-frozen rivers whose bridges had been burned. Soon the Grand Army was scattered over hundreds of miles of desolate country. Before Poland was regained Napoleon deserted his men and made his way with a few attendants to Paris; but of the 600,000 men whom he had proudly led to the conquest of Russia only 20,000 unarmed spectres staggered back.

The War of Liberation.—At the news of the destruction of the Grand Army Russia, Prussia, and Austria leagued together to crush the fallen tyrant, but with armies of recruits newly raised in France he dashed back into Germany. For a time he was successful, and made bold efforts with his "Army of Boys" to prevent his adver-

saries from uniting their forces, but in the autumn of 1813 the allies closed round him at Leipsic. After a three days' fight, the "Battle of the Nations," he was entirely defeated. Then the allies marched on Paris, while Wellington, fresh from a series of victories over the generals left by Napoleon in Spain, pushed into France from the south. In 1814 Paris was occupied, in spite of the superhuman activities of the emperor, who by rapid dashes this way and that with a fragment of his once mighty host tried to stay one or other of the advancing armies. He could only delay the inevitable end, and at last he was forced to abdicate. The allies, as if to mock the magnitude of his shattered schemes, granted him sovereignty for life over the little island of Elba.

The Hundred Days.—Within a year, almost before the conference had assembled at Vienna which was to discuss the reconstruction of Europe, he made his escape and landed in France. By his veterans, many of whom had returned to France from foreign prisons on the conclusion of peace, he was received with enthusiasm, but the rest of France could hardly forget that this man, though he had re-established them as a nation and had won them so much undying fame, had also lost them a million men. Yet the choice was hard. A victory for Napoleon meant the renewal of his despotism. His defeat would bring further dishonour for France, and the renewal of foreign control. As a bid for popular support he issued a manifesto representing that underlying his despotic rule as emperor there had always been the intention of reviving the liberal principles of the Revolution as soon as circumstances permitted, and that he judged the time now ripe. The severity of the imperial government was to be relaxed, the press freed, the electorate broadened, the legislative assembly permitted to vote the taxes and laws and to control the executive. This document had some effect upon French opinion, but before it could be seen how far he meant to fulfil his promises the allies closed in on France. The mass of the nation

remained impassive, and his faithful veterans, in a last effort to prevent the union of their enemies, were crushed between the English and the Prussians at Waterloo. Napoleon fled through Paris to the west coast, hoping to escape to America, but the English blockade was too close. Then followed the surrender to the captain of the *Bellerophon* and the exile in the lonely island of St. Helena. He died in 1821.



EUROPE IN 1810.

CHAPTER III

THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA, 1814-1815

Democratic Changes due to the French Revolution.—

The history of Europe since the fall of Napoleon has been marked by the rapid spread and general recognition of principles and forces not new but never before so influential. To the Revolution in France we owe it that the abolition of class privileges, freedom of speech, and of the press, complete liberty of conscience, and the real control of the peoples over their governments have ceased to be the mere dream of the philosopher and have increasingly become the practical aspiration of the citizen. From one point of view the history of the nineteenth century may be regarded as being mainly concerned with the application of these great principles to the needs and characteristics of the various peoples of Europe. Nation after nation, with varying success, has struggled to secure the triumph of liberty over the repressive forces of the aristocratic and privileged orders. Means have had to be discovered by which the national government can be popularly controlled without damage to national efficiency, and by which the maximum liberty of the individual can be reconciled with the discipline and unity of purpose indispensable to every nation when it has to face its rivals in war or in the equally remorseless competition of peace.

Effects of Napoleon's Career.—Again, just as the development of every nation has to some extent been coloured by the principles which the French Revolution proclaimed, so also the history of the century has been profoundly modified by the career of Napoleon. Though his work as a conqueror was soon undone, no nation has altogether escaped his influence, while in some cases the lessons painfully learnt during the struggle to overthrow his domination have effected changes that are not the least striking of the

age. It is hardly too much to say that the work of Bismarck and Cavour was directly facilitated by the Napoleonic conquests. The political geography of Germany was greatly simplified by his suppression of a host of petty princedoms which were not revived when Europe was resettled in 1815. The first German Confederation, the model upon which later unions were constructed, was formed under Napoleon's auspices in 1806. The Holy Roman Empire, the greatest of all stumbling-blocks to the unity of the German race, was formally dissolved in 1805. Italians had seen themselves united by Napoleon in one homogeneous state for the first time for many centuries, and had been taught that it was not necessarily in the nature of things that Austrian influence should predominate in the peninsula. Moreover, in 1814 the whole of western Europe had been more or less under his despotic sway for eight years, and wherever he ruled his capacity for detail and his interest in material prosperity had made for progress and efficiency. Just as in France, local government and the collection of taxes had been placed in the hands of trained officials, roads had been made, canals cut, trade encouraged, and national education cared for. With the fall of the Ancien Régime in Poland, Spain, and Italy the subject populations learnt for the first time what it meant to be under an efficient government; and the example to the world everywhere survived his fall; for even where this part of his work also was undone, it was impossible not to perceive the contrast between his orderly government and the corruption and inefficiency by which it was in many cases succeeded. And this contrast was made to seem the more marked as time went on. The publication of the Memoirs which Napoleon wrote at St. Helena impressed upon the popular mind a highly idealised conception of his imperial aims. He wrote in order to persuade the world to regard him as a misunderstood idealist working only for the good of humanity—as a true son of the Revolution who had conquered Europe only that in his own good time he might spread the blessings of Liberty and Equality. He speciously argued that his assumption of autocratic power had been forced upon him by the necessity of presenting

a firm front to the enemies of democracy—England in particular. His despotism would have been relaxed as soon as peace had become general and the foundations of constitutional liberty had been laid by education. “I worked upon a plan. I asked for twenty years. Destiny gave me only thirteen.” It was not long before this highly imaginative view of his career was widely accepted. His personal ambition and the harsher features of his despotism were forgotten, and only the sterling merits of his administration remembered.

Nevertheless, the facts were that while he was initiating changes which in themselves might well have earned for him the gratitude of mankind, his constant wars and the steady drain of men and money which they involved were procuring his downfall. His conquests, as we have seen, had at first been welcomed by the peoples concerned, but the further his conquests spread the more widely were felt the rigours of his conscription and his war taxes, and the ruinous consequences of the Berlin Decrees. It was brought home to every soul in Europe what the French supremacy was costing them. Moreover, the humiliation inflicted upon national spirit by the discovery of Frenchmen everywhere in authority awakened far and wide the dormant sense of patriotism among the people, and a general desire for national regeneration and independence. Thus the successful rising of the populace in Spain in 1808 touched a responsive chord in the bosom of every subject nation. In Germany, and later in Italy, it was felt that a similar national rising, if accompanied by national unity, would result in a similar emancipation from despotism and foreign control. The peoples of Europe had fallen to France through faction and disunion; but let German and Italian patriotism replace the local antagonisms between Venice and Milan, or between Bavaria and Prussia, and great nations would arise.

The Spirit of Nationality.—Thus, out of the material want and the sense of wrong, for which Napoleon was held responsible, grew the new spirit of nationality, the principle which dictates that men who feel themselves by reason of ties of blood and language to be one people, should be

united in government and free from the domination of others. This wider spirit of patriotism, though in a sense no novelty, had never before obtained so strong a hold. For centuries past the ruling classes, if they were ever conscious of its existence, had been able habitually to ignore it with a callousness of which the partitions of Poland and the whole career of Napoleon were but the most recent examples. Poets and dreamers, and even statesmen, had before now struggled for German and Italian unity and independence against the forces of separation and foreign domination, but it needed the popular animosity against Napoleon to turn such aspirations into an irresistible national desire. It was this principle that had involved Napoleon's downfall, and since 1815 it has steadily grown in strength. We shall have presently to watch its application not only in Germany but also in the Balkans and in Belgium. For the moment it is enough to say that in spite of some failures its progress has been one of the distinctive features of nineteenth-century history.

Military Service.—Connected with the struggles for the principle of nationality is another less happy feature of the century; and for this also Napoleon must be held in part responsible. Just as his conquests were made possible by conscription, so also, in imitation, the regenerated nations, either to secure or to preserve their unity or independence, have been obliged one after another to adopt universal military service. Year by year, subordinating all other considerations to the needs of national defence, patriotism has called for conscription to be made more rigorous, until, in our own day, we have seen every nation an armed camp, forced to imitate Napoleon in increasing its resources in order to expend them upon preparations for war.

The Congress of Vienna.—In 1815, however, the victors in the great struggle were far from realising the strength of the three great forces to which we have referred—the desire for democratic liberty, the national ideal, and the spirit of militarism. The congress of sovereigns and

diplomatists who met at Vienna after the fall of Napoleon in 1814 to discuss the resettlement of Europe, and who renewed and completed their labours after Waterloo, were for the most part uncompromisingly hostile to all three. It is not to be wondered at that men who had lived through twenty-five years of war and turmoil should long for peace at any cost, for the reduction of armaments and for the eradication of the very roots of revolution. To the upper classes, still omnipotent everywhere but in France, the word "Revolution," and all that it stood for, had acquired a hideous sound. The demand for political liberty and reform, however moderate, was almost universally regarded as the sure preliminary of further disorder and bloodshed, and, just as the rights of individuals were to be ignored where they came into conflict with those of the privileged orders, so also the rights of nations were to be subordinated altogether to the claims of their sovereigns.

The Work of the Congress.—The main tasks, therefore, of the diplomatists assembled at Vienna seemed to be fourfold—to devise a means of avoiding future wars by the establishment of some kind of permanent "Concert of the Powers" which should settle all international disputes; to erase from the map of Europe as far as possible every trace of French influence and aggression; to provide safeguards against any such aggression in future, and to divide among the conquerors with as little friction as possible the spoil taken from the vanquished. The principle of nationality was totally ignored wherever it came into conflict with the territorial ambitions of any of the Great Powers, and, as for the demand for popular government, most of the diplomatists thought it their duty in the interests of future peace studiously to repress it. At the close of the conference, the Tsar of Russia, the Emperor of Austria, and the King of Prussia entered into a solemn compact, known as the "Holy Alliance," by which they undertook to regard one another as brothers and to base

their common action upon the principles of the Christian religion. This alliance was originally intended, by the tsar at least, as an honest protest against the gospel of force and military power in accordance with which Europe had been ruled for the last ten years, and as an attempt to safeguard the tranquillity of Europe. Yet, under the skilful management of Prince Metternich, the Austrian minister, it soon took on the appearance of a sinister league for the support of despotic government all over Europe; for every Austrian minister, as we shall see, had particular reason to regard the "tranquillity of Europe" as dependent upon the repression of liberal principles, and especially of that of nationality. Thus, instead of serving as a means of avoiding war, the Holy Alliance became the excuse for intervening in any state where the established government seemed in danger of yielding to liberal principles or where any oppressed nationality was likely to win its freedom. Most of the petty tyrants in Germany and elsewhere whom the Revolution or Napoleon had cast down were, therefore, to be restored to their dominions, lest in Austria and Prussia also the demand for reform should become too loud to be ignored. The boundaries of France were pushed back to where they had been in 1792, and it was declared that the "tranquillity of Europe" depended upon the maintenance in future of monarchical government in France. Louis XVIII, the younger brother of the unhappy Louis XVI, was placed upon the throne, and for some years after Waterloo, to provide against further republican or Bonapartist outbreaks, the French frontier fortresses were occupied by an allied force of 150,000 men under the command of the Duke of Wellington himself.

Much as it might desire to do so, however, the Congress found it impossible to restore the map of Europe to its condition before Napoleon refashioned it, for it was imperative to provide some permanent bulwark against French aggression. Austria, Prussia and Russia, moreover, were all of them resolved to take the opportunity

of furthering schemes that they had devised for their own advantage. We must take some notice of the more important changes which were thus brought about.

Safeguards against French Aggression.—The northern boundaries of France had never offered serious obstacles to the progress of French armies. It was felt that the most effective possible means of erecting a barrier was to hand over the Austrian Netherlands to Holland, which had recently become a hereditary kingdom under the House of Orange. This arrangement was the more satisfactory in that it might be held to compensate the Dutch for the loss of many overseas possessions, such as Cape Colony, to the English during the wars. It was, however, no concession to the principle of nationality, for the catholic Netherlands were little more closely connected by ties of religion, language or tradition with protestant Holland than with Austria, and the people, if consulted, would have chosen either to form an independent republic or to be incorporated with France. This union, being compulsory, led inevitably to trouble, and lasted only fifteen years. To the north-east, where formerly the existence of numbers of small German states had been a constant temptation to encroachment, France was to be hedged in by assigning the territories of many of these states on both sides of the Rhine to the Prussians, who were thus made the natural guardians of the Germans against the French. In the south-east, for similar reasons, the republic of Genoa, over whose roads the French had so often invaded Italy, was now incorporated with the kingdom of Sardinia and Piedmont.

Division of the Spoils of War.—A second set of territorial adjustments arose from the theory that Denmark and Saxony, in remaining faithful to their treaties with Napoleon, had forfeited all right to consideration, and that their possessions were therefore at the disposal of the conquerors. In the scramble for these territories the proceedings of the Congress degenerated into a series of

unworthy bargains. Thus nearly half the kingdom of Saxony was awarded to Prussia, and Norway, which had been Danish for several centuries, was handed over to Sweden in compensation for the loss of Pomerania, upon which Prussia had ambitions, and of Finland, which Russia had seized at the suggestion of Napoleon in 1809. The vast territories of Poland were dealt with in a similar spirit. Austria retained Galicia, which she had received by the partition treaty of 1795, but Prussia, in view of the acquisitions that she had been allowed to make in Saxony and on the Rhine, yielded to Russia the city of Warsaw and the great district around it. Thus the ancient and once glorious Polish nation was left, as Napoleon had found it, entirely under the domination of foreigners, from which she has ever since been struggling to free herself.

Besides recovering her old duchy of Milan, Austria was allowed to compensate herself for the acquisitions of Prussia and Russia and for the loss of the Netherlands by seizing the lands of the extinct republic of Venice. Elsewhere, both in Italy and in Germany, most of the petty states that had existed before the day of Napoleon were restored to their former rulers. Finally, Great Britain wisely contented herself with the colonial possessions acquired during the war, though she made good her hold upon Heligoland, ceded by Denmark, and upon Malta, won from France; and George III was allowed to call himself King of Hanover instead of Elector.

Such, in the main, was the resettlement of Europe at the Congress of Vienna. In the light of subsequent events grave defects can be detected in many of its provisions, but it had at least this merit, that it kept the greater Powers of Europe at peace with one another for forty years.

CHAPTER IV

FRANCE, 1815-1848

1815. Restoration of Louis XVIII.

1824. Accession of Charles X.

1830. The July Revolution. Accession of Louis Philippe.

1831. Intervention in Belgium.

Restoration of Louis XVIII. The Charter.—Twenty days after Waterloo, Louis XVIII re-entered Paris amid scenes of very real enthusiasm. France as a whole was still monarchical at heart, and though it had remained passive under the Napoleonic despotism, no little relief was felt that the age of turmoil and desperate foreign adventure was over and that there was a prospect of an era of peace and economy under a member of the ancient royal house. At the same time, although he had been placed upon his throne by the might of the victorious allies, Louis XVIII was not the man to attempt to undo the work of the Revolution and Napoleon. He was an easy-tempered man of the world, sixty years old, without prejudices and passions of any sort, and he had honestly made up his mind to play the part of a constitutional sovereign to the best of his ability, or at any rate not to endanger his throne by arbitrary measures. During his brief restoration of 1814, he had granted to France a charter which promised at least a more liberal form of government than Napoleon had permitted to exist. This charter took for granted the maintenance of most of the social and political reforms of the Revolution. Thus all classes of Frenchmen were to be regarded as equal before the law, and equally eligible for all public offices. The

freedom of the press and personal and religious liberty were guaranteed, and the apportioning of taxation was to be regulated by the ability of each citizen to pay. The legislative body was to be composed of two houses, one consisting of deputies elected by all who paid more than 300 francs a year in direct taxes, and the other of peers nominated by the king.

So far the progress made was to be maintained. On the other hand, it was expressly stated that the grant of the charter was an act of grace on the part of the king, and by no means a condition which the people had the right to impose upon him as a preliminary to his election. Moreover, though the parliament could discuss and reject measures proposed to them, the king retained the right to initiate all laws, to issue ordinances upon his own authority, and to choose whom he pleased as his ministers.

French Parties; the Ultra-Royalists.—After his second restoration in 1815 the task that lay before Louis XVIII was one of extreme difficulty. One result of the Revolution was that all Frenchmen took a quicker interest in all public issues; and upon such questions as the amount of power that should be left in the hands of the king and the extension to the poorer classes of the right to vote, there was room for considerable difference of opinion. On the one side stood a small but influential group of ultra-royalists, composed largely of nobles and clergy who had fled the country during the Revolution, and who now returned, with vengeance and bitterness in their hearts, to find themselves strangers in a country whose institutions had been completely transformed. They did not propose wholly to undo the work of the last twenty-five years, but at the same time their intention was to use the new system for regaining their former dignity and influence. Their immediate aims were the increase in the royal power, the restriction of the press; and the recovery of the estates of which they had been deprived during their exile. Their hopes of future success lay partly in the fact that their

leader was the Count of Artois, brother of the king, and heir to the throne.

The Bonapartists.—On the other side were two groups of deadly opponents of the restored monarchy. The Bonapartists, remembering the glories of the past, longed for the restoration of their fallen leader, and bitterly contrasted the humble position occupied by France in Europe with the destiny that had so recently seemed to await it. In numbers they were few, and after Napoleon's death in 1821 their whole attitude and policy seemed futile; but their existence must not be forgotten. As years went on, and time blurred the harsh features of the Napoleonic era, its sufferings and disasters, the Bonapartists became once more a force to be reckoned with, for the glories of their idol only shone more splendid through the mists.

The Republicans.—No less irreconcilable were the republicans, who desired a return to the constitution of 1792. To them, the charter seemed to stop far short of what was indispensable to liberty. The king must at least be shorn of all his power, and the right to vote extended to the poor. The French people must be free to choose its rulers and its form of government, whereas Louis XVIII had been forced upon them by the allies. Like the Bonapartists, this group was small and at first un-influential, but as time went on its power and numbers grew.

The Moderate Royalists.—In the midst stood the supporters of the new constitution. They consisted, generally speaking, of the middle classes, the manufacturers, the investors, and the merchants—of all, in fact, to whom peace, order and settled government seemed of primary importance. Though loyal to the crown and unwilling to weaken the royal authority, they knew that the old régime could never be restored. Some, perhaps, were liberal enough to favour an increase in the number of parliamentary voters and some restriction of the king's

right to choose his ministers, but even to them the charter and the Bourbon monarchy seemed the essential foundations of the prosperity and happiness of the nation.

Charles X.—During the nine years that Louis XVIII lived, the more hot-headed royalists gradually gained strength, and managed to secure control over the two parliamentary chambers. Until 1824 the king's restraining influence kept them in check, but when he was succeeded by his brother the Count of Artois, who took the title of Charles X, the forces of reaction for the moment triumphed. The new king, a man altogether lacking in judgment or foresight, was frankly the foe of constitutional government. "I would rather chop wood," he declared, "than be a king after the English model." The crown, the nobles and the clergy were now to be restored to their ancient rights. Those whose possessions had been confiscated during the Revolution were to be compensated at the general expense, newspapers were once more subjected to rigid supervision, and stringent laws were passed prohibiting attacks upon the Catholic Church. As though to emphasise his policy, the king's coronation at Rheims was conducted with all the ancient ritual and ceremony. As was natural, these measures aroused strong discontent, but though the opposition was victorious at the elections of 1827 and 1830, Charles and his ministers refused to be warned, and the chambers, after short sessions, were prorogued or dismissed. Meanwhile an attempt had been made to win popularity by adopting a vigorous foreign policy. A military expedition was sent to the piratical stronghold of Algiers to chastise the Dey of that country for his refusal to give satisfaction for the injuries inflicted by his subjects. A landing was effected, and the city that had long been a terror to European commerce fell into French hands—to become later the nucleus of the French North African possessions.

The July Revolution.—The tidings of this success encouraged the king to think that the way was now clear

for an open display of absolutism. On July 25, 1830, he issued on his own authority a series of ordinances which practically destroyed the last vestiges of constitutional government. The existing chambers were dissolved, the right to vote was restricted to those who paid land tax, and the publication was forbidden of all newspapers that were not authorised by the government. The result was immediate. The suppressed journalists appealed to the workmen and students of Paris. Under republican leaders, amongst whom was the veteran revolutionary Lafayette, the mob mastered such troops as were brought against them. By the evening of July 29, after two days of desperate fighting behind barricades in the narrow streets, they had occupied the Louvre and the Tuileries, and had set up a provisional republican government. The king, who was at his country residence of St. Cloud, and who had seen in the insurrection a mere riot that the troops could easily suppress, recognised too late the seriousness of the situation. He offered to submit, but meanwhile such of the members of the dissolved parliament as were in Paris had hastily resolved to take a line of their own. They had as little sympathy with the republican mob as with the absolutist party, and knowing, besides, that the establishment of a republic would inevitably mean the armed intervention of Europe, they had offered the crown to Louis Philippe, Duke of Orleans, the representative of a younger branch of the House of Bourbon. Charles X, realising that his position was hopeless, now abdicated, and retired with his family to England.

The provisional government had still to be reckoned with, for the republicans of Paris had not begun the outbreak to make Louis Philippe king. They were taken by surprise, however, and knew that they could count on little support outside the capital. Thus, when Louis Philippe, accompanied by his supporters, and wearing the national tricolour in place of the white cockade of the Bourbon monarchy, made his appearance at the Hotel

de Ville, Lafayette grudgingly came to terms. The two men then went on a balcony and publicly announced their agreement by embracing one another in the presence of the crowd.

Louis Philippe.—The “July Revolution” put an end to the attempt to re-establish Bourbon absolutism in France. Louis Philippe, a son of the Duke of Orleans who had played a prominent part in the Great Revolution, had fought bravely in the revolutionary army in 1792, and though he had been reconciled with Louis XVIII, he had taken no pains since 1815 to conceal his liberal opinions. He was a quiet and cautious man, genial and unassuming in manner, and though lacking in resolution and leadership he was well suited to play the part of a popular constitutional king in times of peace. As a Bourbon prince he was acceptable both to the moderate French royalists and to the anxious diplomatists of Europe. As a man who had always identified himself with the people’s cause, he satisfied all liberals except the out-and-out republicans, who were still unorganised, and few in numbers outside Paris. Thus when he was declared by parliament to be “King of the French,” France and Europe gladly accepted his accession as a guarantee of peace and liberty.

Revision of the Charter.—A revolution so conservative, which merely replaced one king by another professing more liberal views, needed little constitution-making. The ordinances of Charles X were, of course, swept away. It was now understood that the Charter of 1814 had been accepted by the king as a summary of the national will and as a condition of his election, instead of being granted as a royal favour. The newspapers were once more freed from supervision, and the king’s power to issue ordinances was limited to such cases as did not involve suspension of the ordinary law. The responsibility of the king’s ministers to parliament was expressly claimed, and the right to

vote was extended to those who paid 200 francs in direct taxation. All this, of course, was progress, but it hardly implied democracy. The power in the state had passed finally from the nobility and landed gentry to the middle-class manufacturers and merchants. The majority of Frenchmen were still excluded from political life, for even now less than a quarter of a million of the whole population were thought fit to use a vote, and with a government of this sort the men who cherished the memory of 1793 were scarcely likely to be satisfied for long.

Middle-Class Domination.—The reign of Louis Philippe, therefore, proved no age of internal peace. Placed on the throne by the middle class, he proved an amiable bourgeois sovereign, living almost as a private citizen, sending his sons to ordinary schools and walking almost unattended in the streets. But though he thus avoided throwing down a challenge to the republicans, it soon became clear that his liberalism was more apparent than real, and that the despotism of the wealthy middle class was a burden scarcely less hard to bear than absolute monarchy.

Socialism.—With democratic aspirations, in France or elsewhere, such a government had little sympathy, and it suffered in popularity by failing to prevent the re-establishment of absolutism in Italy and Poland between 1831 and 1834. Nor was its cautious intervention in Belgium (see page 64) likely to win it much support. It also energetically repressed popular insurrections which from time to time the republicans, remembering the ease with which they had overturned the throne in 1830, attempted to organise in Paris, Lyons, and elsewhere. Driven into conspiracy by persecution, the republicans everywhere formed themselves into secret revolutionary societies, in imitation of the Italian Carbonari, and managed to propagate their doctrines far and wide. The soil, meanwhile, had been prepared for the seed. The growth of commerce and manufactures since 1815 had

promoted, as in England, the development of large industrial cities, such as Lyons, Toulouse and Marseilles, where lived an ever-growing class of wage-earning artisans. The squalid and miserable surroundings amongst which many of these lived, intensified from time to time by periods of unemployment or low wages, when it was impossible to secure even a bare living, aroused among them a passionate conviction that they had a right to live under conditions less intolerable. The growing wealth of their employers, the direct result, as it seemed to them, of the labour of the poor, awoke the demand that the workers should enjoy a proportionate share of what their toil had helped to win. The whole conditions of life and the relation between employers and employed seemed to require complete re-organisation. To men who held these doctrines, no change from empire to monarchy, no making of constitutions, no amount of mere political liberty, no extension of the right to vote, seemed sufficient; for all these, though excellent in themselves, left the great problem of poverty still untouched. Their proposals for reform, involving the rebuilding of the whole framework of human society, were many, and were often indefinite and unpractical; but underlying most of them was the claim that all property, or at least all great business undertakings such as mines and factories, should be transferred to the State, and should be so administered by the government as to assure everyone employment at a fair wage. By this means, both the accumulation of fortunes by private employers and the spread of hopeless poverty among the masses would be prevented. It was this demand, rather than any visionary scheme for establishing actual equality, which henceforth began to make itself felt in every industrial community in France as well as in England under the title of "State Socialism"; and in estimating popular aspirations we shall have henceforth to reckon with the steady progress made in many parts of Europe by the "socialist" party.

The Napoleonic Cult.—Parallel with this new offshoot of republicanism was another development, at the time even more threatening. The return of wealth and some measure of general prosperity to France caused many to think that the time had come for her to abandon the humble position which she had adopted in Europe since 1815 and to resume her proper rank among the Powers. The further back into the past the figure of Napoleon receded, the more imposingly heroic were the dimensions that it assumed. Writers and poets appeared, who by audacious misrepresentations of history, based upon their hero's own memoirs, written at St. Helena, taught the nation to look back upon the first decade of the century as an age of glory, and to regard Napoleon as a benevolent sovereign who hoped and laboured only for his people's good. In 1840, with the full consent of the government, the remains of the national hero were brought back to France and solemnly interred under the dome of Les Invalides in Paris. Under such influences, there grew a demand that a vigorous and warlike national policy should replace the cautious attitude always adopted by Louis Philippe's government in its foreign dealings. Moreover, in 1830 Louis Philippe had seemed to stand between France and the violent interference of Europe in her internal affairs, but every year that passed made such intervention less possible, and to the same degree made the Bourbon government less essential to her welfare. Thus it was natural that all who wished France to reassert herself should dream of a revival of the Empire, and that the Bonapartist party should gain adherents.

Louis Napoleon.—Nor was the heir to the Napoleonic dynasty altogether unworthy of the cause. Louis Napoleon Bonaparte was the son of Louis Bonaparte, ex-King of Holland, the second of the great Napoleon's brothers. There was little in the outward man by which his future could be predicted. His dull eyes and expressionless countenance, together with his natural taciturnity, passed

in early life as evidence of stupidity, and at a later period were taken, equally erroneously, to be the mask of a consummate dissembler. Behind his unattractive exterior, however, lay a passionate craving for distinction and a faculty for dreaming that led him firmly to believe that his mission was that of working out the imperial destiny of his family. Exiled with all his kin since 1815, he had wandered aimlessly abroad, awaiting his chance and making his uncle's ideas and deeds the subject of his daily study, until at last he felt himself under the spell of what his imagination had created. After the death of Napoleon's only son in 1832, he publicly advanced his claim to the imperial crown, and four years later, at Strassburg, he attempted to provoke a rising of the garrison which should place him on the throne of France. The movement succeeded in alarming the government for a day or two, but after that it made no headway. Though he appeared in the uniform that his uncle had made familiar and was followed by a group of confederates to play the part of a staff, the would-be emperor was quickly arrested, and since no one yet seemed inclined to take his pretensions seriously, he was packed off to America in a French war-ship. In 1840, after publishing a book that he had written during his exile entitled "Napoleonic Ideas," he repeated the experiment at Boulogne, this time accompanied by a tame eagle as an imperial emblem, but with the same result. He was now placed in easy confinement in the castle of Ham, whence he escaped in 1846 in the disguise of a workman. Two such ignominious episodes might have been expected to ruin his cause for ever, but his book, which held up the Napoleon of his own imagination as the champion of the principles of the Revolution and the guardian of popular liberty, was widely read in France and saved his pretensions from being altogether extinguished in a flood of ridicule.

The Approach of Revolution.—Between 1830 and 1848, while these two popular movements, Bonapartism and

socialist democracy, were steadily gaining in strength, the political power lay really in the hands of statesmen who resisted all legislation for the benefit of the working class and all changes in the constitution which would endanger the middle-class domination. After 1840, as the agitation for reform gained ground, the government became constantly more and more reactionary, and was obliged to have resort to a regular system of corruption in order to maintain a majority in parliament. Besides money payments, commercial privileges and offices of all sorts were bartered as the price of votes. To stifle protests wholesale arrests and the prosecution of journalists became once more the order of the day. In France, such a policy could have only one end. Not even the successes in Algeria, the conquest of which was the one solid achievement of Louis Philippe's reign, could divert attention from the crying needs at home. The elections of 1846 sent up as usual a parliament of servile place-hunters, whose solid support confirmed the king and his ministers in their determination to resist reform. By 1848 Paris was ripe for revolt.

CHAPTER V

HOLLAND AND BELGIUM

- 1815. William I.
- 1830. The Belgian Revolution.
- 1831. Intervention of the Powers.
- 1839. Treaty of London.
- 1840. Abdication of William I.

Union of the Netherlands.—In 1579 the northern provinces of the Netherlands proclaimed their independence of Spain and formed themselves into the state which we know by the name of Holland, under the rule of the House of Orange. After that date the Belgian, or southern, provinces were for more than two centuries under separate government. At first a possession of Spain, and, after the Treaty of Utrecht, of Austria, their history and the influences to which they were subjected drew a sharp line of distinction between the Belgians and their northern kinsmen. The free and independence-loving merchants and seamen of Holland had few interests in common with the farming, manufacturing and mining population of the south. The ties of nationality were not very strong, for though the bulk of the population of the western or Flemish districts of Belgium were closely connected with the Dutch in language and blood, the Walloons of the eastern provinces were of different descent, and their language was akin to French. The complete subjugation of the Belgians by Spain had left them devotedly catholic, while Holland had long been a centre of the extremest type of Protestantism. In the south their long contact with France had profoundly modified the manners and

culture of the upper and commercial classes, amongst whom no language but French was spoken. Moreover, the Dutch, looking back upon their long independence and the glories of the struggles by which they had maintained it, were apt to regard with contempt a people who could boast no history of their own and who for centuries had endured the rule of foreigners; and this attitude was naturally resented by the Belgians, who outnumbered the Dutch by more than three to two, and were at least their equals in wealth.

It was not to be expected, therefore, that the Belgians would welcome the incorporation of the two countries decreed by the Congress of Vienna. It is true that during the Hundred Days they had rallied round King William of Holland in the final struggle with Napoleon and had fought side by side with the Dutch at Waterloo. The Belgian city of Antwerp would undoubtedly profit if the union of the two countries were to result in the abolition of the restrictions which the Dutch had imposed upon the navigation of the Scheldt, but beyond this no class in Belgium stood to gain by the arrangement.

Discontent in Belgium.—The settlement of the details of the union during the first ten years did nothing to decrease the discontent that prevailed, for every dispute that arose was decided in favour of the Dutch. Holland already enjoyed a parliamentary constitution on the model of that which had been given to France in 1814. It was now arranged that a joint assembly should sit to represent the whole of the new state, but that the representation of the two countries should be equal, in spite of the larger population of Belgium. This meant that in all disputed questions the Dutch would have the upper hand, for among the Belgian representatives there were bound to be a few officials dependent upon the royal favour for their salaries, and the king was likely to exert his influence on behalf of his own people. Thus The Hague was definitely adopted as the seat of the joint government. The more important

administrative, legal and military posts were filled almost exclusively by Dutchmen. The use of French was vetoed upon all official occasions in favour of "the national language." Holland was burdened by a heavy national debt, while that of Belgium was small. Yet Belgium, as well as Holland, was subjected to the heavy taxes upon food which were required to pay the interest, and the prospect of increased trade with Holland was hardly an adequate compensation. Above all, the Dutch made attempts to interfere with the position of the Catholic Church, insisting, for example, that all candidates for the priesthood must pass through a secular university course. Meanwhile, advantage was taken of a decree issued as a temporary measure during the Hundred Days, and not since withdrawn, to silence the protests of the press by imprisoning the editors and depriving them of their rights as citizens.

As a result, the fusion of the two nations became each year further removed from realisation. By 1828 the Belgian representatives in parliament had organised themselves into a firm opposition party, pledged to thwart and obstruct the Dutch government in every possible way. A stream of monster petitions flowed to The Hague, demanding the consideration of grievances, but the king, whose authority was really unlimited, refused to listen, referring in public to the "pretended grievances" of the Belgians and the "infamous conduct" of the agitators.

The Belgian Revolution.—Such was the condition of affairs when the news arrived of the July Revolution in Paris, exciting the greatest enthusiasm. A great industrial exhibition was being held at Brussels, and amongst the proceedings with which it was to close was a performance of an opera, the plot of which made a direct appeal to popular and revolutionary passions. The audience were roused to a frenzied state of patriotic fervour. The infection spread from the theatre to the streets, and there ensued a formidable riot, with which the troops, irresolutely handled, were unable to cope. Before many days had

elapsed the mob obtained complete control of the capital, and their leaders proceeded to formulate a definite policy, demanding the separation of the government of the Dutch and Belgian provinces, with a personal union under the same crown, as was the case with Norway and Sweden. King William, still determined not to give way to what he considered a disorderly faction, ordered his second son to occupy Brussels with troops and to suppress the rising by force. After five days' desperate fighting, the ten thousand men at his disposal proving inadequate, he was forced to retire upon Antwerp. This attempt at force altered the whole situation, for the national spirit of the Belgians was everywhere thoroughly awakened. They would now hear of nothing short of complete separation. By the middle of October, except for the citadel of Antwerp, the whole country had been cleared of Dutch troops, and a provisional government which had been set up at Brussels declared Belgium independent.


Conference of London.—Meanwhile a conference of the Powers had met in London to discuss the situation. In view of the fact that Belgium had been placed under Dutch rule for the purpose of guarding against French aggression, King William appealed to Europe for assistance in restoring order. At the moment, Russia and Prussia were too busy with Poland, and Austria with Italy, to think of carrying out their favourite policy of intervening to prevent revolution. England, following Canning's policy of championing the cause of small nations, declared in favour of Belgian independence, and as for France, Louis Philippe's government, itself founded upon revolution, could scarcely intervene on the other side. Indeed, there was a loud call for France to seize the opportunity, and to enter the field as the ally of the Belgians. Such action, however, would have alienated the sympathy of England, whose policy, then as always, was to keep the Netherlands free from the interference of any of the greater Powers. Eventually the conference decided in

favour of Belgian independence under a king to be chosen by the Belgians themselves, subject to the approval of the Powers. The new crown was first offered to Louis Philippe's son, but it was obvious that such an arrangement would not be acceptable to England, and in the interests of peace the offer was refused. Finally the Belgians elected Prince Leopold of Coburg, a German prince closely connected with the English royal house. The conference fixed the boundaries of the new state as they now stand, but left the greater part of Luxemburg, which still formed part of the German Confederation, in the hands of King William. Holland also retained both banks of the estuary of the Scheldt, and was thus able to maintain the restrictions which hindered Antwerp from competing commercially with Rotterdam, and prevented its development as a naval base.

French Intervention. Treaty of London.—The Dutch were by no means content with the decision of the conference, and determined forthwith to attempt the recovery of Belgium by force. In August, 1831, their army, ably led by King William's eldest son, routed the Belgian forces near Louvain, and by threatening Brussels seemed likely to strangle the new kingdom at its birth. The decision of the Powers, however, was not thus to be flouted. The British fleet threatened the Dutch coast, while a French army entered Belgium from the south. The diplomatists now took up their task once more, but King William could not be persuaded to relinquish Belgium altogether until the French had advanced to Antwerp and had compelled its Dutch garrison to surrender. There followed a series of wearisome negotiations between the various Powers whose interests were affected. At last, in 1839, a treaty was signed in London by which that part of the Vienna settlement which concerned the Netherlands was definitely abandoned. Belgium was declared an independent and permanently neutral state, under the guarantee of the five great Powers, including Prussia.

the collapse of Germany before Napoleon, there had been a deep-seated desire among the Germans for something more than a vague alliance. Nowhere in Europe had the struggle for liberation aroused a more strongly national spirit, and though in the larger states the sense of kinship was tempered by the more local patriotism of Prussians or Bavarians, yet there were many who desired to be protected by a powerful government to which the whole nation should pay obedience; for only thus could the German people take a position among the states of Europe in keeping with their numbers. The difficulty was that of finding some form of union which would leave the individual states in free possession of their sovereign rights.

The Regeneration of Prussia.—Among these states there was one whose recent growth seemed to open the way for it to replace Austria as the predominant power in Germany. Under Frederick the Great, Prussia had played the part of a great Power. Its army had everywhere been respected as the finest in Europe, and though, like all the others, it had collapsed before Napoleon, the remarkable series of reforms carried out between 1806 and 1812 had re-established its prosperity and strength. This regeneration had largely been the work of two ministers named Stein and Hardenberg. They had realised that in order to resist Napoleon all classes in Prussia must unite. They had done something to abolish the barriers that had kept nobles, citizens and peasants apart, by freeing the agricultural class from the condition of serfdom in which it had hitherto lived. In the interests of national unity and efficiency the government was reconstructed from bottom to top. The whole country was divided into regular administrative districts under the control of trained officials responsible to the central government at Berlin. In place of ministers over separate departments of government working in isolation, a cabinet was established in which the heads of departments met and deliberated in common.



THE GERMAN CONFEDERATION IN 1815.

Much was done to improve the national system of education, and to provide schools and universities for rich and poor, and there was established a League of Virtue, a society for the cultivation of patriotism, morality and public spirit.

The Reform of the Military System.—Side by side with these reforms, which were Napoleonic in their thoroughness, and of which it is not too much to say that they were the foundation of all future Prussian progress, was the reorganisation of the military system under a scientific soldier named Scharnhorst. To meet the country's immediate needs were developed the principles which lie at the base of all modern army organisation—the principles of universal service and of a short period of training during peace. Napoleon permitted Prussia to maintain an army of no more than 42,000 men, but this force was so arranged that by constantly passing fresh recruits through it, and by constantly allowing those who had had some training to retire, a numerous reserve could be built up which could be recalled to the colours whenever occasion arose. The obligation to serve applied to all classes, and, in the enthusiasm which the War of Liberation inspired, the army, being no less than the nation in arms, became a school not only of discipline, but also of the spirit of patriotic and self-sacrificing devotion which to our own day has been a distinguishing Prussian characteristic. It is perhaps worth while to note that this system has since been imitated in its essentials by almost every civilised state, and that the burden of armaments, under which in recent times the nations have groaned, can thus be traced directly back to Napoleon's fruitless attempt to limit the numbers of the Prussian army.


After 1815, the exchange of some of her recently acquired Polish territory for purely German possessions in Saxony and on the Rhine, besides increasing her population and wealth, made her an almost exclusively German power, and strengthened her natural claim

to be the guardian of Germany against Russia and France.

Distrust of Prussia.—At the same time, the growing power of Prussia had long since provoked jealousy and fear elsewhere in Germany. Its government, though wise and fatherly, was nevertheless despotic, and though there was some talk in 1815 of providing it with some form of parliamentary government, the events of 1819 (see page 35) postponed all progress in that direction for thirty years. Nor was there in Prussia any general demand for constitutional government. Prussians, as a whole, had come to regard the liberty of individuals as an altogether secondary matter compared with the strength and efficiency of the whole. They preferred good government to self-government, and looked with confidence to their sovereign and his advisers to give them what was good for them. On the other hand, in the South German states, such as Würtemberg and Bavaria, liberal principles had made some progress, and any steps that seemed likely to bring them under the domination of the upstart military despotism of Prussia were bound to be watched with suspicion.

The Austrian Empire.—The Austro-Hungarian empire, meanwhile, was steadily becoming less fit to resume the task resigned in 1805, for while Prussia was laying foundations for future progress, Austria's energies were confined to maintaining her past acquisitions. For centuries it had included many peoples differing radically in blood, language and tradition, and the addition of Galicia and Venetia had only made the chaos worse. West of Vienna, towards Bavaria and Switzerland, that is to say, in Austria proper, the inhabitants were almost exclusively of German blood. To the north, in Bohemia and Moravia, were the Czechs, mingled with a considerable German population, and further east, in Galicia, Poles and Ruthenians. In the central plains, on each side of the Danube, lived the Magyars or Hungarians, and beyond them, in Transylvania,

Roumans. South of the Drave from the Adriatic to Belgrade the inhabitants were Croats and Serbs, both, like the Czechs and Poles, of Slavonic origin, while beyond the Alps, from Trieste westwards they were Italians. To compel these peoples, each with its own national aspirations and dreams of independence, to dwell peacefully side by side and to co-operate for common ends, was the task of the dominant race, the Germans of Austria. In the eyes of every Austro-German statesman, therefore, progress along national lines meant separation and ruin. The only way to retain a hold upon the discordant elements was to turn Serbs against Hungarians, Germans against Czechs, and all against Italians. Nor did the difficulty arise only from the welter of nationalities. The system of government was different in every district. In Austria itself it was purely despotic. The making of laws, the levying of taxes and the spending of revenues were uncontrolled by the people. Newspapers, books, teachers and theatres were all under police supervision to prevent the spread of liberal ideas. The administration was in the hands of Viennese officials, often corrupt and inefficient. Elsewhere, however, purely feudal government often survived, in which local magnates and landowners were all-powerful and ruled as they pleased. Hungary was constitutionally a separate kingdom, united to Austria only by the fact that the same sovereign ruled over both, and here the government was largely under the control of the Magyar nobility, who enjoyed a considerable degree of independence. A sort of parliament met from time to time at Pressburg, which was the focus of efforts at separation and reform. Thus to secure joint action in any cause or to mobilise the full resources of the whole empire even in emergency was utterly impossible. In such a state the coming of revolution, or indeed of any change, seemed to threaten the existence of the whole, and the policy of its statesmen aimed at no more than the preservation of the existing conditions. It was Metternich



THE AUSTRIAN EMPIRE AND ITS RACES, 1815.

himself, who said, "I have to give my life to propping up a mouldering edifice."

The German Confederation.—It was therefore impossible for Austria, no longer a predominantly German state, to think of playing openly the part of a leader in German affairs, for her possessions as a whole could never be included in any real German union. At the same time, since she inherited from the preceding century a traditional jealousy of Prussia, she was loath to resign all interest in Germany, and thus allow her rival to step into her place. She felt that she might still be leader in a very loose union in which all the members should remain practically their own masters. Thus, when the future of the German states came up for discussion at the Congress of Vienna, and Prussia proposed the creation of a strong central government under the dual management of the two great Teutonic Powers for the purpose of controlling the individual states in all matters of general concern, such as defence and foreign relations, Austria strenuously opposed it. Bavaria, Würtemberg and Baden concurred in the objection, for they feared that to be put under the control of Prussia would mean the loss of their rights as independent states. Even the suggestion that their several armies should be so organised as to be capable of acting together was vetoed, and the appointment of a joint commander-in-chief was considered as a question to be decided only after war had broken out. In consequence, all idea of a strong Germany had for the time to be sacrificed to more local ideas of patriotism. Instead, a constitution was adopted of the loosest kind, which thwarted all the aspirations of the larger patriots and left all burning questions in suspense. This was known as the German Confederation. Its objects were mutual protection against foreign aggression and the maintenance of internal peace, but as neither Austria nor Prussia was to bring its non-German possessions into the union, the Confederation was to have no concern with the defence of Poland, Hungary or Galicia. The organ of the

union was to be a permanent Diet, or assembly of ambassadors from each of the states, at Frankfurt, under the presidency of an Austrian. When the diet met to discuss important matters it was to be composed of sixty-nine members, some states sending four representatives each, some two, and others one. Each state was pledged to make no alliance with foreign powers against the others, and undertook to grant some form of representative government to its own people. All other questions were left for the diet itself to determine.

Its Weakness.—This loose confederation, which amounted to nothing more than a permanent congress of ambassadors, was a poor substitute for the German unity that had been dreamed of. Even in the discussion of purely German affairs the diet was subject to powerful outside influences. Not only had Austria and Prussia considerable non-Germanic interests, but England, Denmark and Holland were represented as well, for the sovereigns of those countries were also rulers respectively of Hanover, Holstein and Luxemburg, all states within the confederation. The result was seen as soon as the diet began to consider the question of representative government.

The Movement towards Political Reform.—By 1818 several of the South German states had declared in favour of constitutional reform, and parliamentary institutions had been established. In other parts of Germany university students and others were fervently discussing liberal ideas and publishing pamphlets directed against military and autocratic government. Even in Prussia the subject had been mooted, and vague promises given. In 1819, however, when a German writer named Kotzebue, who was known to be opposed to liberal ideas, was murdered by a student of the university of Jena, the centre of the movement, panic seized the governments of nearly every state in the confederation. Metternich's fears had already been excited by a movement in favour of the very principles

which he dreaded, and he was not slow to take advantage of the revulsion of feeling occasioned by the outrage. Cynically disregarding the interests of Germany, he aimed at eliminating representative government altogether from the confederation, and the fear that the murder was merely the first act of revolution brought almost all the sovereigns into agreement with him. He persuaded the King of Prussia to abandon his projected scheme for constitutional government and to join in calling a special conference of the larger German states to deal with the situation. At this conference decrees were passed putting all universities under close government supervision, enacting a strict censorship of the press, and establishing a special commission to investigate the revolutionary conspiracies which Metternich supposed to exist. These decrees were approved by the diet at Frankfurt, and, in spite of some protest, Germany as a whole was brought to acquiesce in Metternich's claim to interfere. Moreover, at a subsequent conference at Vienna in 1820 it was decided that, although the constitutional governments already established in Würtemberg and Bavaria were not to be interfered with, no similar institutions were to be erected in any other state without the consent of the rest. By this means the further progress of reform, although provided for at the original creation of the union, was checked, like that of real unity, for a generation.

The Zollverein.—During the next twenty years, however, a movement of supreme importance to the German cause gained ground. This was the gradual formation of a Customs Union, or Zollverein, which permitted the transference of goods from one state to another inside the confederation without the payment of duties at each boundary. Initiated in the north by Prussia, for the purpose of securing free transit from one portion of her dominions to another, the system was so obviously advantageous to all concerned that it was imitated by the South German states, led by Bavaria and Würtemberg.

Soon a third union grew up in the centre under Saxon influence, and gradually all three coalesced under Prussian management to form one league, including eventually all the more important states excepting Austria. Heavy protective duties were levied upon foreign imports at the frontiers of the union and the income was distributed amongst the states in proportion to their population. Austria was naturally unable to enter the league, for by doing so she would have cut herself off from free intercourse with her non-German possessions. Being thus commercially excluded from Germany, Austrians were more than ever forced to separate themselves from their fellow-Teutons in other respects and to look to the Balkans and the Mediterranean for their future expansion. The formation of the Zollverein was therefore significant both as a triumph of Prussia over her rival and as an indication of what was to come. Germany now found herself for the first time in a commercial position to compete equally with other nations, and it was a circumstance full of promise for the future that, in spite of the looseness of their political union, the states had shown themselves able, for one practical object at least, to form an effective combination.

Except for the formation of the Zollverein, there were few developments of importance in Germany between 1820 and 1840. In most of the states the administration of government was reasonably efficient, and in the absence of real oppression or actual misgovernment the demand for reform gained ground but slowly. The news of the July Revolution in Paris revived the unrest for a time, but the agitation was of a milder character in Germany than elsewhere, and found expression for the most part in noisy public meetings, which had little result beyond calling down further restrictions upon the right of free speech and upon the press.

Frederick William IV.—The accession of Frederick William IV of Prussia in 1840, however, inaugurated a new epoch. His father, one of the heroes of the War

of Liberation against Napoleon, had been a steady opponent of liberalism, but in his later years he had been regarded with a loyalty and veneration which in themselves had been enough to keep in check the agitation for reform in North Germany. The new king, on the other hand, a man of culture and imagination, had enough sympathy with the movement to feel drawn by many of its demands. A policy of repression and persecution seemed to him detestable. Some form of representative government, with a parliament to advise and support the crown, he would have gladly admitted. His conception of the kingly office, however, was radically undemocratic. He regarded it as a divinely consecrated and patriarchal monarchy. It was his sacred duty to serve his people, but to the people it belonged loyally to receive the benefits which the ruler toiled to bestow upon them. Criticism, opposition, or popular control were therefore out of place, for every man and every institution had an appointed function under himself. Speaking of written constitutions he said: "I will never suffer a sheet of paper to come between the purposes of Almighty God and this country. The crown can and must govern according to the laws of God, and not according to the will of majorities." More than any other European sovereign of the time he stood for the doctrine of, "Everything for the people and nothing by the people." Yet his personality gave the nation the impression that he was born to play the part of a leader in an age of expanding ideas and popular movements, and his vaguely liberal sympathies had the effect of stirring into life the very principles to which he was opposed. Thus the first eight years of his reign were marked by a growing demand in Prussia, reflected elsewhere in Germany, for political freedom, coupled, as always, with the longing for a powerful and united Germany.

CHAPTER VII

ITALY, 1815-1848

1820. Insurrection in Naples and Piedmont.

1831. Accession of Charles Albert of Sardinia.

(See Map on page 141).

Napoleon in Italy.—No people in Europe had better reason to welcome the conquests of Napoleon than the Italians. Before 1796, Italy had been, as Metternich expressed it, no more than a “geographical expression,” separated politically into a number of petty states, ill-governed, and subject always to local tyranny and foreign interference. The conqueror had at first promised the Italians, in the name of the French Republic, political equality and orderly administration instead of oppression and chaos, public improvements instead of stagnation, and unity instead of separation. By 1815, though they had learnt to loathe Napoleon as a selfish tyrant, they had come to know and appreciate efficient government, and a national demand for unity and liberty had been awakened which no effort could afterwards extinguish. The interests of Austria, however, demanded that Italy should remain in practical subjection, and the Congress of Vienna could find no solution but to hurl it back into the chaos of the past.

Lombardy and Venetia.—The rich agricultural plain of Lombardy and Venetia, then as now the most thriving district in the country, remained under the direct rule of Austria. Here the government, conducted by German-speaking officials, though one of unqualified absolutism,

was reasonably efficient. Education was encouraged, justice was well administered except in political cases, and newspapers were free from interference so long as they did not attack the Austrian rule. On the other hand, no effort was spared to "Germanise" the people. Besides paying taxes altogether out of proportion to their resources, they were forced to live under Austrian law, to buy Austrian manufactures, and to learn Austrian history from Austrian professors and schoolmasters. Innumerable secret police kept careful watch on every department of life, and a few thoughtless words spoken in private against Austria were enough to bring the offender to a trial which was a mockery of justice and which might end in lifelong imprisonment.

The Duchies.—Not content with Lombardy and Venetia, the Austrians claimed to act as the protectors of the Italian princes elsewhere against popular revolutions or anything else that might disturb these puppets on their thrones. In return for such protection many of the princes once more became in effect the vassals of the Austrian Emperor, and the influence thus obtained was steadily directed against any movement that might tend towards the unity or reformation of the country. Thus Modena, Parma and Tuscany, all three ruled by sovereigns of Austrian blood, before long became practically Austrian protectorates, and their governments, though less oppressive than that of the districts under direct Austrian rule, were also less efficient.

The Kingdom of Naples and the Papal States.—In the Kingdom of Naples matters were worse. Under its French kings, Joseph Bonaparte and Murat, it had undergone a sweeping reformation, including the introduction of a regular system of local government and of education, but as soon as Murat was replaced by the older Neapolitan dynasty, mismanagement, corruption and disorder reigned supreme. In the country districts hordes of brigands

roamed unchecked and even paid the government to protect them. In the towns all property was at the mercy of the idle starving mob. The rulers knew no other rule of conduct than their own will, and though the laws and institutions of the French régime remained nominally intact they were openly ignored or neglected by ministers, judges and police alike. Sicily, united to Naples under the same crown but in all else separate, had been granted constitutional self-government in 1812. This was now withdrawn, and the fiery, half-savage people of the island bitterly resented the loss of their rights. Nor were the Papal States in much better plight. The administration of justice was everywhere corrupt. Agriculture, trade and roads were totally neglected. Order was maintained by the Inquisition and the use of torture, but all freedom of speech and independence of thought were rigorously proscribed. Yet behind these two governments also, stood Austria, ready for the sake of peace in her own provinces to guarantee by the strength of her arms all the evils that existed elsewhere, and foredooming every revolt to failure. What wonder that this selfish policy stirred deep in the hearts of the Italian people a fanatical passion for independence and reform!

The Kingdom of Sardinia.—To the rest of Italy some sort of contrast was provided by the Kingdom of Sardinia, which, besides the poor and backward island from which it took its title, included the fertile province of Piedmont and the mountain district of Savoy. On his restoration in 1814, Victor Emmanuel was received in Turin with sincere and general enthusiasm, and though the popular joy was short-lived, though the hard-won reforms of the last fifteen years were set aside and class privileges and absolutism restored, yet here alone could be detected some promise of healthy national life. Its royal house had provided a series of hard-working and often able rulers. The geographical position of Piedmont as the natural guardian of the mountain barrier against the

French, and the sense of the danger and responsibility thus involved, had developed in the official classes a respect for honest administration, in the nobles a sense of public duty, and in the people an instinct for obedience unknown elsewhere in the peninsula. In Piedmont alone of all the states under native rule was to be found some measure of national efficiency, and though the incorporation of the ancient republic of Genoa, bitterly resented by its democratic inhabitants, was a certain source of weakness, in Piedmont there existed enough national spirit and self-confidence to resist the Austrian domination, paramount elsewhere. In the course of the century it was round this state that the Italian people were to rally in the formation of a united kingdom.

The Carbonari.—By 1820, with the forces of absolutism dominant, and every lawful way of protest closed, Italian malcontents and patriots had formed themselves everywhere into secret revolutionary societies. Of these the most important was that of the Carbonari, once a kind of trades union of charcoal-burners, but now an organisation with vague aspirations towards the liberty, unity and independence of Italy, and still vaguer ideas as to how these were to be realised. In this society were enrolled some men of high social position, numbers of the middle classes, many soldiers and even government officials. Of enthusiasm there was plenty, but of leadership at first too little. There were few who realised that in order to win their national freedom from foreign domination it was essential to organise a truly national resistance. Thus the risings that they engineered were local and spasmodic, and were repressed without serious difficulty.

Insurrection in Naples.—In July, 1820, inspired by the news of revolutionary successes in Spain, the Carbonari broke into revolt at Naples, the headquarters of the society, under Pepe, himself a Neapolitan general. They met with immediate success, for King Ferdinand of Naples was taken

by surprise. A constitutional government was established, in which Sicily was to be included; a parliament was duly elected and debates began. The Sicilians, however, immediately flew to arms at the threat to impose Neapolitan control of any sort over them. Thus the first task of the new government was to send troops to pacify the island, and it was only after fierce fighting that the rising was suppressed. Meanwhile Metternich had appealed to Russia, Prussia, France and England to unite in order to suppress "revolt and crime," and though France stood aside and England protested, Austria was encouraged by the others to intervene. Ferdinand, who had taken a solemn oath to maintain the constitution, was now provided with an Austrian army. Treacherously repudiating his obligations, he defeated the undisciplined Carbonari, dismissed the parliament, and inaugurated a series of ruthless reprisals. Thus the first Italian uprising for liberty ended in a reign of terror.

Insurrection in Piedmont.—While the Austrians were occupied with Naples, the Carbonari of North Italy thought they saw their opportunity, but here again a lack of leadership ruined the enterprise. The conspirators tried to force King Victor Emmanuel to act as national champion against the foreigner, and believed themselves sure of the support of Charles Albert, a young member of the royal house, to whom the crown would ultimately fall and whose liberal opinions were well known. A definite plan was drawn up to proclaim a constitution, to send the Piedmontese army to the assistance of the discontented subjects of Austria in Lombardy, and to expel the foreigner from Italian soil. The king was torn between his fear of Austria and his unwillingness to use force against his own subjects, and the government's decision was delayed until the rising had actually broken out, and a portion of the army had actually taken the field. Too late to prevent the outbreak, orders were given for its suppression, and Charles Albert was forbidden to take the lead. The

patriots unexpectedly found themselves in the position of insurgents, and an Austrian army, hastily brought up from Venetia, together with such Piedmontese troops as remained obedient to their government, easily defeated them.

Renewed Outbreaks.—Thus the dream of Italian liberty quickly faded, for though conspiracy was everywhere rife, the activities of the political police were successful for the moment, in preventing further outbreaks. The next ten years were a period of violence and cruel persecution all over Italy, but the fires of rebellion could never altogether be extinguished, even by the systematic use of torture or by such savagery as was shown in suppressing a rebellion in the Neapolitan kingdom in 1828, when the heads of the leaders were sent on parade from village to village in iron cages.

Charles Albert.—In 1831, the succession of Charles Albert to the throne of Piedmont lent encouragement to the patriots, for with their aspirations he had some sympathy. He yielded to no one in his hatred of the Austrians and looked forward to the time when by valorous and warlike action they should be expelled from the peninsula. On the other hand he had good reason to respect and fear their strength, and until it was safe to defy them he preferred to walk warily. Similarly, though he was by no means opposed to political reform, he had no taste for the revolutionary methods by which popular movements in that age were conducted. Thus his reign was marked by a caution which shortsighted popular clamour stigmatised as timidity.

Mazzini. "Young Italy."—At the moment of his accession revolution was again stirring, this time in the Papal States. The patriots widely entertained the false hope that the French government, which was supposed to have been organised on a democratic basis by the Revolution of July, 1830, would intervene on their behalf.

The pope called in the assistance of Austrian troops from Lombardy, and the outbreak, like all such local insurrections, was quenched in blood. By this time, however there had appeared one who saw that the might of Austria could be defied only by a nation organised and inspired by unity of purpose. From their aimless policy of conspiracy and local insurrection Italian patriots were rescued by a native of Genoa named Giuseppe Mazzini. Imprisoned in 1830 on suspicion as a carbonero, and exiled from Italy the following year, he settled first at Marseilles and later in England. By correspondence he founded and kept on foot an association known as Young Italy, which numbered many thousands of members and aimed at the regeneration of the whole nation by the education of young men in republican principles. The people must be taught to think not only of Lombardy or Naples, but of the whole of Italy as their native country. His letters and pamphlets were read throughout the country and everywhere inflamed his followers with a patriotism as fiery as his own. Nevertheless, republican as he was, he recognised that if Italy was to throw off the Austrian yoke all parties must unite under one leader, and on Charles Albert's accession he had written the new king a long letter in which he had appealed to him to champion the cause not merely of Piedmont but of Italy. "All Italy," he said, "waits for one word to make herself yours. Place yourself at the head of the nation and write on your banner: Union, Liberty and Independence. Unite us and we shall conquer." Although Charles Albert's heart was with the growing cry for independence he was not yet ready to face the Austrians, and in any case he could have little sympathy with a man whom he considered a dangerous republican. He therefore ignored the appeal.

Rival Aspirations.—Until 1848, indeed, few outward signs were visible of Mazzini's success. Further risings occurred, but all were easily put down. One of them, directed against the King of Sardinia, drove Charles

Albert, himself for a time into a policy of vigorous repression. Moreover the patriots remained divided in their aims. The motto of all was, "Italy for the Italians," but beyond this they could not agree. One party wished for an Italian republic, another, for a confederation under the presidency of the pope, and a third, for constitutional government under the King of Sardinia, for by the soundness of his administration and by the liberality with which he initiated reforms Charles Albert, alone of the Italian sovereigns, managed gradually to win the affection of his people. The practical importance of Mazzini's burning exhortations, however, lay not in any immediate action that they might provoke, but in the fact that all the while they were kindling far and wide an enthusiasm for Italy sufficient to insure the ultimate triumph of his ideals. Without his efforts the work of his successors could never have been accomplished.

CHAPTER VIII

RUSSIA AND THE NEAR EAST, 1815-1848.

1817. Liberation of Serbia.

1825. Accession of Nicholas I.

1821. The Greek rebellion.

1829. Treaty of Adrianople. The Liberation of Greece.

1831. The Polish rebellion.

The Rise of Russia.—By 1815 the claims of Russia to occupy a place among the leading European Powers—claims first heard only a century before—had reached their zenith. By the addition of Finland and the larger part of the ancient kingdom of Poland, Russia's European dominions had taken the shape that they retain to-day. Her tenacity of purpose and endurance in the struggle with Napoleon had won for her not only a reputation for vast strength but also a moral ascendancy as the liberator of Europe and the champion of freedom.

Alexander I.—Alexander I, an enthusiastic student of the doctrines of the French Revolution, was known to desire above all things to depart from the traditional absolutism of the Russian tsars and to play the part of a liberal monarch. Before 1815 he had initiated reforms intended to be the nucleus from which constitutional government was eventually to grow. It is more than doubtful whether the vast area of Russia, with its hordes of primitive and even barbarous inhabitants, Slavs and Teutons, Finns and Poles, Jews and Tartars, differing totally in customs, language and religion, provided a soil where any form of representative institutions could as yet take root. Certainly the demand for them was confined to a small band of the tsar's more enlightened subjects.

In any case, after the Congress of Vienna, Alexander, always an impressionable dreamer rather than a man of action, fell gradually under the spell of Metternich's influence. By 1820, taking alarm at the news of revolutions in Spain and Naples and at the discovery of conspiracy among his own troops, he had definitely though reluctantly abandoned his earlier ideals and joined the ranks of the reactionaries. He began to dismiss his liberal advisers, lent his encouragement to the task of suppressing revolutionary movements, and, except in Poland, set himself to stamp out the very ideas that he himself had inspired. He died suddenly in 1825, and was succeeded by his brother Nicholas.

Nicholas I.—The new tsar was a man of radically different temperament. His gigantic figure, invariably arrayed in stiff military uniform, was the very type of stern and unyielding autocracy. An honourable, high-minded man of his word, and, in a sense, an enlightened ruler, he devoted his whole life to administrative reform, to the redress of all grievances that did not question his sovereign power, and to the expansion of his vast dominions. Iron thoroughness and tireless energy, always devoted to the interests of his country as he saw them, were the characteristics of the whole thirty years of his stormy reign. From first to last he stood fast for the old traditions of Russia and for the principles of absolutism. His accession was the sign for the outbreak in Petrograd of a military revolt in favour of constitutional or even republican government. Nicholas himself rode at the head of a detachment of loyal troops to face the mutineers. "If I am to be tsar but for an hour," he said, "I will be so with dignity." His commanding presence and fearless demeanour won him the support of many. Volleys of grapeshot decimated and scattered the remainder. The victory was followed up by a relentless prosecution of the movers of the conspiracy. Their trials were held in secret, and evidence was procured where necessary

by threats of torture. The ringleaders were hanged; thirty-one others were sent to Siberia for life and nearly a hundred imprisoned. As his reign began, so it continued. In carrying his policy of repression to the most barbarous extremes he believed that he was saving his country from the ruin in which the spread of liberal ideas would necessarily involve it, and it is at least arguable that in that age of ferment and unrest his iron system was for the moment essential to save his unwieldy kingdom from disruption and anarchy. At home his reign was a period of comparative tranquillity and of industrial, commercial and even educational progress, while he was able to direct his foreign policy steadily towards two objects—the provision in all directions of future markets for Russian produce, and the release of the downtrodden Greeks and Slavs from the tyranny of the infidel.

Poland.—Amongst the Russians themselves, liberal ideas, never widely spread, were by these means held in check until the Crimean War; but it was otherwise in Poland. This unhappy country had been completely partitioned between Russia, Austria and Prussia before the rise of Napoleon. In 1815, in disregarding the claim of the Poles to form an independent nation with their own language and constitution, and in assigning the bulk of Poland to the control of Russia, the Congress of Vienna bequeathed to the tsars a legacy of endless trouble. Alexander, while still under liberal influences, had granted to the Poles independent government under the Russian crown, and a representative constitution, guaranteeing them the free use of their language, personal liberty and religious toleration, the last being of importance because of the antagonism between the orthodox Russians and the Catholic Church, to which the Poles adhered. Gradually however, Alexander's liberal ideals faded, and in 1820, taking offence because criticism was passed upon his conduct of the government, he dismissed the Polish parliament. One by one the weapons of repression, the

press censorship, political spies, and illegal imprisonment, came into play, together with their inevitable response—conspiracy in the name of patriotism and the activity of secret revolutionary societies. Thus by the time of Alexander's death hatred of the Russian domination had taken deep root.

The Polish Rebellion.—After the accession of Nicholas, though he opened his reign by undertaking to maintain the Polish constitution, new dangers quickly appeared. Russian troops were employed to garrison Warsaw, Russians were installed as government officials, and a commission was appointed to investigate the workings of the secret societies. In 1830 Nicholas visited Warsaw for his coronation, and although his speeches to the parliament were friendly, he was suspected of wishing to overthrow the constitution. The news of the July Revolution in Paris, together with the suggestion that Nicholas intended to use the Polish army against Louis Philippe's government, moved the Polish conspirators to action. In January, 1831, after a final appeal for concessions, the Polish parliament, finding Nicholas inflexible, publicly announced his dethronement, and declared Poland an independent state. Rioting broke out in Warsaw, and the Russian garrison, irresolutely handled, was forced for the moment to withdraw. Soon, however, the Poles were faced with the whole might of Russia. They made agonised appeals to the European Powers for help. The response was significant. Austria deluded the Polish envoys by negotiating with them, while, at the same time, secretly informing Nicholas of their plans. Prussia took steps to prevent assistance being sent from Prussian Poland to Warsaw, and supplied the Russian troops with provisions and ammunition. France and England, though a minority in each country in vain urged intervention, offered nothing more than ineffective sympathy. Thus abandoned, the Polish army, a well-trained and disciplined force, heroically resisted, but lack

of real leadership, and disunion and treachery behind them made their efforts vain. After six months of desperate fighting Warsaw fell, and Poland lay prostrate at the feet of Nicholas. Henceforth, as long as he lived, repression reigned supreme. Order was indeed kept, but at what a cost ! Representative government was abolished. All official posts were filled with Russians. The Polish army ceased to exist as a separate institution. Their national flag, the official use of their language, everything in short that might serve to keep alive the memory of their former independence or stir their national spirit, was studiously proscribed. Patriotic agitation and even petitions for justice were rewarded by deportation to Siberia or the Caucasus. The outcome was a national despair that was eventually to find its outlet in the use of the dagger and the bomb. The rest of the reign of Nicholas, however, was for Poland as well as for Russia a period of quiescence under the iron system of the tsar.

The Turkish Empire.—Another problem with which Russia has been confronted throughout the century is that of the Balkan peninsula. In 1815, the Turkish Empire, once the terror of south-eastern Europe, was no longer regarded as formidable. During the eighteenth century it had steadily declined in power, and the period of its decadence was marked by its division into provinces each under the despotic rule of a local governor, known as a Pasha. The central government still retained in name the whole peninsula except for the Dalmatian coast, which was in the hands of Austria, and the little principality of Montenegro, but Austria and Russia had recently pushed back its northern frontiers to the Drave, the Danube, the Carpathians, and the Pruth. Even south of this line, the Roumanian provinces of Moldavia and Walachia were semi-independent states, nominally Turkish, but really under Russian protection, and in 1817, some of the Serbs were allowed self-governing rights under a native prince, with Belgrade as their capital. Almost



TURKEY IN EUROPE AND THE SUBJECT RACES.



THE BALKAN STATES, 1815-1885.

everywhere in the peninsula the Turks themselves formed but a small minority of the population, and were in the position of a military garrison imposing their rule upon the subject peoples. The latter were allowed some measure of religious liberty, and were not habitually ill-treated; but of progressive or enlightened government there was none. Partly because of the traditional hostility between the religions and partly because of the attitude of contemptuous aloofness adopted by the conquerors, four centuries of their rule had done little to effect any fusion of the Mohammedans and their Christian subjects, and had not altogether extinguished the hopes and desires of the submerged nations for eventual independence. That the Christians should have shown themselves as a whole but little further advanced in civilisation and material progress than their rulers, and that, when it came to the use of force, the Greek and Bulgar peasants were capable of perpetrating deeds of blood no less horrible than those committed by the Turks, was the inevitable result of the conditions that had prevailed in the peninsula for five centuries. To whom the fault may be ascribed is clearly to be seen when we note the wonderful advance in these respects which the Christian peoples have one and all made since their emancipation.

The Balkan Nations.—Out of the strange welter of races composing the Christian population, five nationalities stand out distinct in blood and language, each with religious and historical traditions of its own. Although in a few areas, as for example among the rugged mountains of Macedonia, and in some of the larger towns, such as Adrianople and Salonica, two or more of these peoples were settled in inextricable confusion, yet each of the five possessed a district where it decidedly predominated and where it showed all the necessary conditions of nationhood. Between the Adriatic and the Black Sea were two peoples connected with Russia by racial and religious ties. Both were largely of Slavonic origin and adhered for the most

part to the Orthodox Christian Church. To the east on both sides of the main range of the Balkan mountains dwelt the Bulgars, and, north-west of them, the Serbs. Some of the latter had always retained their independence among the inaccessible glens of Montenegro, and a proportion of the rest had been allowed to form themselves into the self-governing province of Serbia in 1817. North of the Bulgars, beyond the Danube, lived the Roumans of Moldavia and Walachia, a Roman Catholic people speaking a language based on Latin forms and claiming descent from the Roman soldiers who in the early days of Christendom had garrisoned the imperial province of Dacia. On the Adriatic coast, next to the Serbs, were the Albanians, perhaps the remnants of the prehistoric inhabitants of the peninsula. These were a primitive and almost savage race of mountaineers, many of whom had long since been converted to Mohammedanism. Further south, the remainder of the peninsula was Greek-speaking and by religion Orthodox, and Greeks, interspersed with Bulgars and Turks, occupied also the north coast of the *Ægean* and the neighbourhood of Constantinople itself. Even in the Turkish capital the majority of the population was Greek.

The Views of the Powers.—With all these nationalities awaiting the hour of deliverance, the days of the Turkish Empire seemed numbered, and very soon after 1815 the problem of the attitude to be taken up if serious outbreaks should occur became one which the Powers of Europe had to face. For the moment the welfare of the little nations was everywhere regarded as a matter of secondary importance. The Russian interest in the question was twofold. On the one hand, she could not be altogether indifferent to the call of races akin to her in blood and religion. Indeed, she had some time since been recognised officially by the Turks as the champions of the religious interests of Orthodox Christians within the empire. On the other hand, Russian sea-borne trade had hitherto

bees subject to restrictions and tolls on its passage from the Black Sea, and to a country whose traditional policy had always been that of securing undisturbed commercial access to the open sea the chance of seizing Constantinople and the narrows of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles was too alluring to be neglected. Yet, though Russia for her own purposes would have been glad to see the Turks driven from Europe, she had little desire to see their empire replaced by a series of really independent and national states, which might in time prove a much more effective barrier to the extension of her influence. England, on the contrary, already anxiously watching Russia's advance through Asia towards India, was full of jealous fear that the Russian possession of Constantinople would open the way to commercial competition in the Mediterranean, and the British government had pledged itself to prop up the mouldering edifice of Turkey as a barrier to Russian ambition. The Austrian attitude was similar, for the establishment of Russian influence in Moldavia and Walachia was held in itself to threaten the freedom of commerce on the Danube, the natural outlet of German trade to the Black Sea, and the further advance of Russian power seemed therefore a thing to be obstructed at all costs, especially as the Austrians themselves were beginning to harbour designs of acquiring territory to the south of the lower Danube. To Austria, moreover, it was of vital importance to prevent the subject nationalities from recovering their liberty. There were both Serbs and Roumans in great numbers within the Austrian Empire, and the effect upon them of their brethren's successful struggle against established authority would be beyond calculation.

The Greeks.—None of the subject peoples was more conscious of its nationality than the Greeks. It is true that in language and even in race they bore little enough resemblance to the Greeks of two thousand years before, but they had recently been taught by a few patriots who

had acquired some culture abroad to consider themselves the heirs of the inspiring glories of Leonidas and Plato. As their national self-respect awoke, they began to chafe under the humiliation of their servitude to the infidel foreigner and to attribute their national backwardness to the conditions under which they lived, and by 1820 they wanted but leaders and an opportunity to break into revolt. Nor were they destitute of elements of military strength. For a navy the Turks relied largely upon the seamen and shipping of the Greek coasts and islands, while everywhere among the mountains dwelt fierce and warlike tribes, which, though lacking in the discipline and unity of purpose that are essential to real success, nevertheless provided formidable fighting men.

The Greek Rebellion.—It was not, however, from the Greek peninsula that the movement received its first impetus, but from Constantinople. In Byzantium itself, the capital of the ancient Eastern Empire, amongst the colony of wealthy Greek merchants settled there, were men of high culture and intellect, who dreamed of restoring, not merely the Greece of Pericles, but rather the Empire of Constantine and Justinian. Here, and in a similar colony at Odessa, dwelt most of the leading members of the secret society of the Hetairia, or Friends, formed for the purpose of organising the whole Greek nation for rebellion. In 1820 Ali Pasha of Albania broke into revolt against the Sultan, and while the bulk of the Turkish armies were engaged in besieging him in his stronghold of Janina, the Hetairia resolved to act. As their leader the conspirators chose Prince Alexander Ypsilanti, a Greek officer in the Russian service, a man of no great ability but claiming descent from the ancient Byzantine Cæsars. Their plan was to invade the principalities of Moldavia and Walachia from Russia, calling upon all the Orthodox Christian subjects of the Sultan to rise against his tyranny. Ypsilanti gave out, and perhaps persuaded himself, that the rising would be supported by the Russians,

but no such assistance was forthcoming, and the Roumanian and Slavonic peoples showed little sympathy with the Greek cause. In June, 1821, after a few successes signalised by hideous massacres of Turks, the outbreak collapsed before the advance of the Turkish armies, and the dream of re-establishing the Greek Empire of the East was shattered.

Meanwhile an insurrection of a different nature had been stirred up by the agents of the Hetairia in the Morea, the Greek peninsula south of the Gulf of Corinth, known to the ancients as the Peloponnesus. Here the rising was more truly national, and less ambitious. In April, 1821, unorganised and lacking any settled plan of action, wild hordes of brigands and peasants, under their local chiefs, fell upon the Turks that dwelt amongst them and massacred them by the thousand. The cause was disgraced by acts of indescribable barbarity, but the result was that by the end of the year the Turks of the Morea, save the garrisons of a few strongholds, had been exterminated, and the revolt had spread to the mainland of Greece and into the mountains of Macedonia and Thessaly. The Turks retaliated by hanging the Patriarch of Constantinople, the official head of the Orthodox Church, and by organising wholesale massacres of Greeks both in Constantinople and in Asia Minor. Henceforth for six years the struggle between the races became also a pitiless Holy War between the two religions. Feeling in Russia ran high at the news of the Patriarch's death, but the Tsar Alexander, though protector of the Orthodox Church, had always a peculiar horror of rebellion, and his hostility was for the time disarmed by the plea that the Greeks had died as traitors and not as Christians.

The Overthrow of the Greeks.—In 1822 Janina fell, and the full force of the Turkish armies could be directed against the rebels. Though the Turks were powerless on the sea before the prowess of the islanders, the insurgent districts on the mainland and in the Morea were overrun. The Greeks, retiring on their strongholds, now resisted

with an heroic determination that obliterated the memory of the horrors that they had so recently committed. Throughout Europe ran a thrill of sympathy for the Christian patriots struggling against overwhelming odds. Imagination painted them such as their reputed ancestors had been, and volunteers, the most famous of whom were Lord Byron and Admiral Cochran, poured out to assist and lead them. Meanwhile the Sultan, to finish off the business, bent his pride to beg assistance of his nominal vassal Mehemet Ali, Pasha of Egypt. A disciplined army and, more important, a well-equipped fleet were placed at his disposal under the Pasha's son Ibrahim, and with the arrival of these the fate of the Greeks seemed sealed. In 1826, after a prolonged siege, the stronghold of Missolonghi fell, the defenders, after an unsuccessful midnight sortie, blowing themselves up in the citadel rather than surrender. With the occupation of Athens in 1827 all Greece lay at the feet of the Mohammedans, who now began a policy of systematic extermination throughout the Morea, with the idea of repopling the country with new inhabitants from Asia.

The Intervention of the Powers.—By this time, however, the prolonged agony of Greece, and the deliberate adoption by the Turks of a policy of massacre, convinced many of the statesmen of Europe that something must be done to restrain the victors. Throughout the course of the struggle the intervention of the Powers had constantly been discussed. As long as the Tsar Alexander lived, Russia had been under the restraining influence of Austria, and Metternich was not only fearful of any advance southward on the part of Russia but was also opposed, as always, to any action which might encourage subject peoples to revolt. The insurrection must therefore be allowed, he said, "to burn itself out outside the pale of civilisation." Moreover, Canning, the English Foreign Secretary, although public opinion was strongly sympathetic with the Greeks, was unwilling to see Turkey so weakened

as to be at the mercy of Russia. With Nicholas on the throne, however, and the Turks victorious, the situation was changed. The new tsar let it be known that he was determined to bring pressure to bear on Turkey to put an end to the struggle, and rather than allow him to take action alone—action that might have resulted in the establishment of the Russians at Constantinople and the erection of an independent Greek state under Russian protection—England and France resolved on joint intervention with the tsar. Austria remained aloof, but after prolonged negotiations, the main difficulty being that Russia wished to use force against Turkey, while England and France preferred to rely on peaceful persuasion, the three Powers agreed in 1827 that fighting must be stopped and that Greece should be established as a self-governing state under the nominal control of Turkey. A joint fleet under Admiral Codrington was sent to Greek waters to put a stop to the devastation of the Morea, by peaceful means if possible. This expedition, however, met the Turkish and Egyptian fleets in Navarino Bay. Shots were fired, the engagement became general, and in two hours the whole Mohammedan armada was destroyed. The British public rejoiced, but the government regarded the action as “an untoward event,” for it definitely weakened Turkey and seemed to make war between her and the three Powers inevitable, a result which England had all along been striving to prevent. The tsar, indeed, now proposed that the victory should be immediately followed up, but England and France, faithful to their policy of friendliness with Turkey, and satisfied that Greece was safe, decided to go no further. Russia, however, was left free to deal with Turkey as she pleased, on the understanding that she would make no territorial acquisitions in Europe.

The Treaty of Adrianople.—The following year, the Russian armies entered Turkey, but their invasion was anything but the military promenade that had been

expected. Resisted at every turn, they met with little success until 1829, when by audaciously advancing southward through the Balkan passes with only 13,000 men, leaving the Turkish armies unbroken behind them, they seized Adrianople and threatened the capital itself. Panic-stricken, the Turks did not stop to discover how weak was the invading force, but forthwith came to terms. By the Treaty of Adrianople the Turkish rights over Moldavia and Walachia were still further weakened, the freedom of the Straits and the Black Sea to the commerce of all nations was recognised, and the independence of southern Greece established. During the next three years these terms were revised by the Powers, who fixed the Greek boundary along a line drawn between the Gulfs of Arta and Volo, and selected Prince Otto of Bavaria as the first king of the new state.

Russian Influence in Turkey.—Thus far, in spite of Navarino and the separation of Greece from the Mohammedan Empire, Great Britain had succeeded in maintaining the integrity of Turkey as a barrier against the suspected designs of Russia. Before long, however, events occurred which showed that the British success had been more apparent than real. Since the Greeks had won their freedom, Nicholas had come to the conclusion that the splitting up of the Turkish Empire might result after all in the formation of a number of independent states guaranteed by the western Powers. Such an issue seemed to offer little chance to Russia of acquiring fresh territory, especially in view of the consistent opposition of Great Britain and France. His policy, therefore, underwent a complete change. The prestige which Russia had won by her victory in 1829 had in fact reduced Turkey almost to the position of an appanage of the tsar, and in this position Nicholas hoped to keep it. Events encouraged him. In 1832 Mehemet Ali and Ibrahim broke into revolt against the Sultan, their nominal suzerain. They invaded Syria, and seriously threatened to overthrow the

empire. In despair the Sultan turned to the Powers for help, and it was from Russia that he obtained it. Nicholas sent a fleet to the Bosphorus, and landed some 12,000 men on Turkish soil, with the result that the advance of the Egyptians was stayed. In return for this support the Turks undertook by a secret treaty to close the Dardanelles to the warships of all nations whenever the Russians wished. The tsar's influence seemed paramount, and his triumph complete.

The Dissolution of the Turkish Empire Postponed.—However, as soon as the new attitude adopted by Russia was realised, the feeling in England was one of relief, for the way seemed open for friendly co-operation between the Powers for the purpose of permanently maintaining the Turkish Empire, and an opportunity soon presented itself for Great Britain to recover some of her lost influence. In 1839 a new advance of the Egyptians from Syria towards Constantinople was met by the joint action of Russia, Austria and England. Acre was bombarded by the British fleet, and Alexandria threatened, with the result that Mehemet Ali and his son resigned all their claims to Syria and contented themselves with their original dominions in Egypt under the nominal control of the Sultan. This vigorous action did much to put British prestige in Constantinople on a par once more with that of Russia. In 1842, a conference held in London agreed that in future the integrity of the Turkish Empire should be respected and that Russian influence should be restricted by the closing, not only of the Dardanelles, but also of the Bosphorus, to all warships. As long as this agreement was observed, the dissolution of European Turkey, constantly threatened during the twenty years of turmoil that had followed the Greek revolt, seemed definitely postponed, and the ambitions and fears of the Powers respecting it received for the moment their quietus.

CHAPTER IX
SIX MINOR STATES
NORWAY AND SWEDEN

Union of Norway and Sweden.—One more violation of the principle of nationality was accomplished by the Congress of Vienna when Norway, which had formerly belonged to the Danish crown, was awarded to Sweden in compensation for the loss of Finland. Now the two nations, though racially akin, were quite distinct in language, resources, law and political traditions. Sweden was comparatively densely populated, and was possessed of considerable agricultural and mineral resources, which, as time went on, were to be actively developed. The middle classes and peasants had been accustomed to exert little influence in politics, and the absolute power of the crown had been generally accepted. The Norwegians, on the other hand, a race of mountaineers and seafaring adventurers, whose shipping interests were already considerable, were imbued with thoroughly democratic traditions, and jealously resented any intrusion upon their self-governing rights. A compulsory union between two such peoples was bound to result in friction, and, as a matter of fact, their subsequent history, in other respects a tale of steady and peaceful progress towards material prosperity, has been deeply affected by the unsatisfactory relations that have existed between them throughout the century.

Bernadotte. The Norwegian Demand for Independence.—The Norwegians at first attempted to assert their independence by force, but their resistance was easily overcome by the Swedish army under the French Marshal Bernadotte, who had been adopted by Charles XIII of

Sweden as his heir. As soon as Norway had been reduced to obedience, the Swedes adopted a policy of conciliation. The authority of the Norwegian parliament was duly recognised, and Bernadotte, who in 1818 succeeded to the joint throne as Charles XIV, did his utmost, in spite of his own absolutist instincts, to placate the feelings of his unwilling subjects. He granted them the use of their own national flag, he permitted the parliament even to retain its control over the army, and, although he kept the foreign affairs of both countries in his own hands, he refrained from any other step which might appear to place Norway in a subordinate position. Nevertheless, the jealousy between the two nations continued, and it was only by the personal popularity of Charles XIV and his successors that the union was peacefully maintained. Even after 1866, when the Swedish parliament was modernised by the establishment of a Lower House elected on a democratic basis, the strife was continued. Towards the close of the century the vague discontent took a more definite shape. It was maintained that the commercial and maritime interests of Norway, which often clashed with those of agricultural and industrial Sweden, demanded the creation of a separate foreign office, and especially of a separate consular service in foreign ports. The Swedes offered to grant the second demand, but remained firm upon the question of the control of foreign affairs. All efforts at compromise failed, and it soon became apparent that the union could only be preserved by a resort to force. Public opinion in Sweden, however, was averse from a war, which, even if successful, would hardly help to consolidate a state composed of elements so irreconcilable. In 1905 a conference of representatives of both nations was held to settle details, and on September 23 the union was declared dissolved. The Norwegians chose a grandson of the King of Denmark as their ruler, who, under the name of Haakon VII, still occupies the throne.

The separation of these states, neither of which is rich or really populous, has undoubtedly diminished the external security of both, and their independence may conceivably be threatened in the future. The Swedes, in particular, are in a delicate position, for they have never allowed themselves to forget that Finland once was theirs, and their relations with Russia, accordingly, have not often been cordial. On the other hand, both countries have profited from the cessation of the perpetual hickering between them, and each is now free to develop upon its own lines and according to its own traditions.

DENMARK

After the rough handling which she received from England during the Napoleonic wars, and the subsequent loss of Norway, Denmark was left the smallest and perhaps the poorest of the Scandinavian states. Except for one striking episode in her history, however, the Nineteenth Century has proved for her a period of peace and of rapid internal development, during which, under the sound administration of her rulers, her prosperity, based almost entirely upon agriculture and dairy-farming, has reached a high level. Her government, in which the authority of the crown was formerly paramount, has gradually been subjected to liberal influences, and since 1901 the right of the parliament to control the king's ministers has been definitely admitted. The steps by which this transformation was effected led to considerable bitterness between the various parties in the state, but, although for nine years after 1885 the royal government levied taxes and controlled the administration in defiance of the expressed will of the parliamentary majority, political strife was seldom allowed to interfere with the process of developing the country's resources.

Schleswig and Holstein.—The one serious crisis in which Denmark was involved arose out of the problems connected

with the provinces of Holstein and Schleswig, which lay on the German border. The former, though ruled by the King of Denmark, was a member of the German Confederation, and was almost exclusively inhabited by Germans, while even the latter contained few Danes except in the north. The growth of the desire for the union of all the Germans under one strong government led naturally to an agitation that these provinces, which were regarded as inseparable from one another, should be liberated from Denmark. During the general excitement of 1848, Holstein repudiated its allegiance, and set up a provisional government; and when the Danes attempted to assert their rights by force they were faced by troops sent by King Frederick William of Prussia in the name of the German Confederation. The Powers now interposed to protect Denmark, Frederick William having no choice but to recall his army, and after some delay, during which the nationalist enthusiasm in Germany died down, it was decided that the provinces must be left, for the time at least, under their former rulers.

In 1862, however, the Danes took steps to strengthen their hold upon them, and in defiance of German feeling Schleswig was declared to be incorporated with the Kingdom of Denmark. The question was now seriously taken up by Prussia and Austria, and in 1864, after a short and one-sided war, Denmark was compelled to surrender both provinces. The quarrel that broke out in 1866 between the victors upon the question of the ultimate fate of Schleswig and Holstein was no concern of hers. Since that date she has been able to stand aloof from all continental disputes, and she cannot be said to have suffered from her isolation.

SWITZERLAND

Switzerland has suffered no more than the Scandinavian states from her internal dissensions, and has managed to keep altogether clear of foreign complications. The

success of the Swiss in these respects is the more remarkable in that as a nation they lack many of the features that tend towards unity. They comprise three diverse races, the Germans far outnumbering the French and Italians. They speak three languages, and are divided by keen religious differences. Nevertheless, their pride in their traditions and in their free institutions has proved strong enough to overcome the natural tendencies towards separation; and the three races have never exhibited any wish to join Germany, France or Italy.

The Federal Constitution.—Prior to the French Revolution, the state had been little more than an alliance between a number of self-governing provinces or Cantons, drawn together solely by the desire for mutual defence. The Cantons in most cases corresponded with strongly marked physical features. Formidable mountain barriers made intercommunication difficult, and in almost every valley the inhabitants had been accustomed to act as an independent community except when threatened by some external force. A Central Diet had indeed existed, but it had possessed little power of common direction, and no right to legislate for the whole state. After the fall of Napoleon no great alteration was made in the constitution but by 1830 some form of popular government had been established in every one of the twenty-two Cantons, and the Diet was recognised as having the right to organise an army for the common defence and to levy taxes for that purpose. There now followed eighteen years of considerable unrest, the chief disputes arising from an attempt of the seven Roman Catholic Cantons to form a "league within a league," known as the "Sonderbund," for the purpose of dominating the whole Confederation. For a time it seemed possible that the country might fall into a chronic state of anarchy and that the European Powers might intervene and even partition Switzerland between them. In 1847, however, a brief civil war led to the collapse of the offending Cantons, and the revolutions

that took place all over Europe during the following year turned the attention of all the Powers to their own affairs. Left to themselves, the Swiss now took steps to transform the "League of States" into a union of a more compact nature. Berne was chosen as the permanent capital, and, to act as a federal executive, a permanent council of seven was constituted, with an elected President at their head. The central government thus erected was charged with the direction of foreign affairs, the national army, the coinage, postal service and customs, other matters being still left to the unfettered control of the Cantons. The old Diet was replaced by a federal assembly, sitting in two houses, which were to legislate for the whole.

For some years these institutions remained unaltered, but the several Cantons still retained their traditional jealousy of any form of central government; and to content them it was decided in 1874 that before the enactments of the federal assembly came into general operation they must be submitted to the vote of the whole population. This "referendum," a highly democratic expedient which would hardly be practicable in a large country, naturally tends to decrease the importance and to limit the power of the federal government, but it is thoroughly in keeping with the national traditions of the Swiss, and has served to soothe the racial antagonisms which might otherwise have threatened the integrity of the state.

Freed from its internal distractions, Switzerland since 1848 has made remarkable progress in education and in industrial prosperity; while the consistent neutrality which the Swiss have been able to preserve in all continental disputes has made their cities the natural meeting-places of international conferences, such, for example, as that which sat at Geneva in 1864 to arrange for the treatment of wounded in war.

SPAIN

It remains to treat briefly of two more states of the second rank, whose fortunes during the Nineteenth Century have been decidedly more chequered than those of the Scandinavian countries or of Switzerland. The part played by Spain in the overthrow of Napoleon during the Wars of Liberation had augured well for her future. Her people had been thoroughly aroused against tyranny and foreign interference, and in 1812 a highly democratic form of constitutional government had been adopted. The promise shown, however, was far from being fulfilled. In the first place, the new constitution, which provided for a newly elected parliament every two years and the complete subjection of the king's ministers to the representatives of the people, proved to be unworkable in a country altogether inexperienced in the management of such institutions; and after 1814, when Ferdinand VII was restored to his throne, secure in the devotion of the bulk of the people, he was able to overthrow the parliamentary government and to re-establish the old absolutist régime. For a few years his power was unchallenged, but in 1820 serious trouble arose from two sides. His finances were in utter disorder, and as a means of restoring them he was foolish enough to insist on the payment of the old tribute of two millions sterling by the Spanish colonies in America. The colonists, who had long been restless under the selfish tyranny of the home government and had successfully asserted their independence during the Napoleonic occupation of Spain, declined to return to their allegiance upon these terms. It was Ferdinand's intention to use force to re-establish his sway in the West, but the effort proved his undoing. In 1820 his troops, whose pay was sixteen months in arrear, and who were terrified at the prospect of service in the tropics, broke into revolt. In helpless terror the king promised to restore the constitution of 1812, but he remained practically

a prisoner in Madrid until 1823, when a French army crossed the frontier and replaced him in power. Until 1833, when he died, he was able to indulge in a policy of uncontrolled reaction, disregarding his promises altogether, and wreaking a blind vengeance upon the leaders of the revolt. He was compelled, however, to recognise the independence of all the colonies on the mainland of America, Cuba remaining as almost the sole relic of the ancient Spanish Empire in the West.

Perpetual Anarchy.—For the next ten years Spain was the scene of almost perpetual warfare between the supporters of absolutism and the constitutionalists, the national problems being further complicated by the rival claims of Ferdinand's widow Christina, who was declared regent for her daughter Isabella, and his brother Carlos. In 1843 Isabella was proclaimed of age, Don Carlos and his supporters having been driven from the country; but another thirty years elapsed before Spain began to show signs of permanently emerging from the state of political anarchy and commercial collapse into which the prolonged strife had plunged her.

With abdication of Isabella in 1868 the outbreaks were renewed. Her young son Alphonso was considered too young to reign, and after two years of disorder the vacant throne, which had in the meanwhile been refused by various foreign princes, among them Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern, was accepted by Amadeo, the second son of Victor Emmanuel of Italy. However, the danger from the Carlists, who now urged the claims of the grandson of the original pretender, was not yet over, and the new king, after struggling in vain to maintain order, soon returned to Italy. In 1875, after another period of anarchy and bloodshed in every corner of the kingdom, Alphonso was restored to his throne. The Carlists were now finally suppressed, parliamentary government was re-established, and the country was at last permitted to enter upon a period of peace and recuperation.

Progress since 1875.—Since 1875 Spain has slowly emerged from the state of commercial and industrial stagnation in which she had been involved since 1815. Under Alphonso XII and his son Alphonso XIII, who has occupied the throne since his birth in 1886, the government has been able to find a reasonable mean between absolutism and full democratic control, for which the excitable Spanish populace have scarcely shown themselves fit. Republican and socialistic doctrines have taken deep root in Spain, but the personal popularity of the present sovereign seems to have prevented them from making much headway since he assumed control of the administration.

The Spanish-American War.—The most serious crisis which the government has had to face in recent times occurred in 1898, when Spain lost the remains of her colonial empire. For many years the island of Cuba had been in a state of ferment, which often found expression in fierce risings against the Spanish administration; and the home government could not bring themselves to face the expense which the complete subjugation of the island would have entailed. Meanwhile, the important business interests of American citizens in the Cuban tobacco and sugar plantations led the United States to view the continued disorder with grave disapproval. In 1895 a new rebellion broke out, with which the Spaniards were altogether unable to cope, and two years later the impatience of the Americans was increased by the destruction of the United States warship *Maine*, under circumstances which led to the suspicion that the Spaniards had blown her up. The ill-feeling thus produced now led to war. Cuba and the Philippine islands were quickly lost, the former being declared independent under American protection, while the latter were annexed to the United States.

This humiliation seemed likely at the time to provoke a fresh series of agitations against the government at home, but the danger passed away, and it has since been generally

realised that the loss of her overseas possessions has in no wise weakened Spain. In 1899 the Caroliné Islands, the last important fragment of her former empire, were sold to Germany. The freedom from the strain of colonial wars and from the temptation to waste their scanty capital upon colonial enterprises, together with increased political stability at home, has permitted the Spaniards at last to develop the agricultural and mineral resources of their country, which they had neglected as long as she had possessed a colonial empire. Considerable sums have been spent upon roads, railways and irrigation, and much of the ground lost since 1815 has thereby been caught up. Spain also has begun to make progress along the path towards material prosperity and to take her rightful place among the minor Powers.

PORTUGAL

The recent history of Portugal shows points of resemblance to that of Spain. The struggle between the supporters of an absolute monarchy and those of popular institutions, complicated from time to time by disputed successions, kept the country in constant disorder until 1836. In that year some sort of constitutional government was established, but the natural indolence of the inhabitants, and the flagrantly corrupt self-seeking that has characterised all parties of Portuguese politicians, have always kept the country poor and backward, despite the excellent soil and climate. Her vast colony of Brazil declared its independence in 1822, and, though she still retains considerable territory in Africa, four ports in India and some islands in the Atlantic, these possessions have always been poorly administered and add little to her strength. During the early years of the Twentieth Century the extravagance of King Carlos, the crushing burden of taxation, and the perpetual ministerial corruption, led to the rapid spread of republican ideas. In 1908 Carlos

and his eldest son were shot in the royal carriage as they drove through the streets of Lisbon, and, though his second son Manuel, succeeded to the throne, a revolution four years later forced him to take refuge in England. It cannot yet be said, however, that the republican government which has been set up is likely to do more than its predecessor for the prosperity of Portugal.

CHAPTER X

REVOLUTION IN FRANCE, 1848-1852

"The Year of Revolution."—We have seen that the thirty years separating the Congress of Vienna and the "Year of Revolution" were a period of national restlessness and political agitation, but in 1848, in spite of some notable changes of political conditions—the separation of Belgium from Holland and the emancipation of the Greeks—the work of the Congress remained on the whole intact. The revolutionary and nationalist efforts in Poland and Italy seemed equally to have failed. The Czechs and Magyars were still in Metternich's grip, and the Serbs and Bulgars in that of Turkey. The cause of German unity had made little advance, and the condition of France was still far from realising the democratic ideal of 1793. What had yet taken place, however, was but the muttering of the coming storm. The movements that were now to convulse Europe were the natural outcome of what had gone before, and though they nowhere met with complete success, though in France and Austria absolutism seemed wholly to triumph, yet enough was accomplished in Germany and Italy to sustain the hopes of nationalists and patriots and to spur them to further endeavours.

Abdication of Louis Philippe (February, 1848.)—The first outbreaks of 1848 occurred in Italy, but it was from Paris, as usual, that the real impulse came. The government of Louis Philippe, conservative at home and pacific in its dealings abroad, was already tottering to its fall

On the one hand was the clamour for the overthrow of an unjust and dishonourable government which in no sense represented the people of France and which did nothing for the masses of the working population; and on the other, the widespread conviction that only under the control of a Bonaparte could France play the part in Europe to which destiny called her. By clinging so tenaciously to the power won in 1830, and by blindly refusing to extend the right to vote, the middle class minority left only one path open to the nation—that of revolution. The coming crisis was precipitated when, early in 1848, the ministry decided to prohibit a monster demonstration in favour of reform. On February 22 rioting broke out in Paris. Barricades were erected in the streets, and shops were looted by an excited mob. The troops already in the city showed from the first their sympathy with the rioters. For two days the king's attitude was undecided. At the first alarm he dismissed his hated ministers. A few hours later he drew all the popular venom upon himself by calling fresh troops to Paris. These proved no more willing than the others to fire upon the people, and point by point the city was abandoned to the mob, until the Tuileries itself was invaded. At this he decided to abdicate in favour of his grandson, and the parliament met to consider the question of a regency.

The People of Paris Victorious.—By this time, however, the people of Paris had found leaders and a sort of organisation, and were thus able to prevent the outbreak from ending as that of 1830 had done. At the offices of the republican newspapers and at the meetings of innumerable secret societies it had been decided that no change of kings or ministers would meet the situation. Cries of "Vive la Republique" were everywhere raised. The parliament itself was invaded, the majority of the members withdrew, and the remainder proclaimed a provisional government. Meanwhile a self-appointed revolutionary assembly had

assumed authority in the name of the victorious people at the Hôtel de Ville, and from this body three men, among them Louis Blanc, the principal exponent of the popular socialist doctrines of the day, were sent to confer with the parliament. A republic was immediately established, a committee of ten appointed to carry on the government, and orders issued for the election of a new parliament by the votes of all Frenchmen over twenty-one years of age. In three days the revolution was ended. It was the shortest and least violent that Paris has ever known. Accustomed to receive its orders from the capital, France accepted passively the new form of government chosen for it by the mob of Paris, as it had done more than once before, and Louis Philippe made his way to England with his family.

Socialist Experiments (March to June).—The provisional government, however, was immediately divided against itself. On the one side was a group of wild spirits who were resolved to seize any chance of putting into practice their dreams for the reform of the whole fabric of society, without waiting to inquire whether their schemes would receive the support of the nation or whether the times were ripe. On the other side were more moderate republicans, who were opposed strongly enough to any return to the methods of government that had just been overthrown, but whose object for the moment was to maintain order in Paris until the new parliament should be elected. To quiet Louis Blanc and his followers they accepted the socialist doctrine of the "Right to Work," which implied the obligation to find employment on demand for every unemployed workman. And as these were numerous in Paris, owing to the stoppage of trade caused by the disorders, "national workshops" were immediately established, where every applicant was guaranteed well-paid work. It hardly needs to be pointed out that these workshops were by no means a real test of the socialist doctrine that all trade should be managed and financed

by government. A real application of the doctrine would have required a general public ready to receive it, elaborate organisation, plentiful capital, and, above all, time for the gradual development of the scheme by taking over existing businesses; and none of these essentials was available. Even if the organisers had been whole-hearted, the experiment must have failed. As it was, the workshops were no more than temporary relief works, intended to occupy the idle and to prevent disorders until the moderates should receive the support that they expected from the provinces. Over a hundred thousand men enrolled themselves, but the difficulty was to find work for all to do. A certain number of military uniforms and cavalry saddles were turned out, but the bulk of the men had to be employed in such unproductive work as digging trenches and filling them in again, and the cost naturally embarrassed a government whose resources were at best scanty.

The Paris Mob Suppressed (June).—The meeting of the new parliament, chosen by universal suffrage, meant the end of the experiment, for the result of the elections showed that France, though on the whole republican, had as yet no sympathy with the aspirations of the socialists. Even in Paris only three labour candidates out of twenty-four were elected. In June, in spite of the protests of Louis Blanc, the workshops were closed, and though the Paris working men rose as a body and attempted to organise another revolution, the government was by this time ready for them. Troops were assembled and used without hesitation. For four days a series of pitched battles was fought around the people's strongholds, the Hôtel de Ville and the Place de la Bastille, but at last the poorer quarters of the city were occupied street by street. Before order was restored not less than 10,000 men had been killed or wounded. From its triumph the government proceeded to retaliation of the most merciless severity. Ringleaders were relentlessly hunted down, and four

thousand citizens were transported without trial. Thirty-two newspapers were suppressed and their editors imprisoned.

The parliament could now begin its work of reorganising the government. After four months of discussion a new constitution was proclaimed. There was to be a single house of representatives, chosen by universal suffrage, and a president by whom the ministers were to be appointed, himself elected in the same way for a term of four years.

All Political Parties Discredited. The Presidential Election (December).—The young republic had shown its strength, and now seemed well established, but the events of the year had made the orderly government of France by any of the existing political parties very difficult. No co-operation could be expected between the royalist middle class and the men who had overthrown them in February. On the other hand the failure of the national workshops had brought undeserved discredit upon Louis Blanc and his followers, and in any case the bloody work of June and the vengeance by which it had been followed had erected between the moderate republicans and the socialist working classes a barrier of hatred that nothing could efface. Thus every party that had attempted to govern France since 1815 had discredited itself in one way or another. Some had fallen back into a policy of pure reaction, others had failed to maintain order, and none had succeeded in regaining for France its proper place among the Powers of Europe. It was in these circumstances, while men were inclined to look elsewhere for their leaders, that the presidential election was held. On December 10th Louis Napoleon Bonaparte was elected by five million votes, more than three times the number cast for the next candidate.

Louis Napoleon.—Some of the causes that contributed to this astounding result we have noticed in a previous chapter, but a word more must be said upon the subject.

Throughout 1848 the Bonapartists had been biding their time. Immediately after the declaration of the republic Louis Napoleon had announced his presence in Paris, and had pledged himself to support the government, disclaiming all ambition but that of serving his country. Since then he had been elected a member of parliament, and had everywhere been taken at his word as the champion of order and democracy. When he came forward as a candidate for the presidency he issued a vague but adroitly worded manifesto, in which every party read a promise that its interests should be secure. The middle classes and the thrifty peasantry were guaranteed peace and the maintenance of order. Special schemes of social improvement were to be devised for the benefit of working men. The army was promised that time-expired soldiers should be his especial care. The principles of the Great Revolution would at last be put into practice, and the national dignity was to be restored and safeguarded by a vigorous foreign policy. Such a programme, heralding a golden age, and reinforced by the glamour of the Napoleonic legend, which the Bonapartists had always so assiduously cultivated, won him the heart of the overwhelming majority of the nation.

His Popularity.—Though the new president solemnly swore to remain true to the Republic, it is clear that from the first he was bent upon reviving the Empire. His first task was to make his personal popularity secure. Useful public works were undertaken on every side under his patronage. Paris in particular was given new streets and a new drainage system. Attention was paid to the introduction of scientific farming and agricultural machinery, and to the improvement of manufactures. He showed himself at reviews in the provinces, at industrial exhibitions and at the opening of railways, posing everywhere as the champion of popular liberty and the representative of peace and material progress. The devotion of the army was secured by the extravagant attention that he paid to

the welfare of the soldiers. Whole regiments feasted at his expense and in return received him unrebuked with shouts of "Vive l'Empereur."

The Coup d'État of 1851.—His task was made the easier by the new elections of 1849, which gave no party a decided majority, and left the president free from any real parliamentary control. He was able to turn every step they took to his own advantage. He won general applause by opposing a law which restricted the right to vote to those who were registered as three years' residents at the place of voting. He gained the support of the Catholic clergy, and through them that of the peasantry, by sending to Rome a military expedition to restore the pope's temporal power, and then, when the parliament seemed inclined to support the pope in a policy of revenge upon the Roman rebels, he was able to appeal from them to the people as the advocate of the true principles of liberty. Meanwhile he chose and dismissed his ministers as he pleased and gradually filled his cabinet with men of doubtful principles and ambitions, who owed everything to his favour and were devoted to his person and his cause.

By these means the way was prepared for the realisation of his schemes. The time came for action when the fourth year of his presidency approached, for the parliament refused to consider the question of making him eligible for re-election for a new term of office. Rather than pass into the obscurity of private life, he resolved to re-establish the Empire by force. Elaborate plans were secretly concocted by his ministers, the leaders of whom were the Minister of War, an able but unscrupulous adventurer named St. Arnaud, and Maupas, the Chief of Police. During the night of December 1, 1851, troops were sent by St. Arnaud's orders to occupy the meeting-place of the parliament and other selected strategic points throughout the capital. The government printers were compelled to print a manifesto which was to be posted on the walls before morning. Two hours after midnight Maupas

summoned all the police who could be trusted, and with them arrested all the leading members of parliament in their beds, together with all important army officers who were likely to oppose the proceedings.

At daybreak on December 2, Parisians everywhere stood dazed before placards announcing that the parliament had become the centre of conspiracy against the welfare of the people, that Louis Napoleon had therefore assumed a temporary dictatorship in order to save the country from the dangers that threatened it, and that a new constitution including the restoration of universal suffrage would forthwith be issued. For two days Paris was as if stunned by the shock, but on December 4th the inevitable rioting began. The troops, however, were used with ruthless thoroughness. Their murderous volleys cleared the streets of the rioters, and in the general excitement large numbers of unresisting bystanders were included in the slaughter. Paris was soon overawed, but during the following week spasmodic outbreaks occurred in the provinces wherever socialist teachings had taken root. The savagery which was shown in some of these scared France out of any sympathy that might otherwise have been felt for the victims of the conspiracy in Paris, and seemed to justify the claim that the country was in grave danger from which only a dictator's vigorous action could save it. Seemingly to preserve order, but really to forestall all possible opposition, authority was given to the local officials throughout the country to suppress all newspapers, and to remove all judges, mayors and even schoolmasters who were not likely to prove submissive. By such means, and by the vigorous use of the troops, the disaffected districts were quickly reduced to obedience. Less than three weeks after December 2 the manhood of France, voting by universal suffrage, decided by a majority of more than ten to one to grant to Louis Napoleon full powers as dictator to reorganise the whole government of the country.

Louis Napoleon's Triumph.—The beginning of 1852 saw him in fact though not yet in name the wielder of his uncle's sceptre. He now set himself to give some show of legality to his position. By the new constitution the president was in fact the government. He alone initiated all laws, declared war and peace, appointed ministers and officials, and commanded the army and navy. There were to be two houses of parliament, the one composed of senators nominated by the president, the other elected by universal suffrage; but since the ministers were out of their control and they were able only to pass or reject the laws submitted to them, their existence was no more than a convenient cloak for the president's absolutism. Indeed, hardly was the new constitution in working order than a second national vote authorised Louis Napoleon to lay down his presidency and to ascend the imperial throne with the title of Napoleon III.

The Second Empire.—Such was the famous Coup d'État. It is a subject upon which men's opinions have always been divided. On the one hand, the restoration of absolutism, however disguised, and the revival of the Empire by midnight conspiracy, by the murder of innocent victims and by the plotting of the chief actor against the system which he was sworn to defend, seemed an inglorious conclusion to a prolonged struggle for liberty and the rights of the people. On the other hand it is difficult to see how the bitter class enmities awakened by the strife of 1848 could otherwise have been composed, and it is at least open to doubt whether the Second Republic could have given France a greater measure of domestic prosperity and repose than she enjoyed during the earlier years of the Second Empire. Nor is it necessary to suppose that Louis Napoleon was a prey to mere personal ambition or, indeed, that he was anything but an honest well-wisher to his country. Convinced as he was by thirty years of dreaming that the Empire was essential to the progress of France, he merely seized the proffered opportunity to revive it,

The bloodshed of December 4 was no part of his schemes. Though an inevitable consequence of them, by him at least it had not been foreseen. Meanwhile, a dreamer and conspirator, believing in himself and his cause, had ascended the French throne with the support and approval of the mass of the nation and with the conviction that he was the heir and the destined exponent of his uncle's policy. The consequences were as momentous for Europe as for France.

CHAPTER XI

REVOLUTION IN AUSTRIA-HUNGARY, 1848-1849

Weakness of the Imperial Government.—We have already noticed that the Austro-Hungarian Empire was one which offered a fair field for national aspirations and rivalries tending to disunion. Amongst the Magyars and Slavs there was already visible the glimmering of a desire for national independence, while enlightened Germans were still dreaming of some sort of union that should link the whole German race with bonds more close than those of the Confederation established by the Congress of Vienna. Up to 1848, however, for a variety of reasons, these forces, each of them fatal to the integrity of the Hapsburg dominions, had shown few signs of further awakening. To this result the very weakness of the central government contributed. It was organised in separate departments, for justice, finance, foreign affairs, and so forth, each under an independent minister. Unlike those of Prussia after the reforms of Stein and Hardenberg, the ministers were unaccustomed to meet in conference or council, and were often even enemies and personal rivals. Under these circumstances there was no possibility of co-operation between them to pursue a definite policy unless they were personally supervised by a business-like sovereign. After the death of the Emperor Francis in 1835, the weakness of this system became apparent. His successor Ferdinand was totally without ability, and during his reign the whole central administration drifted into a somnolent routine which left the provinces free, up to a point, to develop much on their own lines. Even Metternich,

though he saw the dangers towards which the policy of drift might lead, was obliged to content himself with his own domain of foreign policy. Here he laboured steadily to prevent any such turmoil abroad as might hasten the awakening of the nations at home.

Except for Italy, where the strength of national feeling had constantly to be met by a vigorous policy of repression, the provinces, having their own governors and local institutions, were thus subject to the minimum of control from Vienna. In most of them there existed a kind of parliament, composed for the most part of nobles; and this degree of independence for the time lulled the half-awakened patriotic aspirations. There were, moreover, formidable difficulties in the way of realising the desires of the more ardent patriots. The Czechs of Bohemia might wish for a more complete autonomy, but if they obtained it, what was to be the position of the large German population living in their midst? The Hungarian kingdom included by ancient right of conquest the Croatian, Serbian and Roumanian districts of the south. Yet the Hungarians, however zealous in proclaiming their own rights, were as loath to relinquish their control over their ancient dominions as were the Viennese authorities themselves. In addition, it was difficult for all the Slavs to act together, as some of the wilder spirits dreamed of doing. Not only were the Poles, Czechs, Serbs and Croats geographically divided, but also their languages, though akin in derivation, resembled one another hardly as much as do those of the Swedes, Germans, Dutch and English. Lastly, the feeling of personal loyalty to the ancient house of Hapsburg was a force still to be reckoned with throughout the empire, and even when the consciousness of nationality should be fully awakened, it was self-government under one crown rather than complete separation that was likely at first to be the popular goal.

The Growth of the Demand for Reform.—But if the weakness of the government postponed trouble of one

sort by allowing to nationality some measure of free play, it opened the way for new and equally formidable dangers. Newspapers published in the country were still strictly censored, but there was little difficulty in introducing from abroad literature and ideas of a disturbing tendency. Democratic and revolutionary pamphlets were eagerly consumed, in Vienna as well as in Prague and Pesth, by the educated classes, by teachers and students in the universities and by many working men. So long as the police were not directly challenged, public meetings were permitted at which advanced liberal doctrines were discussed. Alongside the claim for the emancipation of the individual nationalities, the desire for constitutional and social reform made steady progress. Thus by 1848, even if the outward condition of the empire seemed peaceful, the condition of affairs had become one of unstable equilibrium. The smallest impulse from without might set irresistible forces in sudden motion.

Hungary.—Nowhere in the empire were liberal and national aspirations stronger than in Hungary. The ancient Hungarian parliament consisted of two houses, representing only the nobility and the landowners, and sat regularly every three years. The continued existence of this institution had had two effects. It provided a natural basis for national resistance to Austrian domination, and at the same time its aristocratic constitution acted as a perpetual challenge to the champions of liberal ideas. On the one hand Hungarian patriots demanded that the parliament should sit at Pesth instead of at the less exclusively Magyar town of Pressburg, that the emperor should choose Hungarian ministers who should be responsible to the parliament, and that the Magyar language should be allowed to replace the barbarous Latin which had served hitherto as the only official means of communication between the German-speaking Austrians and their alien subjects. So far all the Magyars were united in their claims. On the other hand the liberals

desired annual meetings of the parliament, equal taxation for all classes, and a greatly extended franchise which should transfer the political power from the nobility to the nation at large. These two programmes were to some extent antagonistic, for although all classes were united by devotion to their country and a belief in its future, the nobility resented any attack upon their privileges, particularly that of freedom from taxation. By 1848, however, the Magyars had for the most part fallen under the sway of a fiery patriot named Louis Kossuth, with whose character and career the fortunes of Hungary were now to be bound up. An uncompromising liberal, he had adopted all the popular doctrines of the west, and since 1840, by his writings and his compelling oratory, he had been striving to fire his countrymen to an enthusiasm equal to his own.

Outbreak in Vienna (March, 1848).—Such was the general condition of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, when like a bombshell came the news of the February Revolution in Paris. Kossuth now flung down a challenge to the government at Vienna. On March 3, the Hungarian parliament, under his influence, demanded in plain language the freedom of Hungary from Viennese control and the establishment of constitutional government over the whole empire. "From the charnel-house of the Viennese system," he cried, "a pestilential breath steals over us which paralyses our nerves and deadens our national spirit." This plain speaking, however anti-Austrian in its spirit, was received with the utmost enthusiasm by the citizens of Vienna. On March 13 the meeting of the provincial parliament of Lower Austria was invaded by a mob of students and artisans. Kossuth's speech was read and his proposals acclaimed. Street orators, meanwhile, inflamed the passions of the populace, and a riotous crowd, headed by some of the members of parliament, surged to the palace, where the ministers were compelled to receive deputations in favour of reform.

Next, fighting broke out with the troops, and barricades were erected all over the city. After three days of indecision and confusion the imperial government collapsed. Metternich, who more than anyone else was identified with the effort to stem the current of the times, resigned and fled the country. A deputation of Hungarians sent to Vienna to demand their rights was escorted in triumph through the streets and was received by the emperor in person, who acceded to most of the demands and promised that constitutional government should be granted to the whole empire.

The Collapse of the Imperial Government.—The sudden collapse of the central power released at last the full flood of nationalist aspirations in every province. Hungary led the way with a series of sweeping changes which would have left her a democratic state connected with Austria only by common allegiance to the Hapsburg house. The parliament was transformed into a modern representative assembly, and was transferred to Pesth. Ministries were established not only for the transaction of domestic business but also for military, financial and foreign affairs. After some attempt to retain control at least over the Hungarian army, the imperial government, being entirely unsupported by the Viennese, hastily gave way, and for the moment left Hungary to enjoy the independence so easily secured.

Bohemia.—The complete success of the Magyars led naturally to a similar outburst amongst the Czechs. Bohemia too was promised constitutional self-government, but the situation here was complicated by the fact that Germans formed a large proportion of the population. These of course resented the notion of being subjected to the government of Slavs, and, being in sympathy with the ideal of a united Germany, began to discuss with fellow-German patriots a scheme for creating a German national parliament to which Bohemia should send repre-

sentatives. As a counter to this programme, the Cze^{ch}s called a Pan-Slav congress at Prague for the purpose of uniting the Slavic races all over the empire against the German nationalist schemes. This congress, however, proved a veritable Babel of tongues. The delegates were eventually obliged to communicate with one another in the hated German language, the only one with which all were familiar. The meeting thus served only to inflame racial hatred still further, and the passions provoked, fanned by extreme democratic demands and industrial disputes, led during the month of June to disorder in the streets of Prague, culminating in serious riots. The Austrian military commandant, Prince Windischgrätz, was a man with no more sympathy with German liberalism than with Czech nationalism. Unable to obtain any clear lead from Vienna, he resolved to take matters into his own hands. On his own authority he decided to ignore the imperial government's promise of constitutional government, and, the decision once taken, he acted with the utmost vigour. On June 17 he mercilessly bombarded the city and reduced it to passive obedience. His action was the turning point of the revolutionary drama in the Austrian Empire. Hitherto the government had given way both to the liberals in Vienna and to the nationalists in Prague and Pesth. The easy success of Windischgrätz showed how popular insurrection could be dealt with. When he was congratulated on having won a victory for the Germans over the Cze^{ch}s he returned the significant answer that he had merely put down a revolt against authority. The fate of Prague was in store for Vienna and Pesth.

The South-Slavs.—Meanwhile the question of Hungarian self-government had, been complicated by the attitude of the southern Slavs, to whom the Magyars steadily refused the rights that they themselves had won. Slav deputations to Pesth demanding self-government and the official recognition of their own languages had been denied a

hearing, and the tide of national feeling rose in proportion to the efforts of the Magyars to hold it in check. In this situation, Count Joseph Jellachich, the governor of Croatia, himself a Slavonic nobleman but devoted to the Hapsburg cause, saw his opportunity and determined, like Windischgrätz in Prague, to act upon his own authority. He deliberately fomented the national antipathy between the Slavs and the Magyars for the purpose of sacrificing both nations to Austria. While Kossuth's government in Hungary was proceeding with the policy of separation, instituting a separate coinage and openly encouraging the German national movement as likely to free Hungary from German interference by absorbing the Austrian provinces in a Greater Germany, Jellachich was encouraging the Slavs to fight loyally for the emperor against their immediate oppressors the Magyars. In September he advanced against Pesth with the half-hearted consent of the imperial government, which had hitherto hesitated to stir up racial war, but which was now recovering some of its courage. The invasion, however, made little headway at first. The Slavs were defeated and forced to withdraw, losing the whole of their rearguard in the action. Here for the time the Hungarian success came to an end. Kossuth had relied upon his friends the German liberals of Vienna for aid. In October the students and artisans again rose in rebellion, but Windischgrätz and Jellachich, who turned aside from Hungary for the purpose, made an end of revolution in the capital by bombarding it for two days and driving off a Hungarian force which Kossuth sent to relieve it.

The Restoration of the Imperial Government. The Reconquest of Hungary.—The suppression of the Viennese revolutionaries altered the whole situation. The imperial government, which by this time had restored its ascendancy in north Italy (see page 145), was now inspired by a spirit which rejected all compromise. The old emperor, whose weakness of mind had always unfitted him for his difficult

task, was now induced to abdicate in favour of his nephew Francis Joseph, then eighteen years of age. A body of ministers took charge of the government, and, acting vigorously together, spared no steps that might lead to the complete restoration of absolute government. Hungary was now isolated and faced by the united Slavs and Germans under the leadership of men pledged to maintain the integrity of the empire. The Magyars, however, had no thought of surrender, and, under Kossuth's inspiring leadership, resisted the Austrian advance with great desperation for the next eight months, relying mainly on the vast extent of their country and on the fact that even though a truce had been concluded in north Italy no considerable portion of the Austrian troops there could yet be spared to take part in the struggle nearer home. In the spring of 1849 their prospects brightened, for they managed to retake Pesth, which had been occupied by Windischgrätz in January, and actually cleared Hungary of the imperialist forces. Moreover, the Slavs were at last beginning to discover that they had been used merely as tools—that they had no more hope of a grant of self-government from the Austrians than from the Magyars—and their enthusiasm for the struggle had accordingly abated. Thus encouraged, Kossuth took the fatal step of proclaiming Hungary an independent republic with himself as president. The results were immediate. Many of his own supporters, who had always looked askance upon his ardently democratic ideas and who all along had been struggling only for the maintenance of the ancient rights of Hungary under the Hapsburgs, were now hopelessly alienated. Moreover, the declaration of a republic incurred the relentless hostility of a new foe in the person of the Tsar Nicholas, who had every reason to fear the effects that Kossuth's success might have in Poland. At the invitation of Francis Joseph he poured his troops over the Carpathians, while at the same time the Austrians renewed their advance from the west. At last, in August,

the Magyars were forced to submit. Kossuth¹ abdicated and fled, first to Turkey and then to England, where his oratory and his tales of heroism aroused deep sympathy for the afflictions of his people. The republican forces surrendered unconditionally to the Russians and by them were handed over to the frenzied vengeance of the Austrian government.

The Final Triumph of the Imperial Government.—The punishment of Hungary was perhaps more severe and more thorough than that which any high-spirited people has suffered in modern times. There were numberless executions. The Magyars were deprived of every vestige of self-government. The administration of the country passed entirely into the hands of German officials from Vienna. Its youth was enrolled in Austrian regiments and forced to serve on the remotest confines of the empire. Under such a régime, reduced to a passive and sullen acquiescence, the spirit of the race seemed broken, and nearly twenty years passed before it could again hold up its head.

The government now set itself deliberately to extinguish nationalism and constitutional government throughout the empire. The German language became the exclusive means of official communication. All forms of self-government were destroyed and all promises of constitutions withdrawn. For the next ten years the whole country was ruled from Vienna in a spirit of uncompromising absolutism, in the vain endeavour to fuse all the inhabitants into a united Austrian kingdom, but this attempt was far from proving a source of strength. Everywhere there was sullen discontent, not only among the Slavs and the Magyars, but amongst the Poles of Galicia and the Roumans of Transylvania, whose hopes had equally been disappointed. Even the Germans of Austria disapproved of the reactionary absolutism of the policy now followed. The government had successfully re-established its sway, but at what cost was seen later, when the empire had to face the more national government of Prussia in 1866.

CHAPTER XII

REVOLUTION IN GERMANY, 1848-1849

The German National Ideal. The **Frankfurt Parliament.**—We have already seen that previous to 1848 Germany had been for the most part in a state of political unrest. Representative institutions already existed in a few states, and there was a growing demand for them elsewhere. The news of the February Revolution in Paris was followed by a series of commotions in several of the lesser states, and in most cases the rulers hastened to grant to their excited subjects the constitutional rights that they had so long refused, only to withdraw them again as soon as the panic was over. The importance of these local disturbances lay not in their immediate effect upon the political conditions of this or that state, but in the renewed opportunity that they everywhere gave for agitation in favour of effective national unity, for in Germany at that time liberalism and nationalism went always hand in hand. Amongst German democrats there had long existed a party determined to effect the transformation of the German Confederation into some form of strong state. Burning with patriotism, and keeping always before their eyes the exalted ideal of the unity of their nation, the agitators were apt to be blind to the difficulties which then, as always before, stood in their way—the jealousy between Austria and Prussia, the interests of the separate states of which Germany was composed, and the problems connected with Austria's non-German possessions. However, during the commotion of March, 1848, an organised national party came into being for the purpose

of realising at last the great ideal. A self-chosen gathering of reformers assembled at Heidelberg and devised a scheme for the creation of a national parliament to be elected by the votes of the whole people. This central parliament was to take over the entire regulation of commerce, foreign affairs and national defence throughout Germany, including the German-speaking provinces of Austria. A preliminary convention was actually elected to settle the details of the new scheme and met at Frankfurt on March 31. It was clear, however, that the success of the scheme depended upon the attitude taken up towards it by the separate states concerned, for their governments had hitherto taken no share in the arrangements. The Diet of the Confederation, though it knew what was going forward, was conscious of its own inherent weakness and took no decisive step. Austria, fully occupied with her own troubles, could for the moment be neglected. Bavaria was openly hostile, but the rulers of many of the lesser states, still under the influence of the panic of the last few weeks, gave their adhesion, for they feared to provoke the strong passions that were abroad. Much, therefore, seemed to depend upon the action of Prussia, for the weight of the Prussian army thrown into either scale would far outbalance the support or opposition of the minor princes.

Frederick William IV Embraces the National Cause.—Now, as we have seen, King Frederick William IV of Prussia was at heart a man of deeply rooted conservative prejudices, who at the same time had seemed to be by no means opposed to representative institutions, provided that his divinely granted authority were not infringed. He was also regarded as an enlightened patriot, who would certainly not attempt to thwart the schemes that were being laid at Frankfurt. A Prussian House of Representatives had been assembled in 1847, but when the members had discovered that the king had no intention of summoning them regularly or of allowing them any real control over the government, they had adopted a

policy of frank opposition to the throne, and in consequence had been dismissed. In March 1848 Berlin was full of ominous symptoms of growing agitation. Monster meetings were held, and deputations were sent to the king demanding freedom of speech and of the press, the responsibility of ministers to parliament and the like. On March 18, after some days of hesitation, during which arrived the news of the revolution in Vienna and the fall of Metternich (see page 128), the king was induced to put his signature to a decree announcing that he would summon a second parliament and would do his best to promote the national representative constitution now being prepared for the whole of Germany. This declaration was naturally received at Frankfurt with the utmost joy, for the cause of German unity now seemed half won. At the news of the concessions the Berliners, some of them to express their gratification, others perhaps to demand something more definite, thronged round the palace. A scuffle ensued with the troops, soon followed by serious street fighting, which continued through the night. The king's paternal instincts were shocked and distressed at the course which events had taken, for his greatest grief was to find his people in opposition to his will, and he now gave way altogether to the popular clamour. He ordered the troops to be withdrawn from the capital and actually appeared on the balcony of his palace to salute a triumphant procession of rioters, who defiled before him, bearing the corpses of their comrades slain during the struggle. The cause of constitutional progress in Prussia now seemed secure, but the king thought it necessary to humiliate himself still further before the popular party. He issued a proclamation declaring that henceforth Prussia was absorbed in Germany, and even consented to ride through the streets wearing a sash displaying the black, red and gold colours of the German nationalist movement. This unlucky ride restored to him his popularity in Prussia, and enabled him to proceed with his concessions without

further¹⁰ humiliation, but at the same time it greatly weakened the authority and prestige of the Prussian government in the eyes of Germany and of Europe. Nor was it in any sense a real step towards consummating the national ideal, for it revived all the old jealousy with which the minor German princes had always regarded any attempt of Prussia to take the lead, and it also displeased many of the nationalists, who considered that he had no warrant to assume the character of a German leader without first receiving the authority of the whole nation.

Obstacles to German Unity.—At the moment, however, the patriots at Frankfurt regarded the surrender of Frederick William to the agitators at Berlin as decisive. The national parliament was duly elected amid unbounded enthusiasm, and met on May 18. Instead of hastening to set the whole organisation of a national government in working order before Austria could free her hands of her embarrassments in Hungary and Italy, it wasted several months in endless discussions of what it called the “Primary Rights” of Germans—the principles of personal liberty and of equality before the law. Nor could it arrive at any final solution of the old difficulties which had always stood in the way of German unity and which sooner or later had to be faced. For example, what were to be the boundaries of the new consolidated state? Should the provinces of Holstein and Schleswig be included? The former, a member of the Confederation, was entirely, and the latter largely, inhabited by Germans, but whose business was it to provide the armed force necessary to wrest them from Denmark? What was to be the position of the Germans in Bohemia? How much of Austria was to be included? What sort of state could it be that would include two great European Powers that had been rivals in the past and might easily become so again? Yet if Austria were altogether excluded, would she consent to be deprived for ever of the influence that she had hitherto

exerted over the Confederation ? By the end of the year it had become clear that the European Powers would not permit the spoliation of Denmark and that, however strongly German national feeling might favour the inclusion of Austria, Francis Joseph's new government had recovered enough of its strength to prevent the dismembering of the Hapsburg dominions at the bidding of the nationalists.

The German Crown Offered to Prussia.—The parliament at Frankfurt therefore fell back upon a narrower Germany, from which Austria should be altogether excluded. Yet even here there were formidable difficulties, for Austria showed herself equally unwilling to be entirely shut out and so to be deprived of her ancient predominance. The scales now dropped from the eyes of the Frankfurt parliament, and they saw at last that without the support of an army to back their policy their efforts were useless. In March, 1849, therefore, hastily completing the constitution, they resolved to offer the position of German Emperor to the King of Prussia, with the idea that if he accepted the title, the Prussian army would be available for the coercion of any of the states that refused to accept the constitution and, if necessary, for its defence in the field of battle against Austria.

Reaction. The Offer Refused.—The offer found Frederick William in an altogether changed frame of mind. The collapse of democratic dictation in Vienna in October, 1848, had been followed by an equally sudden reaction in Berlin. The king had repented of his submission, had ordered Berlin to be occupied by troops in overwhelming force, and had dissolved the Prussian parliament summoned in March. Later on, having shown that he was once more his own master, he had permitted a new parliament to assemble and had issued as an act of grace a new constitution, in which, however, the ministers were responsible to the king and not to the parliament. Strong enough

to come to a decision independently of the wishes of the nationalists, he refused the offered title, and announced his rejection of the new German constitution. He knew that if he accepted, or tried to interfere in any way with the independence of the states, he would have to run the risk of war with Austria, and his army was not in a fit condition to take the field against a first-rate Power. In spite of his temporary surrender to the people in March, 1848, he was by nature, as we have seen, a conservative, and to accept the Imperial crown from a popular and almost revolutionary assembly that had no legal position whatever was repugnant to his deepest convictions. Moreover, he had the deepest veneration for the ancient Hapsburg Empire and was unwilling to take any step likely to add to Austria's embarrassments. Lastly, he was to some extent influenced by a significant series of speeches made by a then little known member of parliament named Otto von Bismarck, who had already outlined the alternative policy by which German unity was subsequently to be achieved. He was a Prussian first, Bismarck had said, and not a German, and he feared that such a union as was proposed would not increase but diminish the authority of Prussia. In the new government, instead of being the leader, she would become only one of many states. If she were to fight Austria on those terms, defeat would mean a disgraceful peace, and victory would bring only a doubtful reward. The true Prussian policy was that which Frederick the Great had followed when he seized Silesia. Prussia must be made strong enough to expel Austria from Germany, to destroy all opposition from the smaller states, and to order them what government they should have. "The Prussian eagle," he declared, "shall spread out his wings as guardian and ruler all over Germany, but he must be free, and not bound down by agreements with other states." The German crown must be taken not as a favour but by the sword.

The Collapse of the Revolutionary Movement.—For 'such a policy, of course, Prussia was not yet ready, but in default of it no progress could be made with the task in hand. With Frederick William's refusal, the whole work of the German national parliament came to a sudden close. It was realised that without Prussian support, and against the expressed wish of Austria, no steps could be taken to put the proposed constitution into operation. The whole scheme was therefore abandoned, and the members of the self-constituted parliament at Frankfurt gradually dispersed. Thus, but for the fact that Prussia now enjoyed some form of representative government, the German revolution of 1848 left everything as it had been. Before long, at the suggestion of Austria, the Diet of the Confederation, which had been abandoned when the new constitution had seemed likely to come into operation, was solemnly revived upon the basis of the treaties of 1815, and all hope of the real unity of Germany had perforce to be deferred for another twenty years. The utter collapse of the national movement was everywhere regarded as a disaster, for which the timidity of King Frederick William was in part to blame. Among the Prussians, on the other hand, the sight of their sovereign perforce relinquishing his grasp upon the long-sought prize at the behest of Austria produced a sense of deep humiliation and a growing feeling of exasperation against the state whose selfish policy had frustrated the national ambition.

CHAPTER XIII

REVOLUTION IN ITALY, 1846-1849

Parties in Italy.—Without the writings of Mazzini the work of uniting and freeing Italy would have been impossible; but though they had done so much to move the enthusiasm of patriots all over the peninsula and to show the need for local self-sacrifice and community of purpose, far more than this was required. Up to 1847 there still remained much divergence of opinion on the question of the means by which the great purpose was to be achieved, and upon the subject of the future government of Italy when united and freed. On the one hand Mazzini's own disciples still relied upon popular insurrection, incited and organised by secret societies, and they looked forward to the foundation of an Italian republic with its capital at Rome. On the other hand, since 1833 there had been steadily growing a more moderate party, largely inspired by Mazzini's teaching, but relying upon other means, and less revolutionary in its aims. This party was composed of men who had been disgusted by the high-strung sentiment and the futile outbreaks of the secret societies and who doubted whether by conspiracy backed by mere enthusiasm, however general, the unity of Italy could ever be accomplished. They saw that, to face the might of Austria, what was required was military power and discipline, and that the talk of republicanism and all such advanced democratic ideas only weakened the national cause, by alienating from it the sympathies of Piedmont, which alone possessed the requisite military organisation. The policy that they would have preferred to follow was one



of watchful patience, their dread being that they would be drawn into conflict before the way had been prepared for success.

The course of events was therefore likely to be dictated by the fact that these two parties, neither behind the other in its real devotion to the cause, misunderstood one another and were as yet incapable of co-operation. If the republicans were to plunge into the struggle, bringing upon themselves the whole strength of Austria, the moderates, doubting whether the hour had yet struck, would give but hesitating help. The air would be filled with accusations of lukewarmness and treachery from one side and of headstrong rashness from the other. Even success would certainly be followed by disputes between monarchists and republicans. Thus until some settlement could be reached between the parties as to the goal towards which they were to strive, little progress was to be anticipated.

Pius IX.—In 1846 a spark was set to the inflammable material with which Italy everywhere abounded by the action of a new pope elected the previous year. Pius IX was a kindly and high-minded gentleman, full of sympathy with national aspirations, and of concern for the wrongs and sufferings of the Italian people. He vaguely dreamed perhaps of presiding himself over a confederation of Italian states, freed from foreign domination and regenerated by his own beneficial influence and example. He began his reign by proclaiming the pardon of all political offenders and suspects in his own dominions—in other words, of all those enthusiasts who were suffering for their patriotism. He lacked, however, the statesmanship to foresee where such a policy might lead, and later, when the strength and trend of the forces which he had released were forcibly brought home to him, when he found himself drifting into the position of a national champion against Catholic Austria, he tried timidly to draw back, thus bringing upon his own head the whole fury of the movement which

he himself had helped to initiate. The result of his first step was startling. The news that liberalism had received the sanction of the head of the Church was received all over Italy with indescribable enthusiasm. During 1847 patriotic demonstrations took place in Naples, Tuscany and Piedmont. The Sicilians broke into violent disorder and in twenty-four days freed the whole island except the fortress of Messina from Neapolitan troops. At the same time Ferdinand II could find no way of quieting his Neapolitan subjects but that of promising them constitutional government, and the pope, rather grudgingly when it came to the point, was obliged to do the same in Rome. In Lombardy and Venetia also, though outwardly the inhabitants were as tamely submissive as ever to the Austrian yoke, the intolerable situation was slowly gathering to a head. Austrians were ostentatiously shunned in Milanese society, forbidden colours were worn, the "Marseillaise" was whistled, and the election of an Italian as archbishop led to popular rejoicings in the streets which were suppressed with exasperating violence. At last, in January, 1848, blood was shed in a street riot arising out of a foolish joke of the citizens. As the sale of tobacco was a monopoly of the Austrian government, it occurred to them to spoil the government profits by giving up smoking. The troops retaliated by swaggering about the city puffing tobacco smoke into the faces of all who passed. Protests led to blows, and soon the streets had to be cleared by sabre and bayonet.

The Outbreak in Milan.—Thus excitement was everywhere spreading, when in February came the news of events in Paris, followed in March by that of the revolution in Vienna and the fall of Metternich. On March 18, the whole population of Milan, armed with bottles and stones, spontaneously flung themselves upon the astonished garrison. Deafened by the constant pealing of bells, pelted incessantly from the housetops, and prostrated by fatigue and hunger, the Austrian troops held their

ground for five days, but were then compelled to evacuate the city. In Venice, though no actual fighting took place, the result was the same. The panic-stricken Austrians abandoned the arsenal, and withdrew their army and fleet.

The Insurrection becomes General. Charles Albert.—The tidings of these popular successes proved the call to arms for which Italy had been waiting. The smaller cities everywhere followed the example of the capitals. The rulers of Parma, Modena and Tuscany fled, or surrendered to the popular clamour. Streams of volunteers from Piedmont, from the Papal States, and from Naples, poured into Lombardy. Even Ferdinand, to win popular applause, talked of allowing the Neapolitan army to support the national cause. All seemed now to turn upon the attitude of Piedmont. Would she intervene to organise and lead what was hitherto mere insurrection, or would she disown a movement that was for the most part democratic and frankly republican? For some days Charles Albert and his ministers hesitated to take the final step. They had always looked forward to an eventual struggle with Austria, and in some ways, with their enemy embarrassed by her troubles nearer home, the time seemed ripe, but they had hoped to be able to secure some outside support when the moment arrived. Nothing was to be expected from France or Germany in 1848, and the responsibility of taking a step which might bring Piedmont face to face with a first-class Power was one before which a bolder man than Charles Albert might have quailed. Success might mean the establishment of an Italian republic from which his kingdom would necessarily be excluded. Failure might bring to an end all Italian hopes and spell the utter ruin of Piedmont. Charles Albert's people, however, became impatient. Camillo di Cavour, who was one day to be the statesman of the union of Italy, and who shortly before this had founded a newspaper to advocate that union under the Kingdom

of Sardinia, now issued in it an impassioned demand for a general war of liberation. "The supreme hour of the Savoy dynasty has struck," he cried. "We are bound in conscience to declare that only one path is open to the nation, the government and the king: War—instant war." Carried away by this enthusiasm Charles Albert at last resolved to invade Lombardy, but the decision, if indeed it was the right one, came too late. The delay had been fatal to success, and was made worse by the unpreparedness of the army. Milan had risen on March 18. The Piedmontese did not cross the frontier in force until twelve days later. Not only had the Austrians been given time to recover from their momentary panic and to receive reinforcements, but, quite as important, Charles Albert had lost the chance of winning the gratitude of the Milanese by appearing as their saviour, for they were now inclined to think that his help was no longer needed. He was even suspected of having waited till victory was assured and of then intervening merely for the purpose of annexing Lombardy as his reward. He was therefore by no means cordially welcomed, and when the Austrians, refreshed and reinforced, began the work of reconquest, he found himself in actual command of no troops but those of Piedmont. The volunteers from the other states, for the most part an unorganised and undisciplined rabble, with incredible shortness of sight refused to recognise his authority. Thus at the opening of the campaign chance after chance was let slip for want of proper co-operation between the allies, and when the fighting began in earnest it was the Austrians who took the offensive. On July 25, Radetzky, their commander, won a decisive victory at Custozza, which resulted in the reoccupation of Milan.

Reaction.—Meanwhile there were already signs of a reaction unfavourable to the Italian cause. The pope, astonished by the commotion which his well-meant action had provoked, and in deep fear of offending Austria by seeming to pose as a national leader, had issued a pro-

clamation declaring his hatred of war and his equal love for all nations. This step may not have been intended as a final defection from the national cause, but it was generally understood as such, and lost its author all his short-lived popularity. Ferdinand of Naples had seized a favourable opportunity to mass troops in the capital and to let them loose upon the populace. After making an end of all resistance he had calmly withdrawn his promise of a constitution, and had recalled the force which, to satisfy popular clamour, he had ordered to the front.

Revolution in Rome.—In view of these disappointments, Italians looked angrily about for victims upon whom to vent their fury. They found them in the moderate party and particularly in Charles Albert and his advisers, who were accused of mismanaging the national movement and of trying to manipulate it for their own benefit. Everywhere the ideal of Mazzini, that of a united republican Italy, began to recover its lost ground. In Rome, despite the fact that the pope and his ministers were still protesting their devotion to Italy and their friendship for reform and constitutional government, the extreme democrats rose against them. In November, Rossi, the leading minister, was assassinated. Pius IX now completed his change of front by fleeing to the protection of the reactionary Ferdinand. In February, 1849, Rome was declared a republic, and Mazzini himself, confident in the speedy realisation of his visions, hastened to the spot. Similar events occurred in Tuscany, Parma and Modena, and there was already talk of summoning a parliament to represent the whole of Italy.

Novara.—The discredited House of Savoy remained completely out of touch with these democratic movements. After Custoza an armistice had been arranged with the Austrians, but under the influence of wounded pride and a determination not to surrender all their hopes after a

single defeat, the Piedmontese drifted back into a renewal of the war. In March, 1849, Charles Albert denounced the armistice and a second time advanced upon Lombardy. Unsupported from Rome or Tuscany, he was utterly beaten at Novara before the end of the month. He sagerly sought death in the battle, and rather than conclude a peace apparently fatal to the ambitions of his house and his people he abdicated in favour of his son Victor Emmanuel, and fled to Portugal, where he died, a broken and disappointed man.

The Defence of Rome.—At the news of Novara, the tide of reaction rapidly gained strength. Ferdinand began preparations for the reduction of Sicily. Venice was closely besieged. The Austrians were easily able to restore the Grand Duke of Tuscany to his throne. Lombardy was obliged to submit to the yoke. To overthrow the young Roman republic, however, proved less easy. While lovers of liberty all over the world had eyes for nothing but the heroism displayed in its defence, Catholics everywhere held it to be their duty to combine to restore the pope to his dominions. Ferdinand's troops advanced from the south, and the Austrians threatened a move from Tuscany. Louis Napoleon, by this time installed as president in Paris, paid the price of the catholic vote in France by despatching a force to take part in the attack—an act which won him the hatred of all true republicans. In spite of the enthusiastic devotion which his presence inspired, Mazzini must have yielded at once had there not been at his side a born leader of men.

Garibaldi.—The biography of Garibaldi reads more like a chapter of romance than one of sober fact less than a century old. It is a record of stirring adventure in many lands, of hairbreadth escapes from peril by land and water, of a life spent gladly and unselfishly in the pursuit of an heroic ideal. Endowed with unsurpassed personal courage and military genius of an untutored sort, with a manner that

won his bitterest opponents to his side, and with a voice that could in an instant quell a mutiny or stay a rout, he was an ideal leader in a patriotic cause. After the unsuccessful revolution of 1833 he had lived as a homeless exile. For a time he was a teacher of Italian in Constantinople, and then became the leader of the Italian legion, a body of exiles who fought in the cause of liberty in the numerous South American wars of the time. He had returned to Italy in 1848, and after Castozza had won rapturous applause by his vigorous leadership of his bands of irregulars against the Austrians in the hill country around the Italian lakes. He and his picturesque following, arrayed in the red shirts and wearing the long hair which they had adopted as a sort of uniform in South America, now appeared as the champions of the Roman republic. His leonine face and yellow beard, his generous sympathies and kindly heart, proved the bond of union in the glorious defence. Throughout the months of May and June the Neapolitans and the French were kept at bay, their first assaults being altogether discomfited. It was only when the French, who had been reinforced in overwhelming numbers, made a surprise attack under cover of a truce, that any impression was made upon the defence. Even then, though the walls had been breached by an intense bombardment, the desperate struggle was continued for nine days longer. At last there remained only the choice between submission and flight. A small but gallant band accompanied Garibaldi in a dash through the very midst of the investing forces across the Apennines to the Adriatic coast. Here they were hunted down by the Austrians and dispersed, but Garibaldi himself made his way safely to New York, to await his opportunity.

The Movement Collapses.—With Piedmont negotiating a humiliating peace, Lombardy completely subjected, Rome once more in the hands of the pope, who hesitated no longer to crush out popular liberty, and Naples and Tuscany at the feet of their princes, the end soon came.

Venice held out against the Austrians until the end of August, but the imminence of starvation and the rapid spread of cholera at last made unconditional surrender inevitable. In September a Neapolitan expedition landed in Sicily, and village by village the island was reduced by bombardment and massacre. All who were too proud or too intelligent to acquiesce in Ferdinand's misrule were left to languish in jails so filthy that doctors refused to visit them, and amid calculated horrors that defy description. Thus all Italy once more lay prostrate. No amount of enthusiasm and patriotism had been able to outweigh the incorrigible internal divisions and want of preparation that had wrecked the movement. Yet the patriots refused even now altogether to abandon their hopes: Mazzini had escaped from Rome and continued his work of encouragement. The hour of Garibaldi was yet to strike. In Piedmont the new king, a man of greater resolution and quickness of decision than his father, refused to continue the hopeless war, dissolving parliament rather than yield to the popular clamour, but this he did only that he might conserve the resources of his little kingdom for the next struggle. With equal firmness he declined to act on the Austrian hints that he should abolish the constitutional government which his father had granted. More than this, by summoning to his councils Cavour and others known throughout Italy for their liberal sentiments, he showed that he was preparing to lead Italy once more against her oppressors.

CHAPTER XIV

THE SECOND EMPIRE, THE CRIMEAN WAR AND THE BALKAN STATES, 1852-1867

- 1853. War between Russia and Turkey.
- 1854. England and France intervene.
- 1855. Death of Nicholas. Fall of Sebastopol.
- 1856. Congress of Paris.
- 1859. Union of Moldavia and Walachia.
- 1863. Election of George I, King of Greece.
- 1866. Election of Charles I, Prince of Roumania.

The Second Empire.—With the proclamation of the French Empire in December, 1852, a new era was inaugurated in the relations between the leading states of Europe. For nearly forty years the fear of revolution and the memory of the horrors of general war had driven statesmen for the most part into a policy of strict conservatism at home and of watchful caution in their dealings with one another. The almost complete collapse, however, of nationalist and liberal hopes in 1848 and 1849, and the circumstances of the accession of Louis Napoleon were the deciding features in determining the course of events during the next thirty years, which formed a period of almost constant war.

Napoleon for the Moment Absolute.—Napoleon III owed his throne largely to the conviction among Frenchmen that the part played in European affairs by their governments since 1815 had been unworthy of their country. From a Napoleon, on the other hand, military distinction was to be expected, and, in place of the policy of "peace without honour," which had hitherto prevailed, one that

should give to France its rightful place as the arbiter of Europe. Thanks to the discredit that had fallen upon all the parties that had tried to govern France since 1815, his seizure of autocratic power in 1852 was everywhere acquiesced in. For a time his popularity knew no bounds. The discreditable features of the conspiracy by which the republic had been transformed into an empire were forgotten, and he was allowed to create an administration in which there was little apparent limitation to his personal power. Of the Houses of Parliament, the upper was nominated by himself, and the lower, though elected by universal suffrage, was summoned and dissolved by his will, and could do no more than discuss and approve the measures that he submitted to it. The emperor was supreme commander of the army and navy. All that concerned peace and war, treaties and alliances, was left altogether in the hands of himself or of ministers responsible only to him. Following in what he honestly believed to be his uncle's footsteps, he persuaded himself that he was playing the despot only that in his own good time, when the nation had been duly educated to receive it, he might the more surely establish the reign of liberty; and he professed to look forward to the time when such a consummation should be possible.

The Foundations of His Power.—Now in such a country as France, where democratic opinions were already all but universal, a structure of this nature was bound to be dependent upon the confidence and personal popularity that the emperor himself could command. As long as he successfully played the part that was expected of him, gave back to France her self-respect, won for her military glory and the esteem of Europe, and exhibited her as the champion of enlightened progress, so long would he be permitted to proceed with his dreamy schemes for the regeneration of Europe. Failure, however, or humiliation, would immediately threaten the whole foundation of his power, for all the blame, whatever went wrong, must

necessarily recoil upon himself. Thus he was never really his own master. At the outset, anxious to allay the fears excited everywhere in Europe by his name, he proclaimed the pacific desires of the newly founded empire; and his own intentions were for the most part unaggressive and certainly free from the worst forms of personal ambition. Yet in his foreign dealings, in order to maintain the part that he had set himself to play, he was obliged to grasp at every opportunity that arose for vigorous self-assertion.

The "Holy Places."—The state of Europe being what it was in 1852, the erection of such a system in France constituted a permanent menace to peace. Innumerable questions were ripening for settlement. In many of these, the internal troubles of Italy and Germany for example, the French held themselves to be directly interested, while others, such as the state of the Turkish Empire, the treatment of the Poles, and the fate of Schleswig-Holstein, were bound to provide Napoleon with the opportunities that he needed. In fact, no sooner was he fairly on the throne than events in Turkey suggested to him his first step in the active pursuit of glory. The custody of the reputed sepulchre of Our Lord and of other holy places in Palestine had been granted in the sixteenth century to the Catholic Church. These privileges had been invaded by monks of the Greek or Orthodox Church, but had been reaffirmed owing to the intervention of France in 1740, France herself acquiring a recognised position as guarantor of the arrangement. Revolutionary France had not troubled herself with such matters, while Catholics generally had suffered the shrines to fall into decay by their neglect, with the result that Greek monks had once more stepped in and had succeeded with Russian support in reasserting their claims. Louis Napoleon, while still president, had reopened the question with the object of winning the Catholic vote in France, and he was now inclined to push the Catholic claims. Moreover, on his

elevation to the throne his new title had been very grudgingly acknowledged by the Tsar Nicholas, and the question of the holy places acquired in his eyes a threefold value, as furnishing a chance at once of advertising the might of his empire, of pleasing his Catholic supporters and of irritating Nicholas. The Sultan, in despair between France and Russia, temporised and made inconsistent promises. Each Power treated the Ottoman reply as confirmation of its own claims, and declined compromise, Napoleon, because he was determined to score a diplomatic success, Nicholas, because the question of the holy places was to him only an offshoot of a far more formidable problem.

Russia, England and the Turkish Empire.—For some time past the mind of the tsar had been deeply occupied with the condition of the Turkish Empire. Since 1829 the principal Russian interests in south-east Europe, the preservation of an open road to the Mediterranean and the protection of the Sultan's Orthodox Christian subjects, had been maintained by diplomatic influence in Constantinople rather than by a policy of conquest. After 1842, however, the tsar had been obliged to watch the substitution of English for Russian control over Turkish affairs, and he was determined to miss no chance of re-asserting himself. The matter seemed to him the more pressing because he was convinced that the end of the Turkish Empire in Europe was at hand, and no efforts that he had previously made to arrange for the approaching catastrophe had served their purpose. He had devised, and had presented more than once for the consideration of British statesmen, a plan by which England and Russia, working together, to the exclusion of other European Powers, should make complete arrangements for disposing of Turkish territory when the expected collapse of the Sultan's government should come to pass. For himself, he disclaimed any desire for territorial acquisition, but hinted at the establishment of independent states of

Moldavia, Walachia, Bulgaria and Bosnia, all, of course, under Russian influence and protection. If England were inclined to take Egypt by way of compensation, he would offer no objection. Such a scheme, however, was too wide and far-sighted in its conceptions to appeal to the rather cautious politicians then in charge of British foreign affairs. They were, as always, full of suspicion of the designs of Russia upon Constantinople, and of prejudice against the autocrat who had destroyed the liberties of Hungary and of Poland. Above all, they failed to realise at this time that to replace the Turkish Empire in the peninsula by a series of national states would provide the surest possible guarantee against a Russian advance in that direction. In any case the British ministers did not agree that the fall of Turkey was imminent, and without absolutely rejecting the proposals, they showed no enthusiasm for them, preferring rather to submit the future of the Balkan peninsula to a general conference. Thus the conversations on the subject, which, if carried on in a spirit of far-sighted statesmanship, might have settled the "Eastern Question," and avoided the seventy years of general distrust and strife which it has caused, led to no result; and the opportunity vanished, never to recur in so simple a form.

Thrown back upon his own resources, the tsar determined to take the action which the urgency of the situation seemed to demand. In Moldavia, in Walachia and in Serbia there had been perpetual unrest which might at any moment result in the establishment of entirely independent national states, and these, unless carefully controlled by himself, would bar Russia from the Mediterranean quite as effectually as the Turks had done. He therefore resolved to insist upon his treaty rights as protector of the Orthodox Christians, and to seize every opportunity for interference and mediation which those rights and the general Balkan unrest afforded him. In 1853, when the question of the holy places arose, Nicholas was con-

vinced that the moment had come when Russia must make a firm stand or turn her back for ever upon the Mediterranean.

The Demands of Nicholas.—Thus, in answer to the French pretensions, the tsar, besides demanding that the Greeks should be left undisturbed in the custody of the holy places, insisted that his vague rights of exercising protection over the Sultan's Orthodox subjects should be definitely recognised. Now such a claim was not without its justification, for the lot of Christians in some parts of Turkey was none too secure, but when pushed to its extreme in such a country, where any difference between governors and governed would immediately take on the appearance of a religious dispute and where misgovernment and disorder were perpetual, it would have given the Russians authority to interfere at any moment that they pleased, and in almost any district of the Sultan's European possessions. Without some limitation, therefore, it was scarcely possible for the Turks to acquiesce in demands that might have made them practically the vassals of the tsar.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.—While the Sultan was still hesitating between the respective claims of France and Russia, a new weight was thrown into the scales. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, the British ambassador at Constantinople, regarded the Russian demands for a protectorate as an insidious attack upon the rights of Turkish sovereignty; and without the authority of his own government, he urged the Sultan to reject them. Under his influence, privately exerted, a firm but courteous refusal was sent to Russia, in consequence of which the tsar broke off negotiations, withdrew his ambassador from Constantinople, and ordered his troops to occupy the Danubian Principalities of Moldavia and Walachia (May, 1853).

Uncertainty of the British Policy.—Hitherto the question had officially been one between France and Russia, but

the action of the British ambassador, as soon as it became known, put England in the position of a principal in the dispute, from which she could only withdraw by openly disavowing him. This, however, was not done. The English cabinet endeavoured to adopt a non-committal attitude. They were unwilling to engage in war even for the defence of Turkey from Russian aggression, but they were divided as to the means by which it could best be avoided. One section would have preferred to yield what was reasonable in the Russian demands, and another wished to show the tsar that any attempt to interfere with Turkey would be firmly resisted by Great Britain. Either party, left to itself, would probably have prevented the outbreak altogether. Their attempt to work together made it inevitable. As a half-measure, to content English public opinion, already deeply moved by its inveterate suspicion of Russia, they allowed the British fleet to assemble with that of France in the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles.

The Vienna Note.—War now seemed to be impending between Russia and Turkey, and France seemed to have gone too far to draw back. The resources of diplomacy, however, were not yet exhausted. A conference of the representatives of the European Powers was held at Vienna in July to try to find some means of stating the undeniable rights of the tsar in such a manner as would not place the Turkish government under the tutelage of Russia. A carefully worded note was duly drawn up and presented to the disputants. It was accepted by the tsar, but the Sultan refused it, and it was known that Lord Stratford, while recommending its acceptance, as he was bound to do, in his official capacity, took no pains to conceal his real opinion that even in its revised form it reduced Turkey to the position of a vassal state. Not content with refusing it, the Sultan, encouraged by the moral support afforded by the proximity of the French and British fleets, summoned the tsar to evacuate the Principali-

ties within fifteen days. The tsar of course declined, and in November actual hostilities commenced upon the Danube.

The "Massacre" of Sinope.—There was as yet no reason why the western Powers should have been drawn into the struggle. Officially at least they had joined with Austria and Prussia in recommending the Sultan to accept the Vienna note. His refusal cleared them of responsibility, and even deprived them of an excuse. Before the end of November, however, the Russian Black Sea Fleet fell upon and totally destroyed that of Turkey at Sinope, and the news of the action was received in London and Paris with a storm of indignation. The tsar was already the object of popular apprehension and hatred as an ambitious tyrant, and this perfectly legitimate act of war was unreasoningly accepted as a fresh proof of his perfidy and brutality. Amid the general excitement, the two governments were altogether unable to restrain public opinion. Napoleon, indeed, had no wish to do so, and a section at least of the English cabinet were of the same mind. By this time, of course, the question of the holy places had receded into the background. The cry was for a check to be put upon the ambitions of the tsar.

The Attitude of Nicholas.—With France determined to plunge, and England suffered to drift, into the struggle, what was the attitude of Nicholas? He was prepared to face war with France and Turkey rather than abandon his claims, especially since they had received, in a modified form, the approval of the Powers, but he had always entertained a warm admiration for England and a conviction that an understanding between her and his own country would be the surest guarantee of European peace. He had done his best to bring about that understanding, and, even when his efforts came to nothing, he failed to grasp the essential hostility with which he and his country were regarded by the majority of Englishmen—

a hostility that made the bolstering up of the effete and misruled empire of the Turks seem preferable to an alliance with himself. Above all, he was deluded, like other statesmen before and since, by the apparently pacific character of liberal and commercial England into thinking that she would never fight except in self-defence, and he was confirmed in his mistake by the sentimental oratory of the "peace at any price" politicians of the day. A clear indication that England was resolved to fight in defence of Turkey, if it had been delivered before it was too late for him to withdraw, would almost certainly have prevented war; but such an indication is just what English cabinets, torn between their desire to preserve the peace and the necessity of following a bellicose public opinion, have often found it difficult to give.

The Declaration of War.—It therefore came as a rude shock to the tsar when, in February, 1854, he was required by the two western Powers, under threat of war, and in terms that made acceptance difficult for any high-spirited nation, to withdraw his fleet from the Black Sea and his army from the Principalities. War was declared in March. The British and French fleets entered the Black Sea, another British force threatened the Baltic coasts of Russia, and a joint expedition, under Lord Raglan, a Waterloo veteran, and Marshal St. Arnaud, one of the conspirators of 1851, to whose machinations Napoleon owed his throne, landed at Varna to co-operate with the Turkish armies already fighting on the Danube. The object in view was of course to eject the Russians from Moldavia and Walachia; but before the allied armies came into the field, other circumstances had already accomplished that aim.

The Attitude of Austria.—The occupation of the Principalities in the autumn of 1853 had caused great misgiving in Austria. Francis Joseph owed a debt of gratitude to Nicholas for the assistance so recently given in Hungary,

but he was bound to regard with jealous suspicion any increase of Russian influence upon the Lower Danube, the highway of Austrian trade. In fact, deft handling of the situation by the diplomatists of the western Powers might have secured Austrian support at the time of their own declaration of war. Napoleon, however, knew that the adhesion of Austria to the alliance would make the situation of Russia impossible, and rather than see the tsar withdraw and the chance of fighting thus disappear altogether, he had deliberately hurried his own country and England into the conflict before the Austrians were ready. In June, 1854, just as the serious fighting upon the Danube might have been expected to begin, Francis Joseph intervened with the intention of dictating terms. The geographical position of Austria would have enabled him to strike decisively at the flank and rear of the Russian armies, and when his government required the immediate retirement of the Russians behind the Pruth, the tsar had no choice but to submit. An Austrian army actually occupied the Principalities, thus separating the would-be antagonists. It may be noted in passing that, without winning the friendship of France, the Austrian intervention earned for Francis Joseph the bitter hostility of Russia, and was to cost his country, as a statesman of the day predicted, a bitter payment in blood and tears a few years later when she needed Russian help against Prussia.

Determination to Continue the War.—Common sense would have dictated that this was the time for the restoration of peace, for the ostensible purpose of the war, the ejection of Russian troops from Turkish soil, had been attained. Neither Napoleon, however, nor the English cabinet were willing to humiliate themselves by withdrawing their costly expedition, which had been already landed in Turkey, without striking a blow. English public opinion demanded that the arch-autocrat should be humbled in the dust, and the French Emperor craved

some sensational triumph that would commend him to his subjects. It was therefore agreed, before bringing the war to a close, to deal a blow to Russian prestige by the destruction of Sebastopol, her arsenal on the Black Sea. In September, against the better judgment of its actual commanders, who acted on orders from home, the allied armies were re-embarked and launched upon the Crimea. The notion was that a surprise landing, followed by a vigorous dash upon the town, before the Russians could assemble their forces in the peninsula, would provide just that signal triumph that was required as a prelude to a glorious peace.

The War in the Crimea.—The enterprise turned out far otherwise. The landing was successfully accomplished on September 14, and six days later, some 60,000 strong, the allies forced the crossing of the Alma, a stream that barred their advance a few miles to the north of Sebastopol. An immediate pursuit after the battle would probably have accomplished the design at once, for the town was indifferently fortified and defended; but St. Arnaud, already sickening of cholera, of which he died a few days later, refused to advance, and the advantage of the surprise landing and the subsequent success was thrown away.

The allies now decided to wait while heavy guns and reinforcements were landed, and from that point onward chance after chance was missed of ending the campaign at a blow. Thus what had been intended to be the work of a few days was turned by constant delays, irresolution and divided counsels into a protracted and on the whole inglorious siege. The Russians were given time to pour troops into the Crimea and to build formidable fortifications under the very eyes of the besiegers. During the autumn the latter were themselves outnumbered and cooped up in the south-west of the peninsula; and at Balaclava and Inkerman they only saved themselves by fighting of the most heroic order from being hurled into the sea.

They maintained their ground until the New Year, only to be confronted with the hardships of a winter campaign in a climate of almost arctic severity. The home governments had not foreseen that the war would be thus prolonged, and the sufferings of the troops were made worse by an insufficiency of fuel, clothing, medicines and even food. In the spring, however, the tide turned. Innumerable reinforcements were poured in. A contingent of Sardinian troops was despatched by Victor Emmanuel's far-sighted statesman Cavour in the hope of winning for the little kingdom recognition and gratitude from the greater Powers. In September, 1855, after a series of bombardments and assaults, the Russians, whose difficulties in reinforcing and supplying their armies over the roadless wastes of south Russia at least equalled those of the allies, were obliged to evacuate the town.

The Death of Nicholas.—The way was now open for the restoration of peace. The heavy losses and the cost of the war, and the incredible heroism and fortitude displayed by their soldiers, had appeased the bellicose appetite of the allies. British opinion was satisfied that the Russian danger in south-east Europe was at an end. The final success, though belated, enabled Napoleon to plume himself at last upon the glories and the victories that he had enabled the armies of France to win, and to that degree secured his position on the throne. Above all, the winter, which had so heavily tried the allied armies, had also proved fatal to the Tsar Nicholas, and, after the fall of Sebastopol, his successor, Alexander II, a man of more tractable personality, showed himself quite ready to treat for peace.

The Congress of Paris.—In February, 1856, a congress met at Paris, and an agreement was soon arrived at, satisfactory for the moment, but in no sense a conclusive solution to the problems that had provoked the war. The Black Sea was declared neutral. Russia undertook

to establish no arsenals and to keep no warships on its waters, to resign her protectorate over the Principalities, and to abandon her special relations with the Christian peoples of Turkey. The Sultan, on his part, promised to place his Christian subjects on absolute equality with the Mohammedans, and to effect substantial reforms in the government. The Powers admitted Turkey to a place at the council-board of Europe, formally disclaimed any right to interfere, either collectively or separately, in her affairs, and pledged themselves to regard any breach of this part of the treaty by any of their number as an act of war.

Unsatisfactory Results of the War.—As proof of the want of finality of these conditions, it is worth while to note how in almost every respect they have since been transgressed. Although the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles have remained closed to warships, the restrictions imposed upon Russia in the Black Sea have proved impossible to enforce in practice. The Turkish promises of reform were left entirely unfulfilled, and for many years to come the condition of the Ottoman Empire went steadily from bad to worse. The treaty did not prevent the Russians from interfering in 1877 on behalf of fellow-members of the Orthodox Church, nor did the Powers redeem their pledge to regard such interference as an act of war. Before long it came to be generally recognised that the whole policy of preserving at all costs the territorial integrity of Turkey was both impracticable and unnecessary. The English have possessed themselves of Egypt, as Nicholas suggested, Victor Emmanuel's successor has laid hands on Tripoli, and the European provinces of Turkey have most of them become self-governing national states. Finally, Russia, the bugbear of the English, has found herself barred from the possession of Constantinople quite as effectively by the creation of these states as by any futile efforts to prop up the mouldering edifice which they have replaced.

Greece.—After the Congress of Paris had ended its misguided labours, the Balkan peninsula still provided questions that pressed for solution. In the young kingdom of Greece the war had been hailed by a large section of the inhabitants as an opportunity for freeing their compatriots from the Turkish yoke. They regarded the triumph of Russia as certain, and at the beginning of the war had been restrained from an onslaught upon Turkey only by the landing of British and French troops, who remained in occupation until 1857. Thus baulked, some of the Greeks were inclined to lay the blame upon their Bavarian king, Otto, whose unpopularity was increased in 1859 by differences between him and his people on the subject of the Italian War of Liberation. His sympathies were with Austria, even to the length of wishing to afford protection to Austrian shipping under the Greek flag. The Greeks, however, felt strongly for the patriots of Italy. The desire to get rid of what they regarded as the Bavarian domination grew apace, and in 1862, the people of Athens, profiting by Otto's absence, declared him deposed, and set up a provisional government. After various personages had refused the vacant throne, it was eventually accepted by the second son of the King of Denmark, who in 1863 was elected as King George I. Under him and his successors, Greece has securely established itself among the lesser Powers of Europe.

Roumania.—After the evacuation of the Roumanian Principalities of Moldavia and Walachia in 1854, the Russian troops had been replaced by those of Austria, who remained in occupation until the close of the war. From then until 1858 the future of these states, hitherto separate and under Turkish control, engaged the attention of the Powers. Napoleon, in his guise of champion of the principle of nationality, had proposed their union under a foreign prince, while preserving the Sultan's suzerainty. Such an arrangement, however, was unacceptable to England, who saw in it the danger that the

new community would inevitably fall under the control of Russia, and to Austria, who considered that the creation of a strong state on the Lower Danube threatened the freedom of that outlet of Austrian trade. In 1858 separate and identical constitutions for the two states were approved by the Powers, and the inhabitants were bidden choose their rulers. The issue, however, was one which had escaped the calculations of the diplomatists, for the elections resulted in the same prince, a native, being chosen to reign over both states. Austria showed a disposition to intervene to prevent the unforeseen personal union that was thus accomplished, but in 1859 the outbreak of the Italian War called off her attention, and the arrangement was allowed to stand. A few years later a quarrel between the new prince and his subjects ended in his abdication, and in 1866 a convention met at Bucharest which unanimously elected Prince Charles of Hohenzollern to the vacant throne, and decreed the permanent union of the Principalities under the name of Roumania. To this arrangement the Powers at first demurred, but the Roumanians held their ground, and in view of the general European situation in that year, no one cared to intervene. The Sultan was obliged to recognise what was in effect the creation of a new and independent state carved out of his own dominions.

Serbia.—Similarly, much progress was made, after 1855, with the transformation of Serbia from a vassal state into a practically independent kingdom. Up to 1862 there was a considerable Turkish population in Belgrade and other towns, and, to the great annoyance of the Serbs, the Turks maintained garrisons in fortified positions all over the country. In that year, however, a series of racial riots, culminating in the bombardment of Belgrade by its Turkish garrison, brought matters to a head. Under the guidance of the representatives of the Powers, negotiations were opened on the subject of withdrawing the garrisons altogether, and in 1867. rather than face a

perpetual state of war with his Christian subjects, the Sultan agreed that this should gradually be done, Serbia now obtaining complete independence in all but name. Thus by 1870, in defiance of the expressed will of the western Powers, three of the national states into which the Turkish Empire was destined to be divided had firmly established their position.

CHAPTER XV

CAVOUR AND THE UNION OF ITALY, 1850-1870

- 1850. Cavour becomes Premier of Sardinia.
- 1859. Magenta and Solferino. Peace of Villafranca.
- 1860. Garibaldi in Sicily and Naples.
- 1861. Death of Cavour.
- 1866. Venetia annexed to Kingdom of Italy.
- 1870. Annexation of Papal States.

Inconsistencies of Napoleon's Policy.—We have seen that two important planks of the platform upon which the throne of Napoleon III rested were his zealous support of the papal pretensions in Italy and the opportunity that he gave to his nation to regain its self-respect by a vigorous foreign policy and successful military action. To these, after 1856, must be added his desire to appear the champion of liberty and nationality. It is true that in France, as long as he retained his popularity, his sovereign will was practically uncontrolled, but, just as he convinced himself that he was establishing autocracy at home for the sake of the ultimate reign of liberty, so also he was persuaded that in adopting a policy of aggression he was assuring the blessings of freedom to the enslaved peoples abroad. With a blindness that eventually proved fatal to his dynasty he refused to see the essential inconsistencies into which his policy was driving him. The centralised autocracy which was the mainspring of his power in France was a perpetual challenge to the advocates of political liberty. To dream as he did of annexing Belgium and the German-speaking districts west of the Rhine was a contradiction of the very principle of nationality, while to act as the champion of that principle in

Italy must necessarily bring him into conflict with the Roman Church.

Thus the greater part of his reign after the conclusion of the Crimean War was one huge endeavour to perform the impossible—to play the part of a military despot without provoking the democratic spirit of France; to enlarge the boundaries of France and to make French influence paramount in Europe without alarming the very nationalities whom he professed to be assisting; and to free Italy without quarrelling with the pope. In these circumstances he was unable to keep one aim steadily before him, and the perpetual shifts of his policy, according as one or other of his objects was for the moment uppermost in his mind, put him at a disadvantage beside any diplomatist who had but one end to serve. More than one country possessed such a man, endowed with the craft and determination necessary to bend Napoleon's whims and vagaries to his own purpose.

Victor Emmanuel and Cavour.—The part that the French Emperor played in the creation of the independent state of Roumania has already been noticed. A still more promising field for his activities was provided by Italy. During the dark days that followed Novara and the fall of Rome the one hope for the future of Italy was centred in the kingdom of Sardinia and its buoyant sovereign. King Victor Emmanuel was a man of hasty temper and coarse tastes, but these shortcomings were more than outweighed by his strong common sense, his steadiness of purpose, and his frankness of speech and manners. His value to Italy was not dependent upon his gifts of statesmanship or political foresight so much as upon the fact that the nation quickly learned to trust him as she never trusted her more talented leaders. Yet without his able lieutenants the great task would never have been accomplished. In 1850 he called to his councils Count Cavour, of whose exhortation to Charles Albert in 1848 we have already heard. The new minister was a man

whose exterior did little to suggest the abilities which were to sway the destinies of Italy, but his commonplace figure, his square plain face and his half-closed eyes blinking behind large spectacles served to conceal from the observer a mind intensely practical and shrewd. He appeared no more than the solid incarnation of common sense, but in the pursuit of his ideal he was to reveal himself an antagonist as bold and as crafty as ever played for high political stakes. He had no sooner taken office than he began to display unrelenting activity in every department of political and social reform. He was soon recognised as the mouth-piece and representative of the cabinet, and in less than two years became officially its chief. For the next seven years he made it his exclusive business to prepare the kingdom for the great work that he meant it to perform. Though he found Piedmont exhausted by the cost of the war of 1848, he did not fear to spend lavishly both on the army and on public works. At the cost of doubling the national expenditure, and cheerfully facing the unpopularity that he incurred, he extended and improved the railway and telegraph systems, the roads, the canals, and all other means by which the country's industry could be stimulated and its resources increased. Always keeping the one object in view, he set to work to increase the prestige and influence of the kingdom among the nations of Europe, and to win their sympathy and respect. It was in accordance with this policy that a small army was sent to fight side by side with the French and English in the Crimea, and the excellent behaviour and equipment of the Sardinian troops were not without their effect. At the close of the war he was admitted to the Congress at Paris on an equal footing with the representatives of the greater European Powers, and this recognition, bitterly resented by Austria, he reckoned as in itself a gain well worth the price that had been paid.

Cavour and Napoleon III.—The failure of 1848, however, had taught him that the Sardinians must never

hope to expel the Austrians unaided. It was his intention to secure, if possible, more than sympathy and good-will from the nations round him when the struggle should be renewed. He soon realised that from Napoleon III much was to be hoped, and by every appeal to his generosity, ambition and vanity he led him on. To the Emperor the prospect was alluring. His position, never too secure, would be strengthened by a policy which provided the army with further opportunities for distinction. A war for the liberation of Italy, ever a cause which appealed to his generous instincts—especially if some bit of territory could be secured for France—would be a most popular step, not only with the army, but with the whole people. With Napoleon, therefore, Cavour procured a secret interview in 1858, and obtained from him a promise that if Victor Emmanuel should find some pretence for attacking the Austrians, the French armies should march to his aid. If the allies were successful in expelling the Austrians from Italy, the Sardinian province of Savoy was to be handed over as the price of Napoleon's assistance. The future of Italy in case of victory was but vaguely discussed. Napoleon was ready to allow the states of the north to fall to Victor Emmanuel, and perhaps some portion of the papal states as well, but a scheme of federation of all the states under the presidency of the pope was left for subsequent arrangement. No mention could be made of any prospective union of all Italy under Victor Emmanuel, for such a project would involve the establishment of a strong power bordering on France and the undermining of the temporal power of the pope, which Napoleon was pledged to defend. Cavour, however, was quite content for the present to conceal his ultimate intentions. The immediate task was to rid Italy of the Austrians.

Magenta and Solferino.—In the early months of 1859 all seemed to promise fairly for his plans. His one object now was to provoke an immediate conflict without seeming

to be the aggressor. By his advice Victor Emmanuel ostentatiously strengthened his army still further, and in the course of a speech to the Turin parliament made use of the threatening words: "Not much longer can I be deaf to the cry of anguish which arises from so many parts of Italy." The meaning of this was unmistakable. The Austrian garrison of Lombardy was at once increased, but until April the question of peace or war remained in the balance, and Cavour had to face accusations from all sides of being ready to plunge Europe into war merely to satisfy the personal ambition of his king and to further the cause of revolution. However, he steadily went his way, refusing to listen to any talk of a general disarmament, for such a course, implying the preservation of the existing conditions, would have meant death to all his hopes. At last the patience of the Austrians gave way. They summoned Victor Emmanuel to choose between reducing his army and enduring an immediate attack. Cavour joyfully accepted the challenge, for he could now appeal to the sympathy of Europe as the defender of the independence of his country against Austrian interference. Immediately Napoleon transferred 100,000 men across the Alps, in accordance with his promise, and though Francis Joseph himself took the field, the allies defeated him with heavy loss in two furious battles at Magenta and Solferino. Meanwhile Garibaldi, the hero of the defence of Rome in 1849, had reappeared, and in spite of his known republican tendencies, Cavour with happy audacity had entrusted to his command a separate corps composed of the volunteers who flocked into Piedmont from all over Italy. With this force he conducted a brilliant guerilla campaign well to the north of the main armies among the foot-hills of the Alps, and though his feats of arms had little effect upon the general course of the war they served to kindle national enthusiasm, to enhance his own reputation, and to train his devoted followers for greater enterprises in the not distant future.

Villafranca. Austria Loses Lombardy.—By the end of June the way seemed clear for the total overthrow of the Austrians. At this moment, however, and with a suddenness that struck Cavour like a thunderclap, Napoleon called for an armistice. He saw that with the awakening of all Italy the movement was slipping out of his control. For the creation of a united Italian kingdom he was in no way prepared, and any further victories over the Austrians might renew the revolt of the papal states against the temporal authority of the pope—a result that would bring him into conflict with his catholic subjects at home. He had also received with some alarm reports that Prussia was mobilising her armies. He therefore interviewed Francis Joseph at Villafranca, and agreed to withdraw from the war. Peace was to be declared on the understanding that Piedmont should be enlarged by receiving Lombardy and the Duchy of Parma. Napoleon claimed Savoy, and the Piedmontese province of Nice as well, as his reward. Elsewhere in Italy everything was to remain as it had been, and Napoleon's old scheme of federation under the pope was revived.

Tuscany, Parma and Modena are United to Sardinia.—Rather than agree to such terms Cavour resigned, with a feeling that all was over. Garibaldi, furious at the cession of Nice, his native town, threw up his command. Victor Emmanuel, however, decided that without France further success was for the moment out of the question, and peace was declared. This sudden negation of their hopes might well have driven the Italian patriots to despair. However, all was not lost. The influence of the Austrians in the peninsula had received a fatal blow. They had been deprived of all their Italian possessions except Venetia. During the war not only Parma, but Modena and Tuscany as well, had expelled their princes and had declared in favour of union with Piedmont, and though in accordance with the agreement of Villafranca the provisional government set up by Victor Emmanuel in these provinces was

withdrawn, the inhabitants refused to receive back their former rulers. By popular vote they again demanded union under Victor Emmanuel, and further fighting would have been necessary to prevent it. The Austrians were unwilling to renew the war, and as long as the pope was not threatened, Napoleon found no sufficient reason for intervention. In 1860, therefore, the union was accomplished. Well recompensed for the surrender of Savoy and Nice, the Piedmontese could say with pride that they had made the sacrifice for the sake of their country, in confidence that what was lacking to its complete unity could now be accomplished without foreign aid. By this time Cavour, quickly recovering from his despair, had resumed office, and on April 2 a parliament met at Turin composed of representatives not only of Piedmont and Lombardy, but of Tuscany, Parma and Modena as well. Victor Emmanuel opened it with the declaration that the Italy of the Italians had been born.

The Rising in Sicily.—It remained to deal with the Kingdom of Naples and the papal states, for these alone stood between the King of Sardinia and the Italian throne. The next step forward originated in the disturbed condition of Sicily, where the malcontents had never been altogether quelled by Ferdinand's atrocities. The reign of that treacherous tyrant had come to an end just before the battle of Magenta, and Francis, his spiritless successor, showed much of his father's cruelty without the cunning. The Sicilians cared little for Italian unity, but in their hatred of the Neapolitan government they were ready to snatch at any chance of obtaining assistance against their oppressor. In these circumstances, Mazzini, whose republican and revolutionary schemes, discredited by the catastrophes of 1849, had yielded still more ground, in North Italy at least, to the saner plans of Cavour, determined upon one more effort in the south. In April, 1860, under his influence an ill-managed rising took place in the streets of Palermo, and though disorder was quickly

quelled in the city it spread inevitably to the surrounding country. An appeal for help was sent to Garibaldi, which that veteran champion found it impossible to resist. During April he assembled at Genoa the volunteers who poured in from all sides as soon as his intentions were known. The difficulty was to arm and equip them for what must prove no easy task. At first he endeavoured to obtain authority and support from Cavour, but that wary statesman was afraid that so rash an enterprise might lose them all that they had gained in the war just brought to a close, for any suggestion that the Piedmontese government was endeavouring to complete the unity of Italy might bring France into the field against them as well as Austria. Moreover, he saw clearly that a triumph for Mazzini in the south would do little for the cause of union under Victor Emmanuel. He therefore counselled caution, and even thought it his duty for the moment to put obstacles in Garibaldi's way.

Garibaldi and the "Thousand."—No such reasoning, however, could stay Garibaldi. On May 5 he embarked his famous "thousand" volunteers upon two small steamers which had been seized, and sailed without stores, ammunition, or even food, upon his perilous enterprise. His task might well seem hopeless. The whole undertaking could scarcely be distinguished in law from the rankest piracy. He had to cross a sea patrolled by Neapolitan warships which expected his coming, to make good his landing upon an island garrisoned by 25,000 regular troops, and to organise and lead a band of lawless peasants unaccustomed to discipline and unprovided with munitions. Nothing short of a series of miracles could insure success. Yet by the lightning rapidity of his moves and by that marvellous compound of audacity, heroism, craft and good luck that made him what he was, he accomplished not only the deliverance of Sicily, but, before four months had passed, a task apparently still more formidable. The deficiency of ammunition and food was supplied by the

Piedmontese commandant of a small fortress down the coast from Genoa, whom Garibaldi deluded into believing that Victor Emmanuel himself had authorised the expedition. The Neapolitan patrols were avoided until Marsala, the chosen landing-place, was in sight. Then three cruisers appeared, and nothing could have saved the expedition but the chance presence of two English men-of-war. The Neapolitan commanders jumped to the conclusion that the statesmen of Great Britain, who had often made ineffectual protests against the misgovernment of Sicily, had determined to support Garibaldi and had sent ships to cover his landing. By the time that they had discovered their mistake and ventured to close, the "thousand" had disembarked. For fifteen days the little force, joined only by small bands of ill-armed peasants, skilfully evaded the army sent to capture them among the mountains. Finally, after repeated encounters with disciplined troops twice as numerous as themselves they made their way by a long night march into the streets of Palermo. In a few hours the whole population of the town rose to greet them, and for three days volunteers, citizens and peasants fought their way from barricade to barricade and from street to street, while the garrison of the citadel rained projectiles into the town. Suddenly the Neapolitan commander-in-chief lost heart. He abandoned Palermo to the patriots, whose own situation was worse than desperate, and before long evacuated the whole island.

The Invasion of Naples.—After a short rest, Garibaldi's force, now largely increased by fresh arrivals of volunteers from all parts of Europe, crossed to the mainland and began a triumphal march through Neapolitan territory. Whole districts rose to welcome the invader. The fortresses he captured by night attack. The towns everywhere received him with wild enthusiasm. Troops arrayed against him threw down their arms as soon as he appeared in the field. On September 6th, Francis fled from his capital. The next day Garibaldi made a formal entrance

into the city amid the acclamations of the people, and after a little fighting, the issue of which was never in doubt, the king abandoned his country for ever.

The Position of Cavour.—The attitude of Cavour towards these events is best expressed in his own words: "We must support this revolution, but it must have the appearance, in the eyes of all Europe, of a volunteer enterprise." At first, to blind the statesmen of Austria and France, he had taken up a position of ostentatious neutrality. He had sent telegraphic instructions to the commander of the Sardinian fleet to prevent Garibaldi's landing, but a second significant message ran: "The ministry has decided upon his arrest." The admiral rightly took this to mean that Cavour himself had decided against it. He replied: "I understand," and kept his fleet at its anchorage. Although, to avoid being involved in war with the Powers that had an interest in perpetuating the division of Italy, he had thus publicly disclaimed responsibility for Garibaldi's actions, in private he rejoiced at their success. When the news arrived of the capture of Naples he at last decided that the time had come to step in and guide the movement. After the completion of their work at Naples, Mazzini and Garibaldi were known to be contemplating an attack upon the papal states. Catholic volunteers were already assembling for the defence of Rome. The effect upon Catholic opinion in France and Austria of a collision between them and the Garibaldians was beyond calculation. Cavour now intervened. He was able to satisfy Napoleon that the purpose of his action was to save Rome from the revolutionaries. His real design, of course, was to secure the union of north and south and to postpone the vexed question of Rome until a more favourable opportunity arose. In October Victor Emmanuel advanced at the head of his army through the territory of the pope into that of Naples. He issued a manifesto to the people of the south, calling upon them to proclaim their will, and such was their confidence in him that a vote

taken in Naples and Sicily resulted in an overwhelming majority in favour of annexation by Piedmont. Meanwhile Garibaldi, with a fine scorn of consequence, counted all that he had done as useless if his career was to be stayed before the flag of united Italy had been planted on the walls of Rome. With fierce anger he demanded the dismissal of Cavour, "the man who had sold Nice," and advanced upon Rome. He was heavily checked, however, and with the advance of the Piedmontese forces he resigned himself to the inevitable. When Victor Emmanuel approached Naples, Garibaldi rode out to make his submission, and with tolerable cordiality saluted his master as King of Italy. Early in the following year, when the first parliament of Italy met at Turin, Victor Emmanuel was formally invested with the coveted title.

Death of Cavour.—In spite of Garibaldi's astonishing feats, however, the work was by no means complete. "Rome is the natural capital of Italy," Cavour had said in the Turin parliament, but the great statesman, whose far-seeing patriotism and devoted labour had guided his country so far along the path to freedom, died in 1861 without seeing the fulfilment of his hopes. He had succeeded just where every Italian leader before him had failed. Under his control the two dominating forces of reform, the constitutionalism of the moderate party and the republicanism of the revolutionaries, had been compelled at last to co-operate. He left his task unfinished. Venetia in the north-east and the papal states in the centre of the peninsula still remained outside the new kingdom. Nothing short of further war would induce the pope and his powerful protectors to yield what was left of his dominions. Nor would the Austrians willingly yield their last foothold, but the lessons that Cavour had taught were not lost upon his successors, and what remained to be done could safely be left to feebler hands.

The Seizure of Venetia.—After 1861 the irrepressible Garibaldi made two more desperate attempts to finish

the task by his own methods, but the government, judging the time not ripe, refused to support him, and he miserably failed. After one of these attempts, indeed, he had actually to be imprisoned for a time, to prevent him from marring the more cautious schemes of his superiors. During the great wars of 1866 and 1870, however, Victor Emmanuel seized his opportunity. In 1866 he allied himself with Prussia, and although at first his armies made no impression upon Venetia, the reverses of the Austrians in Bohemia eventually enabled him to advance. The greater part of Venetia was finally won for Italy, but the faithlessness of the Prussians, who made peace with the Austrians before their allies had achieved final victory, compelled the Italians to stop short of complete success. Garibaldi, who was again operating in the mountains, had to be recalled, and the peninsula of Istria, including the important port of Trieste, and the district round the city of Trent, both in the main Italian-speaking districts, were left still in Austrian hands.

The Union Completed by the Addition of the Papal States.—Then came the Franco-German War of 1870. The French garrison which had been maintained in Rome since 1849 was now withdrawn, and while the attention of all nations was fixed upon the progress of the great contest, an Italian army entered Rome, and the inhabitants by an overwhelming vote chose Victor Emmanuel as their king. In spite of the protests of the Church, the temporal power which the popes had wielded as sovereign princes for a thousand years was brought to an end by the incorporation of the papal states in the Italian kingdom.

Modern Italy.—Though at last united, Italy had many difficulties to face. Under one government there was now a nation of 25,000,000 people, but much patient work was needed to bring the north and the south, so far removed from one another in culture and material progress, into real unity, to re-establish prosperity in a country where brigandage and disorder had been rife for centuries,

and to rid it of the burden of debt caused by the incessant wars in which it had been engaged. Not least of the problems to be faced was the bitter hostility of the pope to the new state, for he was never reconciled to the loss of his temporal power. After the occupation of Rome Victor Emmanuel undertook to recognise to the full the pope's spiritual authority and to make handsome provision for his support, but Pius IX, as his successors have done ever since, persisted in representing himself as a persecuted prisoner in the Vatican. Nevertheless, modern Italy has shown the spirit to overcome all its difficulties—a spirit well expressed in the proclamation which Victor Emmanuel addressed to his people in 1870. “The work to which we have consecrated our lives is at last accomplished. After long trials Italy is restored to herself and to Rome. The future opens before us rich in happy promise. It is for us to respond to the favours of providence by showing ourselves worthy to represent among the great nations of the earth the glorious part of Italy and of Rome.”

CHAPTER XVI

BISMARCK AND THE GERMAN PROBLEM, 1849-1866

- 1861. Accession of William I.
- 1862. Bismarck in Berlin.
- 1864. War with Denmark.
- 1866. War with Austria.
- 1867. Reconstitution of the Dual Monarchy.

William of Prussia.—The complete failure of the German nationalist schemes in 1849 and the subsequent revival of the Confederation seemed to have postponed indefinitely the foundation of a strong and united German nation. Until 1858 the whole of Germany was a prey to political reaction and stagnation, the Zollverein being the only valuable treasure surviving from the shipwreck of her hopes. Besides Bismarck, however, there was one other who looked far into the future and had faith in the power of Prussia to do for Germany what the German people had signally failed to do for themselves. William, Prince of Prussia, the brother and heir of King Frederick William IV, although already elderly, was before everything else a soldier and a man of clear and practical common sense. He had seen the unity of Germany frustrated by Austria, and Prussia humiliated through inability to face the risk of war for the sake of the cause. He had none of his brother's dreamy veneration for the antiquity and historical prestige of the Hapsburg Empire, and he had made up his mind that on succeeding to the throne his chief aim would be to expel Austria from the Confederation, and out of the remaining states to construct a firm union under

the leadership of Prussia. Such a policy would necessarily mean war, and his first step must therefore be so to strengthen the Prussian army that in future it would have nothing to fear. In 1858 the breakdown in his brother's health gave him the desired opportunity. For three years he ruled as regent, and after that in his own right.

The Prussian Army Reforms.—In 1859 the Prussian mobilisation which had alarmed Napoleon III^e into concluding the armistice of Villafranca (see page 131) convinced the regent that the army was inadequately and ineffectively organised, and he began the series of reforms which have made it at once the pattern and the terror of the world. Since the days of Scharnhorst, military service had been a universal obligation in Prussia, three years being nominally required of every man with the colours before retiring into the reserve. This system had been so arranged as to produce a standing army of some 200,000 men, with twice that number in reserve. William now came to the conclusion that this force was inadequate to carry through a great European policy in the face of vehement opposition. Moreover, the existing system had been dislocated by the growth of population, for the authorised number of regiments was insufficient to receive the annual supply of young men due for training, with the result that the period of service had been reduced from three years to two, and that even then more than 25,000 eligible men annually were escaping training altogether. The regent therefore proposed largely to increase the number of regiments, and to prolong the period of training to three or even four years, having as his ultimate aim the creation of a standing army of 400,000 men. These were to be re-armed with the newly invented breech-loading rifle known as the "needle-gun," and were to be carefully trained, under his own personal supervision, by an able staff of officers, of whom Roon and Moltke were the leaders.

Popular Opposition.—The whole project, however, was regarded with grave suspicion by the Prussian parliament, both on the ground of the immense expense involved and because they were as yet altogether out of sympathy with the active militarist policy which so large an increase seemed to foreshadow. A newly elected chamber met in 1862, which resolved to reject the proposals and to compel William, who had by this time become king, to rule according to the wishes of the parliamentary majority by refusing to vote the necessary supplies. Under these circumstances, the king's ministers resigned, and William found himself face to face with just the alternatives that had confronted the kings of England two centuries earlier. He had to choose between parliamentary government and absolutism. Like Charles I, he was a deeply religious man, fully convinced of the divine origin of kingship, and, though he grieved at the impossibility of co-operating with the representatives of the people, he was prepared to abdicate rather than yield to them on a point that he considered essential to the welfare of Prussia. While he was hesitating, he was advised, as a last resource, to entrust Bismarck with the formation of a cabinet.

Bismarck.—The reputation which Bismarck had acquired in 1849 had insured him employment under the Prussian Foreign Office, at first as Frederick William's representative at the Diet at Frankfurt, and subsequently as ambassador in various European capitals. Everywhere he had become known as a man of blunt and brutally outspoken manners, of quick decision and of iron will; but under the apparent frankness of his utterances he concealed vast schemes, for which he steadily laboured throughout his career—the expulsion of Austria from German affairs and the union of all the other German states under the ægis of a strong and warlike Prussia. To this task he brought a talent for unscrupulous intrigue and a ruthless carelessness for all interests but those of Prussia, hardly paralleled even by the chicanery of Frederick

the Great, and justified only by their success and by the sincere patriotism that inspired them. Wherever he had been employed he had taken every opportunity of stirring up enmity to Austria, in the hope that she might be left without allies when the time should come for Prussia to win the upper hand in Germany. The story has often been told how he first claimed equality between Prussia and Austria in the Diet at Frankfurt by arrogating to himself the right to smoke at the meetings, till then the unwritten privilege of the Austrian representative alone. On another occasion, in the course of a public conversation he disputed some statement made by the Austrian. "If it is not true," said the latter, "I should have lied in the name of the Imperial government." "Certainly," said Bismarck, and there ensued a dead pause in the conversation. Meeting Disraeli, then leader of the opposition in the English House of Commons, he said: "If I am called to undertake the leadership of the Prussian government, my first care will be to bring the army into such a state as to command respect, and then I will take any opportunity that offers itself to declare war against Austria, to bring the smaller states into subjection and to give Germany a national union under Prussian control." Long before 1862 he had made his famous remark, "The union of Germany is no matter for speeches and songs; it can be done only by blood and iron."

His Resolute Policy.—In summoning Bismarck to help him in carrying through the unpopular reforms, King William was giving the minister his long desired chance, and at the same time was playing his own last card. When Bismarck arrived in answer to the call, he found William sitting before a table with his Act of Abdication newly signed before him. Before the interview ended, the paper had been torn in half, and the great partnership begun. They both saw that failure meant revolution, for the army was the only support upon which they could rely. "What will come of it?" asked the king. "Already I see the place

where your head and mine will fall." "Well," answered Bismarck, "I cannot think of a finer death. I would fall like Lord Strafford and your Majesty as Charles I." Together they set to work, and in spite of all that parliament could do, they carried out their task. For a time Prussia seemed to be returning to a government of despotism as complete as that of Louis XIV or Frederick. The manner in which taxes were raised and spent, and the whole policy pursued by Bismarck, were altogether unwelcome to the people, but in defiance of parliamentary protests and of public opinion, and perhaps at the risk of his life, he carried out the measures that he thought necessary. As long as officials and army took their orders from him, nothing could disturb him. In the end, however, the wonderful success of his policy appealed to the patriotism of the people, won him the enthusiastic gratitude of all, and blinded Europe to the methods by which it had been achieved.

Isolation of Austria.—Once he was established in power, the army reforms were quickly carried through. The next step was to isolate Austria from all possible means of support. The friendship of Russia was secured by an agreement by which Prussia assisted in the suppression of the Polish rebellion of 1863. Two years later Bismarck met Napoleon at Biarritz, and though little record remains of what passed between them, there is no doubt that vague hints were dropped that if Prussia improved her position in Germany France might reasonably expect to acquire new territory west of the Rhine by way of compensation. Similarly, secret negotiations with Italy early in 1866 resulted in an alliance, by the terms of which, if war broke out between Prussia and Austria during the following summer, Italy was to attack Austria, while no peace was to be concluded without the consent of both Powers.

Schleswig-Holstein.—Meanwhile Bismarck had been steadily fomenting his quarrel with Austria. The agitation,

which had been proceeding for some years in Germany with regard to Schleswig and Holstein, broke out afresh in 1862. So far from listening to the claim of the inhabitants to some form of independence, the Danes had actually annexed Schleswig and proposed to deprive Holstein of some of its existing rights of self-government. The German wrath at these proceedings provided Bismarck with his opportunity. In 1864 he demanded that these provinces should be given up to Germany, and when the Danes refused he threatened them with war. Austria now joined with Prussia, because Bismarck's action was popular in Germany, and the Austrians hated to see the Prussians acting unaided as the champions of the nation. Accordingly, the two great Powers attacked Denmark, and in spite of an heroic resistance, easily overran the country. It remained to be settled what was to be done with the two provinces. At first they were separately administered, Prussia taking Schleswig, and Austria, Holstein. This arrangement, however, did not satisfy German liberal opinion as a permanent measure, and Austria made a bid for general support by encouraging popular agitation in favour of the union of the two provinces under an independent ruler. Bismarck at once protested, but the Austrians, supported by most of the other German states, insisted. Even in Prussia strong indignation was felt against the man who seemed to be forcing his country into a fatal, wanton and purposeless war. Whatever the opposition, Bismarck, with matchless resolution, proceeded upon the course of action which he judged to be necessary. In 1866 war was declared upon Prussia by Austria, Saxony, Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, Hesse and Hanover; but Bismarck was not dismayed. It was what he had foreseen and intended. The ostensible point at dispute was the fate of the two provinces; the real issue was the overlordship of Germany. From that moment the question of German unity lay not with the will of the people but with Bismarck's profound and audacious statecraft,

supported by the valour of the Prussian troops. Yet the risk was great. Had King William, who was deluged with petitions entreating him to preserve the peace, lost confidence in him, had the war ended badly, had Napoleon been prepared to insist upon the compensation which he had been led to expect, Bismarck would have been condemned for betraying German and Prussian interests alike, and for conspiring with the national foe.

The Seven Weeks' War.—As it turned out, the war of 1866 was brief and decisive. It has been called the "Seven Weeks' War," but in less than half that time the result was beyond doubt. In Prussia everything was ready for immediate action, and elsewhere, nothing. War was declared on June 14. By June 30, one Prussian force had defeated the Hanoverians, occupied their country, and made an end of resistance everywhere in north-west Germany. On July 1 a second army, which had dashed through Saxony into Bohemia, attacked the Austrian forces drawn up by the Elbe, between the villages of Sadowa and Königgrätz. While the Austrians were thus engaged in front, they were assailed on the right flank by a third Prussian force which had made its way through the mountains from Silesia. By good generalship the advance of this last army was so timed that its attack was delivered at just the right minute to insure the complete overthrow of the Austrians. On July 5 the Prussians were in full cry for Vienna, and a few days later the news reached Bismarck that Bavaria also had been occupied. Meanwhile the Italians, who, as we have seen, had their own quarrel with the Austrians, had declared war according to the terms of their alliance, and were already in possession of a large part of Venetia. As for Russia, her relations with Austria since the Crimean War had never been cordial, and no assistance could be expected from that direction.

The Peace of Prague.—This brilliant military triumph was of course not Bismarck's work. At the outbreak of war the conduct of affairs had been transferred to the great soldiers, Moltke and Roon. Moreover, the superior weapons, training and available numbers of the Prussians gave them an advantage which in itself must have insured success. The completeness of the victory, however, and its striking consequences, were the work not of the soldiers but of the statesman who had secured the help of Italy and the neutrality of Russia and France. At the Peace of Prague Austria was finally excluded from having anything to do with Germany, and many of the states, including Schleswig and Holstein, were annexed to Prussia. The remaining states north of the river Main (see Map on page 157), though retaining the management of their own domestic affairs, were required to enter into a close association with Prussia, known as the North German Confederation, the foreign policy and national defence of which was placed wholly in King William's hands. Everywhere the Prussian military system was installed, so that if need be the manhood of the whole nation could be called to arms. The southern states, while preserving their independence for a few more years, were compelled to pay a large share of the cost of the war, and to enter a close alliance with their conquerors. Nothing in Bismarck's career reveals in a fuller light his political foresight than his moderation in the negotiations that preceded this treaty. He was tempted, indeed it was King William's firm intention, to insist at once upon the immediate union of all Germany and the cession of territory by Austria. Bismarck saw, however, that the union of the whole of Germany would never be permitted by Napoleon without a determined struggle, and that to humiliate the Austrians by seizing any of their ancient territory would occasion a lasting estrangement between them and the Prussians. He therefore overbore the king, and gave up much that he might reasonably have claimed. He preferred for the

moment to remain at peace with France until reasonably friendly relations had been restored with Austria, for he knew quite well with whom the next war would have to be fought.

French Alarm at the Rise of Prussia.—In spite of his moderation, however, the great increase in the power of Prussia caused considerable annoyance and apprehension in France. Napoleon had hoped that the struggle would be a long one, and that when all the combatants were exhausted he would be able to act as arbitrator, dictating terms of peace and perhaps gaining something for himself. Although the war came to so sudden an end, with Prussia in no way weakened by the struggle, he determined to interfere all the same. Through his ambassador at Berlin he let Bismarck know that he could sanction the terms of the Peace of Prague only if compensation were received by France for the increased power of Prussia. He demanded that practically the whole of the German lands west of the Rhine should be handed over to him and possibly Belgium as well. "Do you require this under threat of war?" asked Bismarck with his customary directness. "Yes," said the ambassador. "Then war you shall have." But Napoleon remembered that the Prussian army was still mobilised, and being, as Bismarck well knew, quite unready for action himself, he hastily withdrew his demand. These secret negotiations were at once published in the French and German newspapers by Bismarck, who foresaw the result that they would have, and before long everyone knew that France had asked for the Rhine country and had been curtly refused. In France this contemptuous denial of their demands was held to be an insult to the honour of the country. National passion was so aroused by politicians and newspapers that it appeared as if nothing but war could end the matter. Throughout Germany, on the other hand, the news of the French demands was received with the utmost indignation. At first Bismarck had been

hated as a tyrant, but now all patriots, even in the southern states, where the jealousy of Prussia had hitherto been strongest, rallied round him for the defence of German soil. State after state, eager to take what seemed the only guarantee against annexation by France, hurried to put its army at the disposal of King William, and even the Bavarians placed themselves under Prussian protection. It was by Napéoleon's own action that these decisive steps in the direction of union were forced upon the German nation. For four years the approaching war was postponed, but with Bismarck transformed from an unpopular tyrant into a national hero, the triumph of his schemes was well in sight.

The Dual Monarchy.—The battle of Königgrätz decided the destiny of Austria no less than that of Germany, for by giving the death-blow to her German and Italian ambitions it enabled her to turn her undistracted attention to the task of setting her own house in order. She realised at last that she could never put forth her real strength until something had been done to meet the claims of her Magyar and Slav populations, and to make provision for constitutional reform. A centralised government with a great parliament sitting at Vienna to represent the whole empire had already been tried and proved impossible, for besides the inevitable language problem, the Hungarian representatives had obstinately refused to take part in its deliberations and had encouraged the Slavs to do the same. Soon after 1866, however, by the personal efforts of Francis Joseph, a compromise was effected. The Hapsburg dominions were to be divided into two practically independent groups, the one including Austria, Bohemia and the northern provinces generally, the other composed of Hungary, the South Slav states and Transylvania. On the one hand, each was to have its own administration for all domestic affairs and its own parliamentary institutions. On the other hand, both recognised the personal sovereignty of Francis Joseph. The depart-

ments of foreign affairs, war and finance were to be in the hands of three ministers common to both divisions; and a kind of joint chamber, representing the parliaments of Vienna and Pesth, was to sit to discuss matters that concerned the whole empire. This rather cumbrous dual arrangement served to content the national spirit of the Magyars, and has given the Austro-Hungarian Empire ~~fifty~~ years of comparative internal quiet. Its main shortcoming has been that it makes no provision for the Slavs and Roumans, either in the north or in the south, nor for the Italian-speaking peoples of Trent and Istria (see page 141), and although in modern times efforts have usually been made to avoid provoking ill-feeling and racial division, the separatist aspirations of the foreign populations of both halves of the empire have never ceased to be a source of weakness. In Bohemia and Galicia no serious trouble has arisen, but in our own day the restlessness of the Serbs, Roumans and Italians has led to results of great consequence.

CHAPTER XVII

BISMARCK AND THE UNION OF GERMANY, 1866-1871

Weakening of Napoleon's Hold upon France.—It has been well said that it was France, not Austria, that was beaten at the battle of Königgrätz, and certainly it was upon that country that the blow principally fell. In spite of all Napoleon's foreign activities, the condition of the French Empire in 1867 was hardly one of stability. His efforts in 1859 on behalf of Italian liberation had from his own point of view been only too successful. After he had let loose the tide, he discovered to his dismay that it was flowing in the direction of union, and union in Italy, as all Catholics could see, meant the end of the temporal authority of the pope. We have seen how, after Solferino, he withdrew his support in the hope of retaining the support of French Catholics. This step, however, was taken too late, and after 1860, as a result of his patronage of nationalism abroad, he was obliged to face their decided hostility. His next move was an attempt to win support against the Catholics by adopting a more liberal policy at home. The time had come, he said, to place the empire on a more constitutional basis, and thus to give the nation a greater share in the responsibilities of government. Parliament accordingly was granted the right, hitherto withheld, of moving resolutions to the throne, as well as of criticising the policy of the ministers. This step was not inspired by any real belief in the principles of liberalism, but was rather an attempt to gain popular applause, to make the parliament share the blame with him

for any mistakes that he might make, and to divide the nation into parties, with the idea that the strife between them would give him an opportunity to play the part of a mediator. The result, however, confounded his expectations. During the ten years between 1860 and 1870 the imperial autocracy was rapidly transformed under the pressure of parliamentary opposition into a constitutional ~~monarchy~~ without any gain of popularity for the emperor, whose repeated concessions appeared due to weakness rather than to generosity. By 1869 his ministers were fully responsible to parliament, which had also step by step secured the right to initiate legislation and to control finance.

The Mexican Enterprise.—Meanwhile a series of bitter disputes between employers and employed, and the steady growth of socialistic teaching and of thorough-going republicanism, showed the dangers to which the empire was exposed, dependent as it now was upon maintaining a parliamentary majority. The clamours of the Catholics, of the artisan population of Paris, and of the convinced republicans, could be silenced only by a series of triumphs for Napoleon in his foreign dealings. Instead, his policy met with nothing but rebuffs. In 1863 he attempted to protect the Polish insurrectionaries from the Russian vengeance, but in face of Bismarck's agreement with the tsar, nothing could be done, and his intervention had no effect but that of hopelessly alienating Russia. The following year an expensive adventure upon which he had embarked in Mexico came utterly to grief. With the idea of spreading French influence beyond the bounds of Europe and perhaps of laying the foundations of a great-Latin empire in the West, he had short-sightedly entered into negotiations with some Mexicans who wished to overthrow the republic there, and had agreed to give armed support to an attempt to turn the country into an empire under Maximilian, the brother of Francis Joseph of Austria. It turned out, however, that few of the

Mexicans were prepared to support the design, and although some 30,000 French troops were landed, and scored some successes, the United States intervened and required the abandonment of the whole enterprise. Unprepared to face a Power so formidable, Napoleon had no choice but to humiliate himself and to withdraw, facing as best he might the recriminations of his people and the total loss of his reputation as a statesman.

Dangerous State of French Public Opinion.—In the midst of the depression caused in France by this expensive failure came the Seven Weeks' War. Every attempt to intervene on behalf of the population of Schleswig and Holstein was roughly repulsed, and a blaze of passion flashed out against Bismarck over the question of compensation. The honour of France was held to be at stake, and it was clear that national resentment, already bitter against a government that had laid itself open to such repeated rebuffs, would soon force the emperor to risk all to save himself from his own people. To yield again on any point would mean instant revolution.

Bismarck's Machinations.—In these circumstances, the task of Bismarck, who believed that war with France was inevitable and wished to provoke it at his own time for the sake of creating German unity under Prussian leadership, was made doubly easy. The only problem was to choose a subject on which German opinion should be undivided, and to make it appear that the provocation came from France. For three years the catastrophe was postponed. Napoleon knew his danger, and did his utmost to obtain allies. Russia, however, had been irrevocably alienated in 1863,* and nothing could be expected from Italy. Although Victor Emmanuel never allowed himself to forget his debt of gratitude for Magenta and Solferino, it was impossible for him to carry his people with him in active support of his old ally while the French garrison remained in the Papal States; and, in face of Catholic

* See page 220.

opinion and Garibaldi's repeated onslaughts upon Rome, Napoleon dared not think of withdrawing it. England was engaged in carrying through a series of domestic reforms, and had given up all idea of following an energetic foreign policy. Moreover, she had been disturbed by rumours of Napoleon's designs upon the independence of Belgium, always a matter of jealous watchfulness with British statesmen, and her apprehensions were increased after the actual outbreak of the war by Bismarck's public statement that Napoleon had actually proposed to annex it in 1866 as the price of his neutrality. From Austria something was to be hoped, but Bismarck had carefully placated Francis Joseph after the Seven Weeks' War. A series of secret negotiations resulted only in a vague understanding that if Napoleon were successfully to invade Germany as the liberator of the southern states, Austria would take action within six weeks. Napoleon was never able, as it turned out, to fulfil the condition, and in any case it is doubtful whether Russia would have suffered Austria to stir. With the horizon so dark, there was nothing for it but to lessen the risk of war by a substantial increase of the French army, his one sure means of support. Laws were passed authorising universal service on the Prussian model, with a system of a short training in the active force followed by a period in the reserve; but the government shrank from increasing the general discontent by enforcing these measures, and up to the last the system existed on paper only. Thus when the war came, a war that was to be fought not between professional armies, but between whole nations in arms, France found herself still relying upon a force admirable in personel, but strictly limited in numbers and lacking in the vast reserve of trained men that Scharnhorst's system had put at the disposal of the German leaders.

France Goaded into War.—In 1870 Bismarck's opportunity arose. A series of events, trumpery in themselves, occurred, which the French, to his delight, chose to regard

as a challenge. The throne of Spain was vacant, and the Spanish government invited Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern, a relative of King William of Prussia, to be their ruler (see page 110). Seeing in this a crafty scheme of Bismarck's to combine Spain and Germany against them, the French forced their emperor to request that the prince should refuse the offered crown. Much to the disappointment of Bismarck, who would have preferred to provoke the French by a blunt refusal, Prince Leopold resigned his candidature, and King William, who so far saw nothing in the question which made it any concern of Prussia, concurred. Thus all grounds for French alarm seemed to have been removed. Honour on both sides was satisfied, and Bismarck accordingly resigned himself to a further period of waiting. Napoleon's advisers, however, urged him to go further. They had no desire for war, but they thought they saw a chance of publicly humiliating Prussia without risk to themselves and of thus winning the diplomatic triumph that the internal condition of the French Empire made so necessary. On July 13 an ill-considered step was taken from which it was impossible to draw back, even if the wild excitement that prevailed in Paris had permitted. By Napoleon's orders the French ambassador called upon King William and demanded a promise that he would not at any future time allow Prince Leopold or any other German to listen to such invitations. The king regarded this as a deliberate attempt to force a quarrel upon him, and firmly refused to give any such undignified undertaking. The same evening he telegraphed to his prime minister a full account of the interview. From this point everything turned out just as Bismarck desired. He and the soldiers were ready for the inevitable struggle, and wished it to be soon, for nothing would further his schemes of union more than a successful war. Yet he had not dared to take the offensive until he could rely upon the absolute loyalty of the southern states. Now he saw his way to secure it. He selected from the king's telegram a few sentences, which, read by themselves, made

it appear that the king had been publicly insulted. These sentences were published, with a misleading account of the interview, in the papers of the following day. Immediately a second storm of indignation was raised all over Germany. Everyone was now convinced that the French desire was for war at any price, and that the insults offered to the aged king by these repeated demands were really meant for the German nation. When, six days later, France declared war, the last differences between North and South were swept away in a desire for revenge upon the common enemy, and the challenge was accepted by all the states, already united in everything but name.

Napoleon's Confidence.—Napoleon, however, refused to see the real condition of affairs. He was convinced that the wounds of 1866 were too recent to be healed, that Bismarck had forced the German states into alliance with Prussia against their will, and that they would welcome the French as deliverers. He himself had not wished for war, but since he had been driven into it by the logic of events, he proposed to make the best of it by initiating a swift and powerful attack across the Rhine and thus overwhelming the smaller states of the south-west. The first defeat, he supposed, would force them at least into neutrality, if not into alliance with himself, and would bring the Austrians into the field. He would then have to deal with the Prussians; and to subdue them he looked to the proverbial fighting qualities of his troops. In all this he was making two grave mistakes. Not only did he misunderstand the relations that had arisen between the Prussians and the allied states, but he seriously believed in the superiority of his army. It was indeed armed with a new rifle, an improvement upon the needle-gun that had helped to win the war of 1866, and it contained many veterans who had waged successful war in the Crimea, in Algeria, and in Italy. In most other respects however, it was inferior. Europe was now to witness for the first time the application to warfare of all the

scientific resources and organising power that mark the modern age, and in all these the advantage lay on the German side. Napoleon's regiments, owing to the defective military system, were short of men. What reserves existed were scattered all over France, far from the units which they were expected to join, and no arrangements had been made for quickly transporting them to any rendezvous. When assembled, they lacked ammunition and equipment of every kind, and even when these were provided, the arrangements for conveying them to the frontier utterly broke down, and the railway-stations were overflowing with stores, while what troops had reached the front were suffering from the want of them. With such an army, in numbers admittedly inferior, the rapid advance that Napoleon's plan necessitated was out of the question. Meanwhile in Germany, at the order to mobilise, the system inaugurated by Scharnhorst and developed by the reforms of King William began to move like a vast machine. The trained men who had passed through the active army into the reserve rejoined the forces, each at his appointed military station, usually near his own home, and there he found his arms and equipment awaiting him. The railways, entirely under military control, conveyed whole armies, regiment by regiment and brigade by brigade, all in accordance with a pre-arranged programme, to the prescribed rendezvous. At the end of a fortnight the armies were lining the frontier, and the plan of campaign, carefully thought out by Moltke years before, and constantly revised in accordance with changing political and military conditions, came smoothly into operation.

The War of 1870.—Napoleon joined his army on July 28, but not a single corps was ready for the intended invasion, and four days later, when the German concentration was complete, the initiative fell wholly into their hands. Advancing in three armies, 450,000 strong, the Germans everywhere drove the enemy before them, and by the middle of August, after a series of bloody encounters,



had shut up the main French army in the fortress of Metz. A second force, which Napoleon led in person to their relief, was allowed to march into a trap, and after being driven headlong northward towards the Belgian frontier was compelled to surrender unconditionally at Sedan on September 2. Napoleon himself gave up his sword to the King of Prussia as a prisoner of war. When his subjects heard of his surrender they deposed him, and once again declared France a republic.

The Collapse of the French.—After Sedan the Germans advanced rapidly upon Paris, leaving behind them sufficient troops to continue the siege of Metz. By the middle of September the capital was so closely encircled that no provisions could reach it, but the new French government resolved to continue the struggle to the end rather than yield an inch of territory. The 150,000 men in Metz, after a vain effort to fight their way out, surrendered on October 27, and Paris, which endured three terrible months of starvation and bombardment, admitted the Germans on January 28, 1871. Other forces that had been raised in various parts of the country, and hastily trained, showed unsurpassed heroism, but nothing could make up for their want of equipment and organisation. During the winter, after many attempts to relieve Paris, the whole nation was fought to a standstill and lay at the feet of the conquerors. Terms of peace were now dictated by Bismarck. He required that France should be shut off altogether from the Rhine, should give up Metz and Strassburg for ever, and should make a huge payment toward the cost of the war. The greater part of two provinces were ceded which had formerly belonged to the old German Empire—Alsace, which France had held since 1648, and a part of Lorraine. Such was the outcome of Louis Napoleon's pursuit of his Imperial dreams.

German Unity.—This signal triumph set the seal upon the unity of Germany. It now required little persuasion from Bismarck to draw from the southern German states

their consent to union under the King of Prussia. Just before the fall of Paris, the representatives of almost all the states—kingdoms, duchies and republics—of which Germany was composed, took counsel together at Bismarck's suggestion; and, after much hesitation on the part of Bavaria, they joined in requesting the King of Prussia to assume the title of German Emperor. In the grand hall of the palace at Versailles, now the headquarters of the besieging army, where Louis XIV and Napoleon I had proclaimed their victories over the Germans, King William formally accepted the proffered title, won for him by Bismarck's policy of "blood and iron." He issued a proclamation to the German people, which ended with these words: "May God permit us and our successors to the imperial crown to give at all times increase to the German Empire, not by the conquests of war, but by the good gifts of peace, in the path of national prosperity, freedom and well-doing." The rulers of the states were to retain their titles and some of their rights as independent sovereigns, but the whole German-speaking race, the Swiss and Austrians excepted, were now to be for all practical purposes under a single government with one army, one law and one master. The period of weakness and misery, due to the petty rivalries and jealous feuds of centuries, was to give way to one of united progress; and under Prussian leadership the Germans were to take the place at last among the European nations to which their numbers and their wealth entitled them. This was the goal towards which Bismarck had directed the policy of Prussia. Nine years before, he had come to the assistance of an unpopular king ready to retire from a throne which he seemed unable to occupy with honour. In that short space he had made him a national hero, and had placed on his head an imperial crown. Now that the work was done, no more was necessary than a period of peace and reorganisation, during which the nation might forget its old divisions and jealousies, and the new empire might develop its inherent strength until it should become the most formidable power in Europe.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE BALKAN STATES, 1870-1893

- 1876. Serbian insurrection.
- 1877. Russo-Turkish War.
- 1878. Treaty of San Stefano.
- 1879. Congress of Berlin.
- 1885. Union of Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia.
- 1886. Fall of Alexander of Battenberg.
- 1887. Election of Ferdinand of Coburg.

See Maps on pages 92 and 93.

The Bulgars.—The history of the Balkan peninsula during the first seventy years of the nineteenth century had been occupied with the separation of Serbia, Greece and Roumania from the empire of the Turks, and with the development of these states into independent kingdoms. The events of the next ten years brought to the front a fourth nationality, long-forgotten and silent, but destined soon to play a leading part in the affairs of the Near East. The Bulgars were as yet scarcely known to Europe. A people of Asiatic origin, akin to the Turks themselves, they derived their name from the river Volga, on the banks of which they had sojourned until well into the Christian era, and they had brought with them to their new settlement astride the Balkan chain a language and national characteristics in the main Slavonic. At one time the scourge of the Byzantine Empire, they had dwindled into insignificance after their conquest by the Turks, and, despite the efforts of a few patriots, they had remained comparatively unmoved by the events which had given freedom to their fellow-Christians of the surrounding

districts. A little group of literary men, however, most of them living as exiles in Roumania or Russia, had been struggling to remind them that they had once been a famous and mighty people, and, by encouraging education and founding schools, had done something to prepare the way for the resurrection, after the lapse of five centuries, of Bulgaria as a Balkan state.

Religious Agitation.—The first sign of a growing desire for liberty was the demand for a separate national religious organisation under a native archbishop, independent of the Greek Patriarch of Constantinople, the accepted head of the Orthodox Church. This demand was granted by the Turks in 1870, not so much in order to placate the Bulgars as to isolate them from the Russians and Greeks, who naturally regarded the new Church as heretic and schismatic. To the Bulgarian agitators the creation of the national Church was only a first step towards freedom. During the same year a programme was secretly drawn up for the liberation of the whole race by revolution, but the conspirators were detected by the Turks before the people had been prepared for a general outbreak, and the movement was quickly extinguished in blood.

Insurrection of the Serbs.—Five years later, however, there began a series of events which eventually involved the resettlement of the affairs of the whole peninsula by a European Conference, and ended in the addition of Bulgaria to the list of self-governing states. The promises of internal reform with which the Turks had been so lavish at the Congress of Paris in 1856 still remained for the most part unfulfilled, and the chronic misgovernment endured by their subjects was constantly provoking isolated outbreaks in every portion of the empire. In 1875, under the combined influence of bad harvests and the exactions of Turkish landlords and tax-collectors, one of these sporadic risings occurred among the mountains of the Herzegovina. At first the movement gave no sign of

being one that the Turkish military organisation would fail to keep in hand. The rural population of the district, however, were for the most part Serbian blood, and their struggles were accordingly watched with unconcealed sympathy by the kindred peoples of the adjacent principalities to north and south. Of these, the rising state of Serbia was governed by a prince of thoroughly ambitious temper, while Montenegro, proud of its position as ~~the one~~ state that had retained its freedom throughout the period of Turkish domination, obeyed the patriarchal rule of its heroic Prince Nicholas, the warrior, poet and statesman who still holds the title. It was the ambition of each of these princes to revive under his own rule the ancient Serbian kingdom which in the fourteenth century had embraced the whole of their race, and neither could afford to disregard for long the struggles of a people whom he hoped eventually to absorb. It could only be a matter of time before both openly intervened on behalf of their compatriots, and in the meantime every form of unofficial help and encouragement was afforded to the rising. Opinion in Russia also was profoundly moved, for the ideal of a great Slavonic union, though quite impracticable, exercised a powerful attraction, and a stream of volunteers poured into the revolted district. During the early months of 1876, the outbreak, spreading northwards into the province of Bosnia, grew into a rebellion, until the whole of the extreme north-west of the Turkish dominions was involved in war of the most determined character, embittered by the religious differences of the combatants.

The Attitude of the Powers.—In this situation, the European Powers, conscious that their failure to enforce the reforms promised in 1856 was in a way the cause of the outbreak, were feeling their way toward joint intervention. Austria had special reasons for taking immediate action. A Serbian success in the Herzegovina and Bosnia would have given her much ground for alarm lest the disturbances should spread to her own South-Slav populations

in Hungary. Moreover, the establishment of a strong Serbian state right across the western portion of the peninsula would have been most unwelcome, as barring the way to any future progress towards the Adriatic and the Ægean. With the co-operation of Russia and Prussia a note was drawn up at Berlin demanding under threat of war the withdrawal of the Turkish troops from the revolted districts and the execution of the promised reforms under the supervision of the representatives of the Powers, on the understanding that, if this were done, the right of the Turks to continue in possession would be respected. This memorandum was circulated for the approval of the other Powers. France and Italy at once approved, but, to the astonishment of Europe, the British government replied by an uncompromising negative, and ordered the fleet to the Dardanelles. They were more than ever convinced, since the creation of the Suez Canal had made the Eastern Mediterranean a vital spot in their communications with India, that their interests were best defended by maintaining the complete independence of Turkey from outside interference. The attitude of Great Britain was a deliberate encouragement to the Sultan to refuse concessions, and as such it was understood. Joint action by the Powers was now doomed to failure, and the Berlin memorandum was accordingly not presented.

Bulgarian Atrocities.—At this moment, the patriots of Bulgaria, stirred by the example of their fellow-Christians of the north-west, broke once more into revolt, but the rising here was again mismanaged, and the Turks were able to suppress it before it became general. They let loose upon the defenceless Bulgars innumerable irregular troops, who perpetrated the series of indescribable atrocities with which the name of Bulgaria will ever be associated. Whole villages disappeared before a storm of cruelty in which the foulest passions that can disgrace human nature played a part. At the little town of Batak 2,000 only, out of a population of 7,000, escaped alive. The remainder

fell by the sword or perished in the flames of the church or the school. Thus the outbreak of the Bulgars seemed to have done little for their own cause or for that of the Serbs. It turned out, however, that the victims had not died in vain. The news of the massacres at Batak and elsewhere aroused the horror of the whole civilised world, In England in particular it caused a tremendous revulsion of popular feeling from the official policy of maintaining the integrity and power of Turkey. In speech and pamphlet Gladstone demanded the ejection of the Turks from Europe. and the government, torn between its désiré to thwart the supposed aims of Russia and its horror at the crimes which its own support of Turkey had made possible, was no longer able, even if it had wished, to protect the delinquents from the consequences of their acts.

Abdul Hamid.—Meanwhile the successes of the Serbian rebels and the threats of pressure from the Powers had served to arouse a deep-seated patriotic feeling among the Turks themselves. Rioting broke out in Constantinople directed against the government, which was supposed to be on the point of yielding to foreign interference, and a national party was formed to demand the vigorous action that was necessary to re-establish the position of the Mohammedans throughout the peninsula—a party which had since striven hard to stave off the collapse of the Turkish Empire. As a first step, the Sultan, to whose incapacity and extravagance the Turks attributed their precarious situation, was deposed, and was replaced in August, 1876 by his nephew, the famous Abdul Hamid.

Turkish Successes.—At the moment when this subtle and saturnine diplomatist ascended the throne, the difficulties that surrounded him seemed overwhelming. Serbia and Montenegro had declared open war the previous month, no progress had been made with the reduction of Bosnia and the Herzegovina, further trouble was to be expected with the Bulgars, the Powers were watching

events with undisguised hostility, and even from Great Britain, under the circumstances, no immediate support could be expected. The danger from Serbia, however, was soon at an end, for the agricultural peasants of that country had been at peace for two generations and their hastily arrayed armies proved no match in the field for the veteran Turks. After two months' fighting all southern Serbia was overrun, and the road was open for an advance upon Belgrade. The more warlike Montenegrins, though they were well able to guard their mountain fastnesses and actually pushed into the Herzegovina, were too few in numbers to provide much assistance. Nor did the Bulgars move again, for they had been utterly cowed by the massacres earlier in the year.

Intervention of the Powers.—In order to save Serbia from immediate annihilation it became necessary by the end of 1876 for the Powers to intervene. The tsar, while giving a solemn assurance that he had no designs upon Constantinople, declared in plain terms that if Europe could not save the situation he should find himself forced to act alone. To prevent this most undesirable issue, the British statesmen suggested that a settlement of all outstanding questions connected with the Turkish Empire should be arranged by a conference sitting at Constantinople itself. This suggestion was generally accepted, for the tsar had no wish to attack Turkey, and thus again incur the suspicion of England and Austria, if any other means could be found of protecting the Balkan Slavs from their oppressors. When the conference met, the envoys at once agreed that the Turkish promises of reform should forthwith be put into operation by officials appointed by the Powers for that purpose. They next proceeded to discuss the erection of Bulgaria, Bosnia and the Herzegovina into self-governing provinces, and there seemed a fair prospect that the sincerity and common purpose of the Powers would bestow at least some benefit upon the oppressed subjects of the Sultan. Suddenly, however,

Abdul Hamid, by a masterpiece of subtlety, brought all the labours of the conference to nought. He summoned Midhat Pasha, the leader of the more enlightened section of the Turkish patriotic party to be his prime minister. The new adviser was known to be a firm believer in the virtues of parliamentary government. Under his auspices a constitution was immediately proclaimed of a highly democratic type, the proposals of the Powers were politely repelled on the ground that they were no longer necessary, and the conference was invited to expect the immediate advent of a golden age, in which Moslem and Christian, now placed on equal terms, would peaceably settle their differences without external assistance. The conference now broke up in despair, for, whatever suspicions the envoys might entertain of Abdul Hamid's good faith, there was now no valid ground for their presence at Constantinople at all. Of the sincerity of Midhat there is no doubt, but as soon as the conference had dispersed he had served the Sultan's purpose. In February, 1877, he was arrested and deported to Italy, and his parliament met but once, to disappear upon the outbreak of the war.

The Tsar Declares War.—With the break-up of the conference and the fall of Midhat, all hopes of serious reform vanished, and the intervention of Russia became inevitable. With grave misgivings the tsar resolved to act in accordance with his declaration of the previous year, and in April, having first secured the neutrality of the Austrians by promising them Bosnia and the Herzegovina at the close of the war, he ordered his troops to advance once more upon the Danube. The British ministers contented themselves with publicly stating their disapproval. In view of the state of English public opinion, of the failure of every other means of securing the position of the Balkan Christians, and of the fact that it was their own interference on behalf of Turkey that had made the tsar's action necessary, they could scarcely do more.

The Siege of Plevna.—Thanks to a convention concluded with Roumania, whose prince had taken the opportunity finally to throw off the Turkish suzerainty, the Russians had unhindered access to the Danube, but here their difficulties began. Besides the formidable obstacle provided by the river, the Turks possessed a series of strong fortresses, behind which there towered the most difficult section of the Balkan range, all the easier passes being fortified and garrisoned. Enterprising leadership, however, carried the Russians over the river and through the mountains within a few weeks of the beginning of the advance, and by the middle of July the road seemed open for an immediate attack upon the capital. This sudden danger struck terror into the Sultan and his advisers, and the tsar, who had no wish to push his successes further, had opened negotiations with a view to securing the mediation of Great Britain, when an equally sudden reversal of fortune revived the courage of the Turks. Their main armies, only half beaten, had been pushed to one side during the rapid progress of the Russians, and as soon as they had recovered themselves they were in a position to advance from their fortresses upon the enemy's line of communications over the Danube. Osman Pasha, one of the best of their leaders and a born soldier, threw forward the forces under his command into the little town of Plevna, where his presence was a serious menace to the Russian rear, and he hurled back repeated attempts to eject him. While he held this position, further progress into Turkey was impossible, and had any considerable proportion of the main Turkish armies been sent to his assistance, the Russian army must have been captured or thrown back across the Danube. As it was, Russian reinforcements arrived from the north, and with the valuable assistance of the Roumanian army, which had hitherto remained inactive owing to the prince's refusal to place it under the control of the Russian generals, the situation was restored. Osman's heroic infantry, however, frus-

trated all attempts to storm Plevna, and it was not until it had paralysed the Russian advance for nearly six months that it at last succumbed to starvation following on a close blockade.

The Treaty of San Stefano.—With the fall of Plevna, the Turkish resistance collapsed. Early in 1878 the Russians entered Adrianople, and Constantinople lay at their mercy. Indeed, the whole empire once more seemed on the point of dissolution. Serbia and Montenegro, profiting by the removal from their front of the best Turkish troops, had won a number of victories, and the Greeks were preparing to seize the chance of extending their frontiers. The completeness of the Russian triumph, however, was awakening misgivings in more than one European capital. It was gravely doubted whether Russian statesmen, and especially the soldiers who had taken part in the campaign, would be content, after a struggle so costly, to fulfil the tsar's promise that their country should reap nothing from her success. Once the Russian armies were in possession of Constantinople, it was felt, they would never willingly withdraw. Public opinion in England veered completely round, and the ministers, in spite of Gladstone's opposition, were generally supported when they ordered the British fleet once more to the East, placing a portion of it actually inside the Sea of Marmora, within sight of the Russian lines. Francis Joseph, also, after taking the precautionary step of mobilising his army, came forward with a suggestion of another European Congress to assemble at Berlin. The geographical position of Austria made her wishes paramount, and no one had better reason than the tsar to know how precarious was the fortune which had turned disaster into victory. The proposal was therefore accepted, but in the meanwhile an attempt was made to anticipate the interference of the Powers and to strengthen the hands of Russia by securing the immediate submission of the Turks. Accordingly, a treaty was hastily drawn up and signed at San Stefano

to the following effect. Roumania, Serbia and Montenegro were to be declared independent, and the two latter were to have accessions of territory which would bring their frontiers almost into contact. Instead of an indemnity, Russia proposed to take from Roumania a strip of Bessarabian territory that had been ceded to Moldavia in 1856, allowing her in exchange to take from Turkey the Dobrudscha, a barren district to the south of the Danube delta. A new state of Bulgaria was to be established, really independent, though nominally under Turkish suzerainty as Roumania had hitherto been, and this "Greater Bulgaria" was to include the whole area between the Lower Danube, the Ægean, the Black Sea, and the Albanian mountains, excepting the Turkish districts reaching from Adrianople to the Sea of Marmora. For two years the new state was to be managed by Russian officials. By this arrangement Turkey would have retained only detached fragments of her European possessions, namely, the capital and its surroundings, including Adrianople, the neighbourhood of Salonica, the turbulent districts of Albania and Thessaly, and the distant lands of Bosnia and the Herzegovina, always supposing that these last were not claimed by Austria.

General Dissatisfaction at the Terms.—These terms, if carried out, would have contented the Bulgar patriots to the utmost, for they would have seen their whole nation united and free. Indeed the whole arrangement had the appearance of having been dictated by a consideration of their interests to the exclusion of all others. Accordingly, the treaty was nowhere else regarded as satisfactory. Turkey, it was true, would cease to exist as a Power in Europe, but Englishmen, still for the most part blind to the consideration that the creation of strong national states afforded the best possible barrier to Russian ambitions, saw in the temporary Russian control over Bulgaria a deep scheme for permanently extending the czar's influence to the Mediterranean—a scheme which

did undoubtedly exist. Yet even in England closer observers had already noticed in the attitude of the Bulgars, as well as in that of Roumania, during the war, clear signs that although they would be glad to be free they had no wish to change one despotism for another; and subsequent events have clearly shown the truth of this contention. Austria, with more discernment, saw clearly that a big Bulgaria would be just as effectual a barrier as a big Serbia to her own plans for pushing her frontiers southwards towards the *Ægean*, and protested accordingly, with the support of Germany. Nor did the treaty give unmixed satisfaction to the Balkan peoples themselves. Included in the proposed new state were several districts where the population was by no means wholly Bulgarian. In Macedonia, for example, dwelt many Greeks, whose hopes of union with their own country were threatened with extinction. Similarly further north there was more than one debatable area to which the Serbs, whose gains by the treaty had been insignificant, had just as good claims as the Bulgars. Roumania also denounced the ingratitude by which she was to be stripped of her fertile Bessarabian territory in exchange for a district which was of value to no one, while the Albanians bitterly resented the idea of yielding land to Montenegro. Lastly, the astute Abdul Hamid was closely watching for the chance that these differences might provide him for recovering all that he had lost.

Strong British Action.—There was therefore a general demand that when the Congress met at Berlin, the entire treaty should be submitted for revision. Russia at first demurred, but the tsar was not ready to face another war, and when the British government showed that it was in earnest by transferring a large body of Indian troops to Malta, he gave way. A preliminary agreement was arrived at that the size of the proposed state of Bulgaria should be considerably restricted.

The Congress of Berlin.—The Congress of Berlin thereupon proceeded to dictate the settlement according to which the affairs of the Balkan peninsula were in the main regulated for the next thirty-four years. The Treaty of San Stefano was almost entirely nullified. If the proposed Bulgaria had been unreasonably large, the diplomatists at Berlin went to the other extreme. The new state was arbitrarily cut in half, only that area being granted independence which lay between the Danube and the Balkan range. The inhabitants of this portion, though still under Turkish suzerainty, were to be allowed to choose a ruler, who was not to be a member of any reigning house, and a Russian official was to undertake the organisation of the government for the first nine months. In order to connect the scattered districts that were left to the Sultan and to provide the Turks with a defensible mountain frontier, an undisputedly Bulgarian district to the south of the range was to be formed into a self-governing province, to be known as Eastern Roumelia. This was to remain under Turkish control, to be exercised through a Christian governor chosen by the Sultan. Almost all the remaining districts of Greater Bulgaria were left practically unconditionally in the hands of the Turks, mainly for the reason that it was not easy to decide between the rival claims of Greeks, Serbs and Bulgars to possess them.

The Austrians Seize Bosnia.—The high hopes of the Bulgars, encouraged by the Treaty of San Stefano, were thus disappointed, but the Serbs found themselves little better treated. The independence of Serbia and Montenegro was duly recognised, but the territorial gains which had been promised, small as they were, were much reduced, and the Montenegrins were forbidden to create a navy to protect the scrap of coast-line that was left to them. Austria renewed her claim to the Herzegovina and Bosnia, and was permitted to occupy and administer these Serbian provinces on behalf of Turkey, and to maintain a garrison in Novibazar, the district that separated Montenegro from

Serbia. This advance, which provided a channel for the penetration of Austrian influence and perhaps of Austrian armies into Albania and Macedonia, and erected a fatal barrier to all hopes of a united Serbian race, was bitterly resented in both the Serb states, and has been one of the main causes of their persistent enmity to Austria, continuing up to our own day. The only justification for the step lies in the fact that the inhabitants have been better off under Austrian rule than they were under that of Turkey. What weighed with the Congress in authorising it, however, was the supposed necessity of preventing the establishment of a continuous line of Slav states right across the peninsula, which might eventually provide Russia with a naval base on the Adriatic.

Roumania and Greece.—If the Slavonic peoples suffered by their treatment at Berlin, the lot of Roumania and Greece was not improved. Roumania was forced to accept with what grace she could the injustice of the Dobrudscha-Bessarabia exchange, and as for Greece, instead of the liberation of their compatriots in the north and their fellow-Christians in Crete, which had been expected, the most that was granted, owing to England's unwillingness to see Turkey further dismembered, was a pious recommendation to Abdul Hamid's generosity. Two years later Greece received a small accession of territory in Thessaly.

Another Unsatisfactory Settlement.—It is clear, therefore, that the Treaty of Berlin did little more than the Treaty of Paris to provide any final solution to the problems of the Near East. The most that can be said for it is that it considerably diminished the number of Balkan-Christians under Turkish control, and that the tardy emancipation of a section of the Bulgars was at least a step in the right direction. On the other hand, by refusing free play to the principal nationalities concerned, by arbitrarily perpetuating and even increasing the divisions of the

Serb and Bulgar races, by deliberately maintaining what was left of Turkish misrule, and by introducing a new element of interference in the shape of Austria, the treaty certainly sowed the seeds of endless trouble during the next forty years. To set up any such barriers and artificial restrictions to their legitimate aspirations was simply to invite the Balkan peoples, as soon as they had gained sufficiently in strength, to unite and settle matters for themselves, even if their action should set the greater Powers by the ears.

Alexander of Battenberg.—The immediate history of Bulgaria brought out this fact to the full, and revealed how far removed from reality were the English forebodings that it would become a mere outpost of Russia. At the outset the tsar made the most of his position as guardian and patron of the new state. To rule it Prince Alexander of Battenberg was chosen, a dashing young man of soldierly presence, who had served with the Russian army in the campaign of 1877 and was a nephew of the tsar. The administration for the first four years lay entirely in the hands of Russian officials, but the wishes of the people were reflected in the attitude of the popularly elected parliament, which from the outset adopted a policy of consistent opposition to the foreigners. At first the prince behaved as the docile tool of his ministers, and silenced the parliament at their behest by suspending the constitution. In 1883, however, there came to the front a native statesman of the first rank, named Stambulov, and under his influence, Alexander, who wished no more than his people to remain for ever under Russian tutelage, came to terms with the nationalist party, restored the constitution, and dismissed his foreign advisers. The tsar was bitterly offended, but he believed that he possessed a sure means of recovering his authority. Bulgaria had never given up hope of reunion with Eastern Roumelia, torn from her by the Treaty of Berlin, and Russian agents had steadily encouraged this aspiration. Such encouragement was

now withdrawn. The territory was to be the reward of unconditional submission. Events in Eastern Roumelia, however, moved faster than the tsar had foreseen. In September, 1885, only six years after they had been solemnly restored to the Sultan, the people of Philippopolis, the capital, rose in revolution against Turkish rule, arrested the governor, and invited Alexander to declare the union of the two Bulgarias. The prince hesitated publicly to defy Turkey and the Powers by accepting this offer, but Stambulov urged the bold course, telling him plainly that the only choice lay between that and abdication. Alexander accordingly mobilised his army, entered Philippopolis, and summoned a parliament, which at once ratified the union.

Union of Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia.—The tsar had little doubt that the Bulgars had sealed their fate, and that they would soon be suing his protection against Turkey. An unpleasant surprise, however, was in store for him. The Powers did indeed express their regret at the infraction of the Treaty of Berlin, but Great Britain, the very Power that had most strongly protested against the creation of the Greater Bulgaria six years before, now took a very different line. The cabinet, headed by Lord Salisbury, now realised that the Bulgarian movement was national and anti-Russian, and they decided to support it accordingly. Strong British influence was brought to bear upon the Sultan to acquiesce in the loss of his province, and in view of England's determined attitude the Powers were unable to take further action.

Serbo-Bulgarian War.—Nevertheless the union was not to be secured without a struggle. The Serbs had not forgotten their treatment at San Stefano and Berlin. They regarded the Bulgars as their rivals, and they thought they saw a chance of trading on their neighbours' weakness and of thus securing that extension of territory which had been hitherto denied them. Their king, never

popular with his people, decided that vigorous action was the best means of raising the prestige of his throne. He had now a strong army, well experienced in war, and the bulk of the Bulgarian forces, as yet untried, were on the frontiers of Eastern Roumelia, in case the Turks should after all attack. Every circumstance augured success, and when he crossed the frontier he promised himself a triumphal march to Sofia. However, the unexpected once more happened. The raw Bulgarian levies were hurried westwards. Fighting for their national cause and inspired by the splendid example of their prince, they stood firm against superior numbers. After a three days' battle at Slivnitza they hurled the Serbs back over the frontier, and were only prevented from taking signal vengeance upon them for their unprovoked attack by the threat of Austrian intervention. Enough had been done, however, to assure the future of the union. There was no more talk of enforcing the Treaty of Berlin. To their own right hands the Bulgars owed their safety.

Fall of Alexander.—Prince Alexander did not long enjoy his triumph. The tsar was not one to forgive his kinsman who had defied him, and though he could not publicly interfere he could countenance conspiracy. Russian agents were set to work to foment disaffection in the Bulgarian capital, and in 1886 a little group of determined conspirators, taking advantage of the absence of troops from Sofia owing to an alarm upon the Serbian frontier, kidnapped the prince from his palace, and hurried him away to Russia, where he was released. A provisional government was set up for Bulgaria under Russian auspices. The nation, however, would have none of this arrangement. Stambulov refused to recognise it, and, supported by the bulk of the army, forced the conspirators to withdraw after three days in power, and invited the prince to return. Alexander did so, but, weary of the struggle and disheartened by the persistent efforts of Russia to stifle the independence of the new state, he abdicated immediately

after and retired into private life in Austria. Stambulov was now left in the position of a dictator. The friends of Russia did their utmost to undermine his position, but their efforts had only the effect of further rousing the national spirit of the stubborn peasants. The next parliamentary elections were a triumph for the national party, and the Russian agents then sullenly withdrew.

Ferdinand of Coburg.—It remained to find a new prince. For six months the crown went a-begging, but in 1887 it was accepted by Prince Ferdinand of Coburg, a man of very different stamp from Alexander—no soldier, but a student and a wary, tenacious diplomatist. With the support of Stambulov he resolutely defied every effort of the Russians to recover their influence, and by 1893, when the statesman to whom the country owed so much retired, the danger from that quarter was over. On his accession Ferdinand issued a declaration that he had mounted the ancient throne of the glorious Bulgarian tsars, and indicated the ultimate aim of his policy—to rid his adopted country of even nominal vassaldom to Turkey and to liberate those Bulgar districts to the west and south that still were unredeemed. Fully to accomplish this dream he was content to bide his time. Meanwhile he devoted himself to preparing his country for the great events in which it was to play a leading part during the succeeding century.

CHAPTER XIX

RUSSIA AND POLAND, 1855-1914

- 1863. Polish Rebellion.
- . 1877. Russo-Turkish War.
- 1881. Murder of Alexander II.
- 1894. Accession of Nicholas II. Dual Alliance.
- 1904. Russo-Japanese War.

The Despotism of Nicholas I.—Under the iron system of Nicholas I the political reforms initiated in Russia and Poland by his predecessor had remained altogether in abeyance, but even his stern autocracy, which barred all progress towards democratic ideals and tended to sacrifice all else to the needs of the army, had failed to eradicate the liberal sentiments which had been widely spread at his accession. His government had not been one of blind reaction. He had been a patron of literature, had codified the law, and had done something to simplify the administration of justice. Such matters as road-making, mining and education had received careful attention. The government was stable, and his reign provided a period of internal tranquillity and marked commercial progress, maintained during the stormy years of revolution elsewhere. Nevertheless, to make so rigid a system of personal rule at all acceptable to a great and high-spirited nation whose intellectual classes were in close contact with the aspirations and ideals of western liberalism, it was necessary that such a government should be one of proved efficiency and capable of maintaining at the highest level the national prestige and honour. Now the humiliations of the Crimean War led all classes of Russians to contrast the existing

order of things, for which they held the tsar's autocracy responsible, with the glories of 1812. The army, for which such sacrifices had been made, was manifestly inefficient. It was revealed to all the world that the government itself was honeycombed with corruption, sloth and incapacity, and that too many of its innumerable officials used their positions for the purposes of local petty tyranny or of private gain. Thus, just when the firm hand of Nicholas was removed, a spirit of antagonism to the personal rule which he had maintained was spreading rapidly throughout the nation.

Alexander II.—His son and successor, Alexander II, was a man of very different stamp. He was certainly no liberal enthusiast, but when the need for thoroughgoing political and social reform in every particular of Russian life was pressed upon him, he showed himself lacking in either the disposition to take the lead or the strength of will to persevere with his father's system. As a result, he inclined at first to take a middle course, acting with a caution that made some of his work of lasting benefit to his country, but later he recoiled in horror from the demands of the more advanced reformers, and, in view of the spread of revolutionary symptoms, fell back upon measures of pure reaction and repression more severe than any that his father had found it necessary to employ. His vacillation lost him the trust both of the admirers of his father and of the reformers, whose hopes of putting Russia in the van of civilisation he disappointed, and created an evil atmosphere of suspicion and class hostility from which the country has never altogether emerged.

His Reforms.—Between 1860 and 1865 many valuable reforms were effected. The serfs, who formed a third of the whole population of European Russia, were freed from the worst of their burdens, and an immense area of the soil was set aside to provide them with plots of land

to cultivate as independent peasant proprietors. Schools and universities were everywhere founded, trial by jury was instituted and much attention paid to the development of railways. The finances were set in order, and the army and navy reorganised on modern lines. The officials by whom the country had previously been administered were largely replaced by a system of local self-government by means of elective district councils, with the idea of preparing the way for the establishment of representative government for the whole of Russia at a later date.

Nihilism.—It was not long, however, before events occurred which occasioned a complete reversal of the policy which the tsar had been led to adopt. It was found that the unaccustomed liberty which Russia now enjoyed was too frequently misused. In particular, the wholesale relaxation of the censorship of the press and the rapid spread of education led to an epidemic of the crudest political speculation. The universities, which were thronged with students from the poorer classes, as being the avenues to the professions and to all public employment, became the centres of socialist and revolutionary agitation. Men who harboured wild hopes of the sudden and violent reconstruction of human society gave the tsar no credit for reforms that he had already effected, and looked upon them as half-measures of the most paltry nature wrung from an unwilling tyrant. It was taught with the utmost sincerity that the reorganisation of Russia must begin with the wholesale destruction not only of the imperial family, but also of the nobility and the higher government officials. Such teaching was given the name of "Nihilism," and since it was widely accepted, in Russia as well as in Poland, it was no wonder that in every town there were constant collisions between hot-headed revolutionaries and the police. It is possible that with wise handling the movement might have harmlessly burnt itself out, but the government took alarm and proceeded to measures which only served to fan the flame.

Condition of Poland.—Most threatening of all was the disturbed state of the Poles, who took advantage of the dissensions in Russia to demand their independence or at least the restoration of the self-governing rights which they had lost in 1831. Here, too, Alexander at first adopted a policy of conciliation, but his offer of a series of measures similar to those that were being effected in Russia contented nobody, and in 1863 savage outbreaks occurred in Warsaw and elsewhere. They had little chance of success, for the Poles no longer possessed any organised military force, and no foreign assistance was forthcoming. England, France and Austria made earnest but quite ineffectual representations on behalf of the oppressed nation, the only result being that they thereby confirmed the hostility with which those countries were already regarded in Russia. Intervention was actually proposed by Napoleon III, but the suggestion came to nothing, and he lived bitterly to rue the day when he had made it. Bismarck, with more foresight, lent the tsar valuable aid by closely guarding the Prussian frontier, a service which was repaid tenfold in 1866 and 1870. In these circumstances organised resistance was put down with comparative ease; but to reduce the whole country to order proved an immense undertaking. A secret patriotic society, which the tsar could never track down, continued to gather arms and money and maintained an apparently endless guerilla warfare in the wastes and marshes of southern Poland.

Reaction and the Growth of Secret Societies.—By 1865 the prevailing conditions in Russia and Poland had caused the growth of a strong party which doubted the wisdom of the whole policy of reform and sighed for a return to the firm and stable despotism of Nicholas; and for the next fifteen years, with the tsar's consent, reaction became the order of the day. By means of innumerable secret police, illegal imprisonment and wholesale deportations to Siberia, every possible effort was made to stifle free speech, political

speculation and even the desire for reform. The movement, however, had taken too firm a hold to be eradicated in this manner. The preachers of nihilism were driven into concealment, but in secret societies they everywhere continued their propaganda, and deliberately adopted a gospel of terrorism, not through any love of bloodshed, but because they saw no other way to free Russia and Poland from oppression. At first they were content with the murder of police spies and minor officials, but before long, the severest penalties and the unremitting police activities proving no deterrent, they aimed higher, and numerous attempts were made upon the life of the tsar, as the representative and head of the whole tyrannical system.

The Murder of Alexander II.—By 1880 the government came to the conclusion that as repression had definitely failed in its object the time had come for a return to conciliation. Public opinion must at all costs be weaned from sympathy with the assassins. To this end Alexander was induced to grant a limited form of constitutional government, in which the nation was to have a recognised channel for the expression of its opinion. An elected assembly was to meet which should have the privilege of advising, but no right of controlling the action of the government. What success this concession might have had in diminishing the fury of the malcontents must remain a matter of speculation. The very day upon which the tsar, after much hesitation, gave his final consent to the proposal a bomb was thrown at him as he was driving through the streets of the capital, and he died of his injuries within a few hours. The nihilists followed up their success by threatening to repeat the crime upon the tsar's successor if fully responsible representative government and freedom of speech were not immediately granted, but the bomb had done what half-hearted measures of reform might well have failed to do. Russian opinion, now thoroughly shocked, remembered that the victim, the liberator of the serfs, had been on the point of granting

them such a constitution as the nation had never yet enjoyed. The devoted patriotism and fervid loyalty to the tsar's person that existed deep in the hearts of the vast majority of Russians was thoroughly awakened and the past weaknesses and failures of the government were forgotten. The party of reaction, thus reinforced, regained the upper hand, and turned strongly against the terrorists, demanding to be allowed to co-operate with the new tsar in the fiercest acts of repression. All discussion of reform and constitutional progress was abandoned, and reaction was for the moment accepted as a convincing theory. Democracy and popular liberty, it was argued, were signs of national decay, and Russia must be saved from the fate that was overtaking Western Europe by the establishment of the most rigorous form of absolutism. So far had the pendulum swung that the revolutionaries, after one more fierce burst of crime early in the new reign, realised that they had nothing to gain by further acts of violence, for Russia as a whole was clearly not yet ripe for the adoption of their ideas. They therefore directed their energies to preparing the way for future revolution by the education of the masses. Secret societies still existed, and an immense organisation was developed for secretly printing pamphlets, in spite of the efforts of the police, and for passing them from hand to hand all over Russia. Many of the leaders fled the country and directed the operations from the comparative security of London and Paris. For the next twenty years, while their efforts were thus preparing the way for a renewed outburst of activity, autocracy resumed its sway, and, outwardly at least, Russia enjoyed a period of peace.

Russian Foreign Activities.—During this stormy period the tsar's government had seldom permitted the disturbances at home to interfere with its activities abroad. In addition to keeping a close watch upon events in the Balkan peninsula, culminating in intervention and war with Turkey in 1877 (see page 166), Russia took advantage

of the European situation in 1870 to repudiate the clauses of the Treaty of Paris which prohibited her from maintaining an arsenal or a war fleet in the Black Sea. The reign of Alexander II was also a period of rapid Russian expansion, both in the Far East and in Central Asia. Treading with deliberate purpose a path similar to that along which Great Britain had been almost unconsciously drawn by the adventurous spirit of her pioneers, the Russian government had long since set itself to build an empire out of the vast plains of the Asiatic continent, and considerable progress in this direction had been made during the first half of the century. Now the entire coast-line of eastern Asia north of Korea was secured, and, besides commercial ports, the naval base of Vladivostok was established on the shores of the Pacific. Similarly, neither the mountains of the Caucasus nor the deserts of Turkestan availed to stay the process of absorption. Between 1860 and 1880 the progress towards Persia and the Himalayas proceeded unchecked, providing the British government new ground for apprehension of the Russian designs. The tsar defended every step forward by explaining that it was taken under the necessity of maintaining order among the lawless savages upon his frontier. He declared that even if the process involved perpetual advances until, as it must do, it brought Russia into close contact with British India, there would even then be no ground for British apprehension, for his object was always the protection of his own territory and never encroachment upon that of other civilised states. Nevertheless, the suspicion gained ground in England, and not without some justification, that it was the ultimate aim of Russia to obtain access to the Indus valley and the Persian Gulf. Meanwhile, the completion in 1869 of the Suez Canal made Great Britain more than ever determined to secure the predominance of her influence in the Eastern Mediterranean; for the security of the new route to India would be jeopardised by any Russian advance to Constantinople or into

Asia Minor. Thus throughout the reign of Alexander II English fears and suspicions were steadily ripening into unremitting hostility. Nor had the tsar any wish to conciliate British opinion. The Crimean War had left bitter memories behind it, and from the day when Russia was forced to abandon the Treaty of San Stefano she owed England a further grudge, to repay which she was ready to seize the first opportunity that offered.

Isolation of Russia.—After the murder of Alexander II, however, the energies of the government were for some years absorbed in the task of repressing internal strife, and Russian foreign policy became accordingly restrained. Moreover, the rebuff that had been administered to Russia at the Conference of Berlin, where she was allowed to gain practically nothing from her victories in the Turkish War, had revealed to her statesman her position of isolation in Europe. Her interests in the Balkans conflicted utterly with those of Austria, and when Francis Joseph was found to have concluded an alliance with the German Emperor, it was obviously time for Russia to walk warily. Thus she found herself in no position to bring her feud with England to a head until 1894, when she formed that close bond with France which still unites them; and by that time the attention of both rivals had been diverted from the Mediterranean and Central Asia to the Farthest East.

The Far East.—The condition of the Chinese Empire had long been held to present some resemblance to that of Turkey. Its immense size, the vast undeveloped wealth that it was known to contain, and the fact that it seemed unable and unwilling on its own initiative to adopt the culture and science of the West, or to transform itself into a modern state on the European model, all suggested that it might easily be exploited by the first civilised state that brought its influence seriously to bear. England and France had already made some efforts in this direction,

but it was the natural ambition of Russia to maintain a paramount influence in this important sphere. As far as North China was concerned, she derived an obvious advantage over her European rivals from her possession of Siberia and ports on the Pacific, and in 1891, with a view to making the most of this, she inaugurated the vast engineering enterprise of the Trans-Siberian Railway, which was to connect Vladivostok with European Russia.

Japan and China.—The building of this railway was in the nature of a race with the astoundingly rapid development of Japan. This is not the place to discuss the extraordinary transformation which had recently been effected in that island kingdom. It must suffice to say that here also the determination existed to secure a predominant share in the commercial profits that would accrue from the exploitation of China. In 1894 a dispute between China and Japan upon the question of the right to interfere in the affairs of Korea, over which China claimed a vague suzerainty, resulted in war. The islanders were victorious, and claimed as their reward the possession of the Liao-Tung peninsula, including the valuable harbour of Port Arthur, which had been seized by them during the war. In the moment of their triumph, however, they were robbed of the fruits of victory. Russia had marked Korea as her own, and also had long desired a port less liable than Vladivostok to be closed by ice in winter. In conjunction with Germany, whose young emperor had resolved upon a vigorous colonial policy, she now ordered the Japanese government to restore Port Arthur and its peninsula to China, and the Mikado had no choice but to submit. Three years later, the tsar having in the meantime come to an agreement with the courts of Peking and Berlin, Japan had the mortification of seeing the disputed prize appropriated by the Russians. The greater part of Manchuria soon fell under their influence, and a branch line was pushed southwards from the Trans-Siberian Railway, now approaching completion, to link the new

port with Vladivostok and the West. At the same time the port of Kiao Chau, together with the neighbouring district, was seized by Germany. With extraordinary restraint, in view of this frustration of all her ambitions, Japan remained content to bide her time.

Ineffective Action by Great Britain.—Great Britain chafed at these high-handed proceedings, but Lord Salisbury's government saw that no resistance could be offered to the combination of Russia and Germany, especially as France, in virtue of her new alliance, had acted with the former. A protest was issued and an attempt made to safeguard British interests by stipulating that Kiao Chau and Port Arthur should be thrown open to the trade of all nations, but it soon became evident that, whatever promises they might make, Russia and Germany meant to regard their new possessions as close preserves. Finally Great Britain swallowed her scruples and seized, as some sort of compensation, the comparatively valueless port of Wei-Hai-Wei, immediately opposite to Port Arthur.

The "Boxer" Rising.—One more step in the Russian advance was taken in 1900, as a consequence of a fierce outbreak of the Chinese, organised by a secret society of patriots known in England as "Boxers." This movement, at first directed against the Chinese officials at Peking who had acquiesced in the recent proceedings of the Powers, soon developed into a general onslaught upon foreigners, and was suppressed only by the landing of large bodies of troops despatched by all the Powers, including the United States and Japan. Under the pretext that such a step was necessary for the future preservation of order, Manchuria was now declared a permanent Russian protectorate.

The Russo-Japanese War.—So far the tsar's policy had been entirely successful, and old scores with England had been to a great extent paid off. Meanwhile, however,

Japan had not forgotten her treatment in 1895. She had ever since been preparing for the struggle with Russia which she knew must come, and ten years of silent work left her army and navy ready to the last detail for their task. In order to prevent a combination of Germany and Russia against her, an alliance had been concluded with Great Britain by which each was to come to the help of the other if assailed by two Powers at once. In 1904, while the Siberian Railway still consisted of a single track, Lake Baikal, a serious obstacle, having to be crossed by a service of ferry steamers, the undisguised Russian intention of ousting Japanese influence from Korea provided the Mikado with good grounds for complaint. An ultimatum was issued, and, as no satisfaction was forthcoming, warlike operations were at once commenced. To all but those who had observed the magnificent fighting qualities and equipment of the Japanese troops landed in China in 1900 their almost unbroken successes in the ensuing war came with something of a shock. The Russians, surprised and outnumbered at the start, laboured throughout under the handicap of having to reinforce and supply their armies, operating at a vast distance from the centre of their power, over a hastily built single line of railway five thousand miles long. This disadvantage alone, apart from other sources of weakness, made it impossible for them successfully to defend their advanced positions against an opponent so determined. They were quickly cleared from Korea, and driven far into the interior of Manchuria. Port Arthur was isolated, and the warships based upon that port and Vladivostok were put out of action. The following year, Port Arthur fell, after resisting desperate assaults for several months, and a fresh fleet sent from the Baltic, after provoking great excitement in England, where public opinion was as usual hostile to Russia, by firing at some British fishing smacks in the North Sea, under the impression that there were Japanese torpedo craft amongst them, eventually

reached Japanese waters, only to be annihilated as soon as they appeared.

The Treaty of Portsmouth.—Matters now reached a deadlock. The Japanese could profit little by penetrating further into Manchuria, and the Russians were unable to accumulate forces large enough to drive them back. During the summer the United States intervened, and at her suggestion the combatants agreed to a conference at Portsmouth in America, where peace was eventually declared. Japan at last made good her hold upon Port Arthur and the Liao Tung peninsula, and Russia abandoned all claim upon Korea and Manchuria. The question of an indemnity, however, an important matter to a state like Japan whose financial resources were hardly fit to bear the expense of war on such a scale, was settled in favour of Russia, for the Japanese possessed no means whatever of compelling payment.

The Weakness of Russia.—It was not altogether to the blows of her diminutive antagonist that Russia had yielded. But for her own internal weaknesses she could have maintained the struggle indefinitely at a distance from the coast, and Japan must before long have succumbed to utter financial exhaustion. The old discontent, however, which had been quiescent for a time after the murder of Alexander II, had latterly acquired new force, and the most vigorous repression was proving insufficient to hold it in check. The war was intensely unpopular at home, and its disasters renewed the feeling of distrust in the government which had subjected Russia to such humiliations at the hands of the youngest of the Powers. Corruption and peculation among officials, of the kind that had been revealed after the Crimean War, was found still to exist upon a scale hardly diminished by the reforms of the last fifty years. Money that should have gone to the equipment of the armies had been diverted to the pockets of high dignitaries, and not even the funds of the

Red Cross Society had been immune. Popular feeling was thus brought to a head. Strikes and riots took place in many parts of Russia and in Poland. The peasantry plundered and wrecked the property of the country gentry. The Black Sea fleet broke into mutiny and actually bombarded Odessa, and the state of feeling in some of the industrial cities, which had greatly increased in size during the last thirty-five years, seemed to presage immediate revolution.

Nicholas II.—Nor was the character of Nicholas II, who had succeeded his father in 1894, such as to inspire the government in its dealings with the situation. Alexander III, who had played such a despotic rôle after the tragedy of 1881, had been a man of commanding presence, and, like Nicholas I, had done something to keep some departments of his government in a state of efficiency by his own unbending will and his personal capacity for detail. Nicholas II, on the other hand, was hardly the stuff of whom successful despots are made. Full of kindly impulses, but lacking in the requisite resolution and force of character, he adopted an attitude which encouraged the agitators without winning them permanently to his side. He issued proclamations vaguely promising reforms which he was unable to induce his officials to carry out, and his promises, being accompanied by sternly repressive action on the part of the government, only aggravated the situation, to which the declaration of peace in August, 1905, made no difference. Protests, strikes, mutinies and assassinations continued well into the following year, until at last the fury of the revolutionaries burnt itself out, and the party of reaction, which had constant resort to illegal courts martial and imprisonment without trial, and had not hesitated to use artillery freely in the streets of Moscow and Sebastopol, at last obtained the upper hand.

Parliamentary Government.—During 1906 and 1907, when the situation was once more fairly well in hand,

some sort of compromise was effected. As had happened before, the wild excesses of the revolutionary socialists alienated the sympathies of all moderate men, and the mass of the nation, setting aside the demands of both parties of extremists, agreed upon the establishment at last of a tentative system of parliamentary government. A house of representatives was elected, known as the Duma, and though its powers of law-making and of controlling the tsar's officials were strictly limited, its very existence, and the hope that it would be able to effect practical measures of reform, had a pacifying effect upon the disturbed country. As a result, Russia was able to resume the industrial, commercial and artistic development which was so prominent a feature of her history during the years immediately preceding the Great War.

Modern Russia.—The limited parliamentary system thus established existed in Russia up to 1914, but it is impossible to state that it ever had much permanent influence over the traditional autocracy of the tsar and his officials. It was the sincere opinion of many Russians that their country was unsuited to free institutions like those of western Europe, by reason of its size and the backwardness of large masses of its population. On the other hand it is not easy to believe that a form of government which in the past had never been altogether free from the charges of cruel political persecution, of repression of free speech, and of corruption in high places, was that best suited to the needs of the country. Nor could tsardom plead, like the despotism of Germany, that its labours provided a government of proved efficiency or that they always maintained the national prestige at the highest level.

CHAPTER XX

THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, 1871-1914

The Fall of the Second Empire.—After the capitulation at Sedan in 1870, Napoleon III telegraphed to Paris: "The army is defeated and captured and I am a prisoner." To such a system of government as his, in which everything depended upon maintaining a hold over public opinion by a vigorous foreign policy and by successful activity in war, this humiliation was immediately fatal. It had been crumbling beneath him during the last few years. It now altogether collapsed. The parliament, surrounded by a mob, shouting, "Down with the Empire," had no choice but to depose him and to establish a provisional republican "Government of National Defence," which was sanctioned and unanimously supported by the whole nation. No amount of enthusiasm, however, could save France from the consequences of her initial unpreparedness for the war into which Napoleon had plunged her. The hopeless struggle was abandoned after the fall of Paris at the end of January, 1871, and negotiations for peace were at once begun. At the conclusion of these in May, Napoleon was released from captivity, but the whole fabric of his dreams was shattered, and he retired to England, where he died two years later. For a second time French Imperialism had brought disaster in its train.

Relations with Germany after the War.—Meanwhile, since it was doubtful whether the provisional government had any right to speak in the name of the whole nation, a new parliament was elected, to which fell the colossal

labour of reorganising the shattered institutions of France. The first task, however, was not one of reconstruction but of preserving the very existence of the state. It was manifestly impossible to hope for any immediate renewal of the struggle, and the German military party was frankly determined to take the opportunity of so crippling France that in their time at least she would never lift up her head. In addition to seizing a great part of the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, including the fortress of Metz, the victors demanded an indemnity of two hundred million pounds, a sum which, it was supposed, would impoverish France for a generation to come. The frantic appeals of the French failed to moderate these demands, and it was only by enduring the final humiliation of seeing the German army march in triumph into Paris that they managed to save the important fortress of Belfort. Bismarck doubted the wisdom of such severity. In his dealings with Austria in 1866 he had shown the solid advantage that may sometimes be gained from the lenient treatment of the vanquished. Although on this occasion he was obliged to support the demands of the obdurate generals, he foresaw that it would be impossible to retain a high-spirited nation in chains for ever, and that the seizure of so much territory almost universally regarded as French would implant in the heart of the French nation an undying hatred which would permanently imperil the peace of Europe. Events soon proved that he was right. The German hopes that the indemnity would prove a permanent burden were quickly disappointed. As soon as peace was declared, the credit of France, based upon the fertility of her soil and the industry of her people, at once recovered itself, and the huge sum was easily raised within three years, the loans for the purpose being actually subscribed many times over. On the other hand, the implacable hatred inspired by the loss of Alsace has not only proved an insuperable barrier to cordial relations between France and Germany. It has coloured their whole foreign policy

from that time to this and has been a prime cause of the growth of armaments all over Europe.

The State of France. The Communards.—Even before the treaty of peace had been signed, the provisional government was obliged to face new difficulties of a formidable nature. The elections of February, 1871, had been conducted at a time when peace was the first object of the national desire. A small but active section of the republican party had even then been clamouring for the continuation of the war at whatever cost, but all sensible men had made up their minds that further resistance was useless and in fact impossible. Everywhere, therefore, safe men—landowners and men of property—had been elected, and when the parliament met at Bordeaux it was found, as might have been expected, that neither the imperialists nor the republicans were largely represented and that a considerable majority of the deputies were monarchists, supporters of one or other of the two branches of the Bourbon Royal House. Now with such an assembly the excited and half-starved working classes of Paris, upon whom had fallen the indignities and privations of the siege, were wholly out of sympathy. Besides suspecting, with some reason, that it intended to re-establish the Bourbon monarchy or at least to restore the middle class domination that had prevailed earlier in the century, they were furious that, after all their sufferings, it should have failed to secure for France more tolerable terms of peace. Moreover, the fall of the Empire had seemed to them to provide an opportunity for the reconstruction of the government upon entirely new lines. They demanded that France should be divided into a series of self-governing districts or “communes,” each of which should take care of the interests of its own people in almost complete independence of the rest. Such a system, striking at the very foundations of the centralised government by which France had been controlled for more than two centuries, would have reduced her to a loose federation

of separate communities, and would have undermined the essential unity upon which the strength of any nation must depend; but the "communards" regarded it as the highest possible development of political liberty. In making these demands Paris soon adopted an attitude of defiance to the established government of France. A revolutionary council was elected in March 1871, which at once hoisted the red flag, set to work to reorganise the city upon the new lines, and called upon the other industrial towns of France for their co-operation. Not content with mere political changes, they proposed to put into practice the extremest revolutionary doctrines. Religion was to be abolished, and the institution of marriage and all private property swept away. Such extravagance naturally alienated the sympathy of all reasonable men and only served further to discredit for the time the whole republican party.

Insurrection in Paris.—The parliament, which had been transferred in the meantime from Bordeaux to Versailles, now determined to reduce Paris by force, and as by this time the prisoners released by the Germans had begun to return, regular troops were available for the purpose. Early in May a systematic attack was begun, and after a fortnight of skirmishing on the outskirts the city was entered. There followed a week of desperate street fighting, in which artillery was freely used. Non-combatants and prisoners were butchered in cold blood, and many public buildings, including the palace of the Tuileries, were burnt to the ground by the frantic mobs. By the end of the month, however, order was restored in Paris, and as the outbreaks in the provinces soon broke down when the capital had been reduced, it remained only to take vengeance upon such of the revolutionaries as had survived the general slaughter. Seven thousand were transported for life to penal colonies abroad, and many more were executed. The revolutionary party was, for the time being, wiped out of French political life. The

middle classes, supported unanimously by the country population, which had been terrified by the proposals of the "communards," held the field.

Reconstruction.—This danger over, France settled down to the serious work of reconstruction. The difficulties might well seem overwhelming. Each of the main parties which had in turn attempted to control the destinies of France during the century was still in existence and was striving to recover its power. The legitimists urged the rights of the Comte de Chambord as the descendant of Louis XV. The Orleanists grouped themselves round the Comte de Paris, the grandson of Louis Philippe. The republicans, heirs of the democratic principles of 1793 demanded the restoration of the system shattered by Napoleon's conspiracy in 1851. Even the Bonapartists, discredited as they were, dared to hope that some reactionary movement might yet place the Prince Imperial upon the Napoleonic throne. The government which had negotiated the peace and upon whose decision the future depended, though republican in form, was frankly monarchical in its sentiments, and at first it was hardly doubted that its deliberations would result in some form of royalist restoration. For a time there seemed a chance that the long-standing rivalry between legitimists and Orleanists would be ended by a compromise, and that the Comte de Chambord, a man of fifty-five, would peaceably ascend the throne as a constitutional king. He was childless, and the idea was that at his death the Orleanist candidate should succeed him. At the last moment, however, he declined to abandon the white flag of the Bourbons and all that it stood for, the principles of divine right and of royalist absolutism. Such an attitude of course made him unacceptable to any but his own personal adherents, and the plan was abandoned. At the same time the legitimists refused to transfer their support to the Comte de Paris, preferring to combine for the moment with even the republicans to exclude him. For four years

this state of perplexity and indecision continued, every practicable form of government being rejected by a combination of parties against it. At last, however, the nation came to the conclusion that, as the two monarchical groups refused to reconcile their differences, some form of republicanism would provide the best chance of future unity and peace. The framework of a new constitution was constructed, by which there was to be a president, elected for a term of seven years, and two representative chambers, one of which should be chosen by universal manhood suffrage. The president was to be endowed with powers resembling those which in practice the King of England wielded. He could delay, but could hardly forbid, the passage of laws, and could appeal to the people by dissolving parliament. He was unable to take action without the authority of his ministers and they, though chosen by himself, were responsible only to parliament for the conduct of their departments.

The Third Republic.—A new parliament was elected in 1876, and as the dread of revolutionary socialism had by this time died down in the country a large republican majority was returned, which immediately ratified the new constitution. The thoroughly democratic system thus adopted has remained substantially unaltered to our own day. It has provided France with a government apparently well suited to her needs and certainly more durable than those which had preceded it since 1789. Although the two royalist parties have from time to time made attempts to recover their power, their intrigues have never seriously threatened its position, and, as for the Bonapartists, the Prince Imperial was killed in Zululand in 1879, and his death proved a blow that deprived them of their last serious chance of success.

French Democracy.—With the gradual disappearance of these malcontents, and the correspondingly firm establishment of the Third Republic, it has been found less and less

necessary to restrict the freedom of the press or of public speech, and in these respects France now enjoys almost the same degree of liberty that prevails in England. Similarly, the socialists, whose activities caused so much alarm in 1848 and 1871, have been permitted to become one of the regular political parties of the state, and have to a great extent availed themselves of the privilege. Very numerous among the industrial population, they have long since ceased to be regarded in France as a public danger to be repressed at all costs, and in consequence they have for the most part discarded the extreme demands which earned for them the hostility of all moderate men. It is true that there has arisen a party, known as that of the "syndicalists," which looks forward to the time when the industrial classes, organised in trades-unions, shall by some bold stroke seize the supreme power and use it for their own exclusive benefit. The majority, however, are content to watch the gradual realisation of their hopes by the ordinary political methods. During the last twenty years there have been several cabinet ministers of pronounced socialist views, and under their influence some of the reforms that were once regarded as revolutionary have been peacefully effected. The demands of 1848 that the state should interfere to protect the poor against exploitation by the rich have long become a commonplace. Besides encouraging the activities of local governing bodies, such as the municipalities of towns, in providing services of every kind for the community, the central government now asserts its right to regulate private industries whenever necessary in the interests of working men, even if such regulation means the diminution of profits. It has established means for the adjustment of disputes between employers and employed, has restricted hours of work, has enforced systematic control over the dwellings of the poor, has provided free education for all, and has successfully assumed the ownership of many of the railways. Thus the more practical parts of the

socialist programme are already in fair way to be regarded, in France as in England, as no Utopia but rather as the natural outcome of democratic government, and, as a result, the danger of national cleavage and revolution, which so constantly jeopardised the country during the Nineteenth Century, seems largely to have passed away. It is probably fair, therefore, to regard modern France as an instance of a country where real democratic liberty has been established without any necessarily fatal interference with national efficiency or unity of purpose. That such a result should have been achieved after all her tribulations since 1789 is the best promise for her future.

Military Service.—The progress of democracy in France during the period under review in no way blinded her to the necessity of assuring her future in other ways. The generation that had endured the sufferings and humiliations of 1870 for the most part desired no immediate renewal of the horrors of war, but the problem of safeguarding their frontiers and their honour against future attacks was universally regarded as urgent. Thus, before any settlement had been arrived at concerning the form of government, and even before the indemnity to Germany had been paid, the nation of its own initiative resolved that, at whatever sacrifices, France must at once be made as far as possible unassailable; and the success attending the measures which were taken is best estimated by the unconcealed annoyance with which they were watched in Germany. Within two years of the declaration of peace an entirely reorganised military system had been put into working order. Five years' training with the active army was demanded from all but those who reached a high standard of education, and every trained man was to be liable to recall to the colours at any time until he reached the age of forty. To equip the huge forces thus raised no less than twenty million pounds were annually voted. The new eastern frontier was organised as a vast entrenched camp, and the great fortresses were rebuilt, and re-equipped

with every improvement that science could devise. For nearly twenty years this extraordinary burden was patiently borne, and in 1889, when the period of active service was shortened to three years, the reduction was accompanied by the abolition of all exemptions, except of course on the ground of physical unfitness. In 1895, after an alliance had been concluded with Russia, a further reduction took place, but in 1914, in view of the threatening increase in the German active forces, the time of training was again increased to three years. Throughout the period, moreover, although the expenditure on national defence increased until it reached forty millions annually, the necessity of developing a large navy has never been overlooked.

Foreign Relations.—Meanwhile, as the terrors of war faded into the past, and as France began to give each year fresh evidence of her wonderful powers of recuperation, the enduring bitterness that had been implanted by the loss of Alsace developed into a pertinacious yearning for revenge, which the government on more than one occasion found it difficult to restrain. Nor were the constant apprehensions of an unprovoked attack by Germany altogether without foundation. As early as 1874 the military party in Germany, disappointed that their efforts to crush the spirit of France had so signally failed, were already urging Bismarck to pick a new quarrel and to finish the business before the French army reorganisation should be completed. In the following year threatening language was used which practically gave France the alternatives of obediently reducing her army or of enduring an attack before she was ready. By this time, however, although the resumption of cordial relations with Germany remained an impossibility, France was able to look elsewhere abroad for the means to safeguard her position. Both in England and, more particularly, in Russia there were statesmen who realised that their countries had an interest in preventing the complete subjugation of France.

In the foreign policy of the Third Republic no signs appeared of any such aggressiveness as had distinguished the Second Empire, while, on the other hand, the tremendous increase in the military power and the political influence of united Germany had already begun to awaken serious misgivings in Petrograd and London. The crisis of 1875 was therefore brought to an end by the interference of Russia and England. The personal remonstrances of Alexander II and Queen Victoria secured from the Emperor William an assurance that no attack upon the Republic was contemplated.

The Dual Alliance.—We can now see that this decisive action was the first step towards the creation of closer ties between France and the Powers which intervened to save her, but no further progress was made along this path for many years. In the first place, Bismarck already realised to the full the implacable nature of the French hostility, and, though he had no fear of France unaided, he lived henceforth in constant fear of the formation by her of some combination hostile to Germany, and he laboured steadfastly to forestall her by conciliating all possible allies. Nor was the task of France, apart from his resolute statesmanship, in any way easy. England and Russia were still kept apart by their rivalry in Asia, and the events of 1879 in the Balkans tended to widen the breach. It was not until after the Russo-Japanese War in 1904 that cordial relations between them became in any way possible. On the other hand the French activities in North Africa (see chap. xxii.), which tended very greatly to increase as time went on, provided until the close of the century a constant source of bickering between England and France, to the delight of the Germans. Between Russia and France, however, no such insuperable barrier existed, and it was to prevent any agreement between them that Bismarck directed his efforts. At the Congress of Berlin in 1879 he managed to embroil them for a moment, but after the formation of the Triple Alliance in 1882 (see page 246),

by which it was understood that Germany definitely espoused the cause of Austria in the Balkans, Russia and France were drawn gradually but inevitably together. Whatever the personal distaste of the autocratic Alexander III for intimate dealings with a country that had shown itself to be the home of democracy and revolution, it was clear that Russia was isolated in Europe and that there was for her only one possible ally. The two nations were already united by the bond of a common antipathy for the Germans. Russia could furnish the military support that France so sorely needed, and French financiers were willing to supply the vast capital required for the development of railways in Russia and Siberia. As soon as Alexander III died, his successor completed the compact that had been so long foreshadowed, and France had peace from her constant apprehension of finding herself left face to face with the whole might of Germany. From 1895 to 1914 the rival alliances, Dual and Triple, stood opposed to one another, each armed to the teeth in full consciousness of the purpose of its existence, and each watching the other for the first sign of aggressive intent.

CHAPTER XXI

THE GERMAN EMPIRE, 1871-1914

1882. The Triple Alliance.

1888. Death of William I.

1890. Resignation of Bismarck.

1897. Seizure of Kiao Chau.

Bismarck's Triumph.—With the creation in 1871 of the national state, of which so many generations of German patriots had dreamed, the first chapter of Bismarck's life-work was completed. The triumph over France awakened a feeling of national unity and kinship that did much to weaken the bitter jealousy of Prussia hitherto prevailing in several of the smaller states, particularly in Saxony and Bavaria. For Bismarck himself the events of 1871 were a personal triumph which silenced all opposition to his resolute policy, and raised him to the position of a national hero. What was now above all requisite was a period of repose during which the extraordinary changes effected during the last seven years might be consolidated, and the new nation might begin to feel its way along the path marked out for it. Granted such a period, it seemed likely that Germany, now a compact state of great military strength, with a growing population and immense sources of material wealth, would before long be in a position to dominate the politics of Europe.

Imperial Problems.—Yet, at the conclusion of the war, Bismarck was confronted with a mass of problems that demanded the most careful handling. The new state was as yet in the earliest stages of reconstruction, for nothing

had been settled but the merest outline of a constitution. The hostility to Prussia, though weakened, was by no means extinct, and it would be a delicate matter to devise any form of strong central government without reawakening local patriotism and prejudices which might immediately threaten the cohesion of the whole. Nor would the liberals, of old the strongest champions of German unity, welcome the erection of a strong executive, independent of popular control, such as Bismarck thought essential to the welfare of the state.

. **Foreign Affairs.**—Foreign affairs would require similarly delicate treatment. The sudden establishment of so strong a Power in central Europe had been watched in many quarters with considerable suspicion. To pursue an aggressive policy any further would surely promote a hostile European coalition. At the same time, although the new state was to show for the next thirty years that its intentions were in the main pacific, the mere defence of what had been won involved the maintenance of the military system of 1861, and even its development, until the whole resources of the nation were organised in preparation for instant war upon the largest scale.

Lastly, the rapid growth of industries and manufactures were soon to bring to the front just the same social problems connected with the position of the working classes and the relations between capital and labour as were already agitating England and France.

The Imperial Constitution.—By the end of 1871, the constitution according to which Germany is still governed had been put into working order. King William of Prussia took the title of German Emperor, with the right to appoint the principal imperial officials, among them the Chancellor, the chief minister of the empire. A parliament, composed of two houses and representing the whole country, was to meet at Berlin, with power to regulate matters of general concern, such as foreign policy,

coinage, customs duties and the control of the army. By way of concession to the feelings of some of the larger kingdoms which had been absorbed in the empire, a few special rights were assured to them. Thus Bavaria and Württemberg, for example, retained their separate postal systems and stamps, while local government everywhere was left in the hands of the older provincial governments under their own kings or dukes. The chief safeguard, however, of the separate states lay in the peculiar constitution of the federal council, which acted as the upper house of the central parliament. In it each province was to be represented roughly in proportion to its population and importance, Prussia, as the predominant partner, sending seventeen delegates, Bavaria six, Saxony and Württemberg four each, and the rest three, two or one apiece. The delegates from each state were not free to vote as individuals, but were obliged to act together on every question as a body under instructions from the government which they represented. Thus the upper house took the form of a congress of ambassadors rather than that of a representative assembly.

The Parliament.—As a concession to the liberals, on the other hand, the lower house was to be a thoroughly democratic body, elected by the votes of every citizen over the age of twenty-five. Bismarck deliberately yielded thus far to liberal opinion, but he showed clearly that he was still no believer in popular government, by taking careful steps to prevent the lower house from assuming complete control over the management of imperial affairs. The ministers, or heads of the various departments of government, were not to be members of parliament as in England or France, and were responsible not to parliament but only to the chancellor. Neither he nor they were bound by the resolutions or votes of the lower house, but were entirely at the command of the emperor. To him alone they owed their authority, and they held their office just as long as he permitted. The chancellor and the ministers

were therefore in no sense constitutional rulers, dependent upon the rise and fall of parliamentary parties and influenced by every wave of uninstructed public opinion. Under the emperor they were the permanent directing force of the government, the houses of parliament serving only as the critics of, and a check upon, their actions. Thus Bismarck, holding the office of chancellor, was able to retain in his own hands all the threads of home and foreign policy. Even since his retirement his system has permitted a continuity of policy and a steady pursuit of fixed aims to a degree not always possible in England or France, where ministries rise and fall under the influence of a vacillating public opinion, and where parliamentary leaders have sometimes had to refrain from measures desirable in the interests of progress or of national safety, for fear of alienating the support of short-sighted voters. This system of government, necessitated by the peculiar circumstances in which the new empire found itself, resulted in the establishment of a strong executive, which regards itself as expressing, more thoroughly than any representative assembly or popular press, the permanent aspirations of the nation, and which, as long as it retains the general respect and confidence of the mass of the people, can lead and manipulate public opinion instead of following it. It remained to be seen whether in the long run such a government, in which democratic ideals had been definitely sacrificed, was calculated to promote national efficiency to a greater degree than the more liberal systems in vogue elsewhere. In matters where secrecy, resolution, carelessness of cost, and the complete organisation of every department of national life, are of vital importance, as for example in preparation for war, it could probably claim an advantage.

The Diplomatic Isolation of France.—The next task was to safeguard Germany against any war of revenge that France might meditate—a task of great urgency in view of the implacable enmity provoked by the seizure of Alsace

and Lorraine. Whether he approved of it or not, Bismarck had been obliged to support the policy of severity towards France in 1871, but he realised to the full the difficulties in which it involved him. France was convinced that she had been shamefully robbed of that which was hers by right of nationality, and it was to be expected that she would give her unconditional support to any foe of Germany. It is probably not too much to say that Bismarck's whole scheme of foreign relations henceforth, culminating in the formation of the Triple Alliance, was based upon the idea that an attack from France was sooner or later inevitable. If this be so, the political tension which existed in Europe for the next forty years must primarily be ascribed to the short-sighted action of the German military party in 1871. As matters lay at the close of the war, however, it was Bismarck's clear duty to his country to conciliate all the Powers to whom France might be expected to look for aid, and thus to forestall the formation of any coalition designed to humiliate the new empire.

The Triple Alliance.—To this end he brought about an exchange of views in 1872 between Germany, Austria and Russia, and an informal understanding, known as the Three Emperors' League, was arrived at between them to maintain the *status quo* in Europe. It soon became apparent, however, that the interests of Austria and Russia in the Balkans were irreconcilable, and that, whatever efforts Bismarck might make to compose their differences, he would eventually have to choose between them. In 1875, the tsar's interference on behalf of France was ill received in Germany, and at the Berlin Congress four years later, though the Three Emperors' League still existed in name, the German influence was thrown with little disguise into the scales against Russia, with the result that the terms of the Treaty of San Stefano were extensively revised, as we have seen, in a manner contrary to Russian wishes. In the same year Germany and Austria contracted a permanent defensive alliance providing for military

co-operation if Russia were to attack either, Austria agreeing in return to remain neutral in case of war between France and Germany. Next Bismarck took advantage of the alarm caused in Rome by the activities of France in North Africa (see chap. xxii). The Italian government, with German encouragement, had come to regard the shores of the Mediterranean between Tunis and Egypt as their destined share of the Turkish Empire, and the establishment of French influence immediately opposite Sicily caused apprehension which Bismarck did his utmost to foment. He was also able to point out to the Italians that by an agreement with Germany they would gain solid advantages over and above his support against France. The Austrians had by this time been promised compensation in the Balkan peninsula in return for abandoning all intention of recovering their lost provinces of Lombardy and Venetia, and by entering an alliance with the two central empires, Italy would rid herself of all fear of attack from that direction. The bait proved too attractive to be refused, and, in return for Bismarck's promises of support, Italy also bound herself to assist Germany in case of unprovoked attack.

The Rival Alliances.—His very success in creating this formidable combination, however, had its natural result in forcing France to seek an understanding with Russia. We have already seen that there were obstacles to be surmounted before an alliance between them could be concluded, but, in face of Bismarck's attitude towards Russia in 1879 and during the disputes that arose over Bulgaria in 1886, it became clear that the interests of both countries demanded some such co-operation. It was not long before the Dual Alliance was formed, with the definite object of balancing the combined power of the central kingdoms. Thus by 1894, as a result of the attempt to isolate France, all the greater continental Powers were ranged in two antagonistic, if not openly hostile, groups, whose attitude towards one another involved each country

concerned in a steadily growing outlay upon military preparations. Russia, Austria and Italy were compelled in turn to adopt to a greater or less degree the principle of training the mass of the nation in arms, in preparation for war upon the grandest scale. For another twenty years the rough balance of power that had now been created, and the obviously hideous consequences of any breach of the peace, restrained the statesmen of the two groups from risking the possibilities of war, but it was all the while inevitable that the dreaded conflagration should eventually ensue. Throughout the period the rivalry of Austria and Russia in the Balkans, and the bitter memories that estranged Germany and France, provided all the necessary materials. Meanwhile, the piling up of armaments steadily increased, until it constituted a menace to progress and prosperity only less formidable than that of war itself, for no nation was willing to risk its national security, or to jeopardise interests which it considered vital, by falling behind in the race or by being the first to call a halt.

For this intolerable situation, Bismarck's deliberate policy of hindering an understanding between Austria and Russia, and of following up the seizure of Alsace and Lorraine by attempting to isolate France, must at least in part be held responsible. It was a policy characteristically Prussian in its thoroughness, in its genuine patriotism, and in its disregard of all but purely selfish interests. Designed and carried through with profound skill, it met with astonishing success up to a certain point, and won for its author unbounded credit. It insured and consolidated the union of the empire which he had founded, and gave to Germany a position unrivalled by that of any continental Power. For forty years it secured a general, if troubled, peace, but at the last it involved all Europe in catastrophe.

Socialism in Germany.—Meanwhile, the empire was being threatened by dangers almost equally formidable from

within. The extraordinary strides that were being made in every department of German commerce and industry very greatly increased the national wealth and prosperity, but, as has often happened in other countries, they led to a situation in which periods of rapid expansion alternated with times of profound commercial depression and wide spread unemployment. This state of affairs, which was especially pronounced between 1876 and 1879, led naturally to violent hostility between employers and employed and to the demand for state interference for the protection of the working classes. During these years the same socialist teachings which had been prevalent in France took firm root in a congenial soil. The German people quickly attained to a consciousness of their political power, and as the number of professed socialists increased and a violently revolutionary spirit began to show itself, the government became apprehensive of a serious attempt to subvert the constitution of 1871. To nip the movement in the bud before it was too late, Bismarck procured from parliament authority to prohibit all associations, meetings and publications having for their purpose the promotion of democratic socialism, and to declare martial law in any city threatened with industrial disturbances. Armed with these powers he took action of the most vigorous and thorough nature, with the result that the German socialists were effectually disorganised as a political body. A policy of pure repression, however, would have been insufficient to check the growth of socialism in Germany any more than in Russia, and, as long as it was attempted, there remained a bitter feeling of resentment among the mass of the people, threatening the disruption of the state. In addition, therefore, Bismarck applied himself to the problem of reconciling class interests and reuniting the nation. To this end he deliberately proposed to take a leaf out of the democratic leaders' own book. With government by the people he had no sympathy, but just as it had been the traditional privilege and duty of the

Prussian government to watch paternally over the welfare of every class of the nation, so now the imperial authorities hastened to take all steps that seemed to them necessary for the well-being and comfort of the industrial population. In 1881 Bismarck announced the government's intention of enforcing many of the measures for which the socialists themselves had been agitating. During the next ten years far-reaching schemes were put into operation for the compulsory insurance of the poor against sickness, accident, old age and incapacity to earn a livelihood. Nor was this the limit of Bismarck's socialist activities. Throughout Prussia, and to a considerable extent in other parts of the empire, the state assumed the ownership of the railways. The government set itself deliberately to foster all kinds of profitable industrial enterprise by such means, for example, as by establishing and financing laboratories for scientific research, by paying large subventions to steamship lines, and by granting state aid to schemes of colonial development. Town planning, the housing and education of the poor, and the internal organisation of factories and of all great industries, were all efficiently supervised by the state. Everywhere the municipalities of towns were encouraged to provide means of conveyance and all kinds of services for the public benefit. It thus came about that Germany, the least democratically governed of the western nations, took the lead in just those departments of state activity which it has been the object of all socialists to encourage.

William II.—When Bismarck disappeared from the scene, the paternal attitude which the government under his influence had adopted towards the working classes was in no way changed. The aged William I died in 1888, and his son Frederick followed him to the grave after a reign of a few months. The new emperor, William II, quickly showed that he possessed many qualities tending to fit him admirably to rule such a state as Bismarck had built up. A man of irrepressible activity, he was as

firmly convinced as any of his Prussian ancestors that it was his heaven-sent mission to guide the destinies of his people. To a steadiness of purpose and a prudence in action that won for him a commanding influence both at home and abroad, he added a partiality for autocratic methods quite as marked as that of the "Iron Chancellor." There was no room in the government for two such men, and it was the older who was obliged to yield. They came into immediate conflict upon more than one point of policy, and for two years a state of considerable friction prevailed. In 1890 matters came to a head. Bismarck refused to admit the emperor's right to consult individual ministers except through the medium of the chancellor. William insisting, the veteran statesman retired into private life, to spend the remainder of his days as the spiteful and undignified critic of his successors—a pathetic close to a life of high patriotic purpose and almost unparalleled achievement. The new emperor now assumed much of the authority that had previously been wielded by the chancellor, and in dealing with social problems he followed the lines already laid down. Further progress was made with the scheme of legislation foreshadowed by Bismarck, and before long the repressive laws which had been passed against socialist organisations in 1878 were allowed to lapse without serious consequences.

National Discipline.—As a result of Bismarck's experiment in what may be called "paternal socialism," Germany escaped much of the internal discord that prevailed elsewhere during the period under review. There are probably few countries in the world where the lives of ordinary citizens have been so subjected to state interference and control as in Germany. Yet the German government showed such a capacity for thorough and efficient national organisation, and wielded its power, as far as internal affairs were concerned, so consistently for the public welfare, that it succeeded in retaining the confidence and support of a large proportion of the nation. This habit

of trusting implicitly in a paternal government, no novelty among the Prussians, seems to have proved one of the main sources of German strength. It has led the nation as a whole to accept discipline as a substitute for liberty and has enabled them to show in times of danger a united front that has proved the envy of their enemies. Liberals and democratic socialists are of course numerous in Germany, and their steady increase in numbers has sometimes caused apprehension, but from the time of Bismarck's adoption of his new social policy down to our own day no serious danger has threatened the state from within as it did in 1878. In fact, the portentous commercial progress made during this period, and the absence of serious industrial or political upheavals, are the best proofs of his foresight, and even provide some ground for the contention that democratic government may not always be essential to the full development of a modern nation. It may be that state discipline as accepted in Germany, under the control of a strong and permanent executive, is after all as conducive to national progress and comfort as the freer institutions of England. It has certainly been vigorously maintained in Germany that the tide of democracy which has flowed so strongly in Western Europe and in Russia is one that saps the whole ground-work of real civilisation.

Colonial Activity.—While the German Empire was thus assuring its position in Europe, it was also embarking upon a new series of activities which were to have far-reaching consequences. As a result of their want of internal union previous to 1871 the Germans had been very late in turning their attention to the subject of colonial expansion. Up to that date what emigrants had left German soil had been entirely lost to the nation, and Germany still remained a purely European state. In view of the growth of their industries, however, and the need for an assured outlet for their surplus manufactures, capital and population, the nation resolved upon an attempt to retrieve the omissions of the past. For some

years the movement took the form of an effort on the part of private merchants to open up new markets for their trade rather than a deliberate attempt to found colonies for emigration and permanent settlement. It was only when the formation of the Triple Alliance had secured the position of Germany in Europe that the government took any definite step in the latter direction. In 1884 and the following years, however, Bismarck officially recognised settlements which had been planted at two points on the west coast of Africa, in the neighbourhood of Zanzibar, and in New Guinea and the adjacent islands. From these beginnings rapid progress was made. Considerable areas of land were annexed, imperial troops were despatched to protect the settlers against native risings, public money was poured out in subventions for the development of the new colonies, and to connect them with the motherland shipping lines sprang up, financed in part by the state.

Relations with Great Britain.—The colonies thus acquired consisted of areas not at that time occupied and definitely claimed by other Powers, but in almost every case they constituted spheres of expansion which British colonial leaders had already confidently marked out as their own. A pronounced conflict of interests quickly arose between the two sets of colonists, and the question of the limits of their respective spheres of influence naturally became one of considerable delicacy. The Germans, having once definitely embarked upon a colonial policy, showed themselves resolved to push forward their schemes with the utmost seriousness, and a certain amount of friction between the home governments became inevitable. By 1890 the actual points at issue had been for the most part settled by negotiation, one noteworthy accommodation between the two countries being that by which Great Britain ceded Heligoland to Germany in exchange for concessions in East Africa, but there remained on both sides a feeling of dissatisfaction. On the one hand the tendency of English public opinion was to regard the

German colonial ambitions as something in the nature of an unwarrantable intrusion, especially as it was held that the Germans showed no obvious aptitude for colonisation or the management of subject races. On the other hand the Germans felt with some bitterness that they were unduly handicapped in the struggle between nations for existence. As a result of their late start in the race for colonial possessions they found themselves forestalled by the Anglo-Saxon race in practically every land whose climate fitted it for settlement on a large scale by white men. The overseas dominions which they had been grudgingly permitted to occupy suffered for the most part from some serious climatic disadvantage, and were in any case far less in area than those of other great Powers. They therefore regarded it as unfair that Great Britain should compete with them for every desirable area that remained open for exploitation. Nor was this feeling diminished by the attitude of the United States government, which had before this time made it clear that no European Power would be permitted to acquire fresh territory in South America. It is thus no matter for surprise that since 1890 the Germans should have maintained a jealous watch for opportunities to extend their dominions and their influence beyond the seas.

World Politics.—After the resignation of Bismarck the young emperor himself began to play an active part in what the Germans called "World Politics." At the outset he tried to induce Great Britain to co-operate with him in a policy of opening up new countries wherever possible to German and English trade. His overtures, however, were coldly received, English statesmen preferring at this time not to fetter themselves by alliances or agreements with any continental Power. The British attitude was unfortunately taken by William as evidence of jealous hostility to his schemes. He therefore exchanged his original plan for one of deliberately forestalling or thwarting the Power which he now regarded as the principal

rival and competitor of Germany in the markets of the world. The first indication of his far-reaching designs was seen in 1895, after the war between China and Japan, when he joined with Russia and France in preventing Japan from retaining the Liao Tung peninsula (see page 225). Two years later two German missionaries were murdered in China. The emperor at once demanded compensation, and sent his brother, Prince Henry of Prussia, in command of a naval squadron to play the part of the "Mailed Fist" of Germany in the Far East. China submitted, and Germany secured, by way of "compensation," a lease of Kiao Chau and the surrounding district for ninety-nine years. It soon became apparent that this action had been taken in co-operation with the tsar, for in the following year Russia obtained the harbour and fortress of Port Arthur on almost identical terms. In face of this combination Great Britain was powerless to intervene. Her prestige suffered severely from the humiliation, the subsequent seizure of Wei-Hai-Wei doing little to improve matters, and her trade in North China underwent a corresponding check.

German Commercial Enterprise.—From that time onwards German commercial enterprise, vigorously backed by the government, has actively rivalled English influence in every quarter of the globe, and in some places has actually supplanted it. Down to 1910 no further territory was acquired, but to show the success of the imperial policy it is enough to cite such varied examples as the enormous increase of German trade with such states as Brazil and Chile, the development of the great shipping lines that ply from Hamburg and Bremen, and the hold which Germany has obtained over Turkey by assisting her to develop her possessions in western Asia.

Friction with Great Britain.—The steadily increasing commercial rivalry between the two great states ripened gradually into undisguised antagonism. It was not only

that the comparison of Great Britain's magnificent colonial dominions with their own unsatisfactory possessions filled German business men with envy. Even what they had, their shipping, and the whole structure of their transmarine interests, lay at the mercy of a Power whose geographical position would enable her in time of war to enforce an effective blockade of German ports. It was obviously necessary, therefore, to create a navy at least so powerful that Great Britain would hesitate to attack them, and the emperor now set before himself the task of supplying this need. He betrayed a further cooling off towards England by telegraphing his congratulations to the Transvaal Boers when they repelled the celebrated Jameson Raid in 1896—an impulsive act which inflamed English opinion against him. In 1897, in a farewell speech to Prince Henry on his departure for China, the emperor made a fair statement of the German aims. "We simply wish," he said, "equal rights for German commerce under the banner of the empire. Imperial power is sea power. One cannot exist without the other." The expansion of the German navy had already made great strides, and from that date it proceeded without pause, until it occupied a position second only to that of our own.

The British Attitude.—In Great Britain, this new development was widely regarded as a deliberate challenge, especially as English opinion had already been deeply stirred by the emperor's previous provocations. During the Boer War, moreover, the Germans, like other nations, had loudly expressed their sympathies with the weaker side. The imperial naval preparations, coming on the top of the success of the German action in China and the rapid increase of commercial competition, caused deep-seated apprehension. British opinion gradually accustomed itself to the idea of a German peril, and it was not long before the government, reflecting this opinion, began to show its readiness to join the ranks of those opposed to Germany. Meanwhile, although the imperial authori-

ties repeatedly protested that their preparations were aimed at no particular rival and were amply justified by the growth of German overseas interests, it was held in England to be necessary to counter each successive development of German strength by a more than corresponding increase in the British naval programme. The other Powers felt bound to follow suit, each in accordance with its needs, Europe being thus saddled with new burdens hardly less crushing than those under which it was already groaning.

German Militarism.—No sketch of the development of modern Germany would be complete without some notice of the dangerous tendency towards self-satisfied arrogance and callous disregard of the interests and welfare of other nations which characterised German policy and some sections of public opinion during the early years of the twentieth century. It would seem as if the truly astounding progress which the nation had made in wealth and strength under the empire had blinded Germans to the merits and deserts of every other race. This patriotically exalted frame of mind may be attributed to a variety of causes. The success which Bismarck's frankly unscrupulous foreign policy habitually commanded undoubtedly tended to blunt the moral sense of German statesmen, and taught them willingly to sacrifice every chivalrous and humane ideal if by so doing they could attain their material ends. The military triumphs of 1866 and 1871, and the solid profits which had thereby been gained, had given birth to the doctrine, solemnly exalted into a philosophic theory, that war was no evil to be shrunk from in horror, but rather a sure source of further profit and an influence which ennobled a nation by stirring it to the highest flights of patriotic and self-sacrificing devotion. We have seen that in Prussia, ever since the days of Napoleon, these virtues had been sedulously cultivated, and that the military system had provided a permanent school for their inculcation. The extension of that system to the

whole empire, while it inspired the Germans with an intense spirit of national unity and a capacity for willing and disciplined co-operation, undoubtedly promoted also a dangerously bellicose habit of mind. Moreover, the Germans felt a pardonable pride in the unrivalled efficiency of their government, and were naturally persuaded that the possession of such an organisation was in itself almost enough to render them invincible. So self-confident an attitude was of course not without its admirable side, but when adopted by a nation so completely organised for war on land and sea it constituted an obvious menace to the peace of Europe. As long as it prevailed, sympathetic relations between Germany and her neighbours, France and England in particular, were always difficult, and England was gradually driven from its position of isolation into the arms of the Dual Alliance. With every new conflict of interests that arose, Germany found it increasingly difficult either to yield or to compromise with good grace, until at last the long foreshadowed trial of strength became inevitable.

The Prussian Aristocracy.—Lastly, a highly disquieting possibility arose out of the powerful influence over the government exerted by the landed aristocracy of Prussia. To this class, the growing demand of the populace for political power was a thing utterly abhorrent. They foresaw that popular control over the government might mean not only the loss of their own influence, but also the undermining of the whole structure of the German militarist policy. Now, besides being loath to relinquish their traditional authority, they were honestly convinced that upon the strength of the army the whole future of Germany depended. The one certain method of making their position still acceptable to the nation, of repressing popular disaffection, and of proving the necessity for the immense military expense, was for them to lead the country once more to victory in war; and there was always present


with them the temptation to seize the first favourable opportunity that arose of putting into operation the vast military organisation which they had at their disposal. The greater the pressure of the popular political demands in Germany, the greater the danger that threatened Europe of a general conflagration carefully engineered by the Prussian aristocracy

CHAPTER XXII

EUROPE IN NORTH AFRICA, AND THE TRIPLE ENTENTE

- 1830. French interference in Algeria.
- 1869. Completion of the Suez Canal.
- 1878. The Dual Control in Egypt.
- 1882. Arabi's rebellion.
- 1885. Death of Gordon.
- 1895. Adowah.
- 1897. The Soudan reconquered.
- 1898. The Fashoda incident.
- 1906. Algeciras Conference. The Entente.
- 1911. Turko-Italian War. Agadir crisis.

Egypt.—It may be contended with some reason that the coastal plains immediately to the south of the Mediterranean should be considered as being essentially a part of Europe rather than as truly African. Separated from the rest of the continent by a vast and almost trackless desert, they have been brought into close contact with culture and civilisation from the north in more than one period of their history, for the great inland sea has always provided the means of easy commercial intercourse. During the first half of the nineteenth century, however, in spite of the efforts of Napoleon to restore Egypt to prosperity, there was little enough in the condition of North Africa to remind the historian of the great days of Alexandria or of Carthage, or to suggest that part of the world as a promising field for European influence. Still for the most part under the nominal sovereignty of the Sultan of Turkey, the inhabited districts of the coast had long been divided into a number of practically independent states.



EUROPE IN NORTH AFRICA.

which had been thrown into barbarism and deprived of the very chance of progress by the misgovernment and tyranny of their rulers. In Egypt, it is true, Mehemet Ali and his son Ibrahim maintained some sort of order, and, by introducing European education and manufactures and by building canals and roads, laid foundations for the eventual prosperity of the country; but elsewhere almost complete anarchy prevailed and the only trade that flourished was that of piracy.

The French in Algeria.—Beyond Napoleon's occupation of Egypt, no serious attempt was made by any of the Powers to colonise these shores until 1830, when, as we have seen, the French obtained a foothold in Algeria. Formally annexing this district in 1848, they have remained in undisturbed possession ever since, gradually extending their dominion by conquest until it includes an area far larger than that of France itself.

The Suez Canal.—In the meantime, events occurred in Egypt which attracted the attention of more than one of the greater Powers. After the close of the Crimean War a French engineer named de Lesseps obtained from the Egyptian government a concession for cutting a ship-canal through the isthmus of Suez. The work, begun in 1859, was completed ten years later at the expense of a company whose shares were held partly by the Khedive Ismail, who succeeded to the throne in 1863, and partly by private French investors. Now Ismail was a reckless spendthrift who found it fatally easy to borrow huge sums of money in Europe on the security of his country's new resources. For some years he not only gratified to the full his luxurious personal tastes, but also spent freely upon public works of doubtful utility; and his persistent borrowing soon involved Egypt in a debt so serious as to threaten the government with immediate bankruptcy. Realising at last whither his extravagance was leading him, Ismail decided in 1876 to dispose of his shares in the

Suez Canal Company. The news of his intention reached the ears of Lord Beaconsfield, the British premier, who saw in the situation a magnificent opportunity. His predecessors had opposed the canal enterprise. They had foreseen that if it were successfully carried through, England, as the possessor of India, would be the Power most vitally interested in it, and that they would therefore be irresistibly drawn to interfere in Egyptian affairs. Any such interference, moreover, would certainly lead to complications with the French, whose investments in the country would give them a right to be heard. Now that the canal was completed, however, it was essential to obtain some control over it. Beaconsfield therefore purchased the Khedive's shares on behalf of the government, securing by the transaction not only a highly profitable investment but also a decisive voice in the management of the company and an equal right with the French to manifest an interest in the affairs of the country.

The Dual Control.—The ultimate consequences of this step, though entirely unforeseen by the statesman responsible, were momentous in the history of the British Empire. The four millions which Ismail received as purchase money proved insufficient to avert the impending bankruptcy, and his British and French creditors, supported by their respective governments, banded together in 1878 to control the finances of the country. Resenting this interference, Ismail showed signs of wishing to rid Egypt altogether of foreign influence. In view of the financial situation, this could hardly be permitted, and in the following year, under pressure from France and England, he was deposed in favour of his son Tewfik. Egypt was now placed definitely under the "Dual Control," a kind of joint protectorate; but a further complication soon arose from the annoyance felt by the Egyptians at seeing their country under the management of foreigners. Tewfik was on the whole loyal to those who had

placed him on the throne, but the army broke into mutiny against him under a native officer named Arabi Pasha, and the whole country was inundated by a wave of Mohammedan fanaticism which resulted in indiscriminate pillage and murder. By 1882 it had become clear that the rights of the English and French creditors and of the shareholders in the Canal Company could be vindicated only by the exercise of force. France, however, as long as her relations with Germany remained unsatisfactory, dreaded to involve herself in complications the end of which could not be foreseen. She therefore definitely resigned all share in the prize which events had hitherto seemed to promise her, and grudgingly consented that England should assume the sole responsibility for solving the problem, with all its possibilities of profit and loss.

Tel-el-Kebir.—Vigorous naval and military action was now undertaken. The forts of Alexandria were bombarded by the fleet under Admiral Sir Beauchamp Seymour; and Sir Garnet Wolseley, at the head of a British expedition, landing at Ismailia, half way down the canal, quickly made his way inland. On September 13, Arabi's forces, though vastly superior in numbers, were defeated at Tel-el-Kebir, near Cairo, and two days later they laid down their arms.

The British Occupation.—By this brief war Great Britain involved herself in an undertaking more onerous than she yet knew. She was now faced with the immense task of establishing orderly government in a country which had hitherto known but a superficial civilisation and whose population were in the main hostile. Moreover, her mere presence in the valley of the Nile caused considerable bitterness in France, and did nothing to appease the perpetual enmity of Russia. To placate this widespread jealousy, the British government thought it wise to promise an early withdrawal from the country, and to declare that her officials there should have no function but that

of giving advice to the government of the Khedive. Thus it came about that the stupendous task was undertaken with an authority resting upon no legal basis. The Khedive himself the nominal vassal of the Sultan of Turkey, still remained the national ruler, and the chief English representative in the country, Sir Evelyn Baring, to whom it fell to create order out of chaos, had no official position but that of Consul-General. Yet it was soon understood in England that the immense financial interests involved, in addition to the necessity of controlling this vital portion of the new highway to India, made it impossible to withdraw. Whatever the cost, whatever the complications that might ensue with the European Powers, and whatever doubts might be thrown upon her legal position, England was definitely committed to her great North African enterprise. It was not realised, however, how soon and how inevitably the modest claim to exercise mere influence in Egypt would lead to further burdens of responsibility.

The Soudan.—Before any steps could be taken to improve the financial and social conditions of the country, there was one other problem that pressed for immediate solution. The half-savage dependency of Egypt known as the Soudan, conquered by Mehemet Ali in 1819, had been for ten years past administered by English governors appointed by the Khedive, the best known of these being the celebrated Charles George Gordon. After his return to England in 1879, a religious fanatic, who called himself the Mahdi and proclaimed his mission to deliver the country from Egyptian oppression, had raised the whole district in rebellion, declaring war upon Egyptians and Europeans alike. With the treasury empty and the army in revolt, the Khedive's ministers had been unable to prevent the movement from spreading, and, by the time of Tel-el-Kebir, nothing was left of the Soudanese empire but a few garrisons, who were struggling to hold their own in isolated fortified posts. Even when the English assumed control of Egyptian affairs, the reconquest of the lost territory

was a task too formidable to be undertaken without considerable financial and military assistance from England; and this assistance the British government, unwilling to be drawn further into an enterprise that promised little direct profit, declined to provide. In spite of Baring's advice, however, the Khedive's ministers determined to make the attempt, and in 1883 an Egyptian expedition was sent up the Nile under the command of an English officer named Hicks, to see what could be done. This force, quite inadequate for the purpose in hand, was overwhelmed and totally destroyed by the Mahdi's hordes, and the disaster removed all reasonable doubt about the immediate possibility of reconquest. There still remained the difficult task of extricating the garrisons from their impossible situation. For this purpose Gordon was once more sent up the Nile. Unfortunately his instructions were so framed as to give him the impression that it was still an open question whether the garrisons were to be withdrawn, and that, if he chose, he might exercise his own discretion after a study of the state of the country. The very merits of his noble character, his fearless self-reliance and his enthusiasm for spreading the benefits of civilised and Christian rule, led him to mistake the nature of his mission, and the misunderstanding between him and the statesmen at home, who had resolved in no case to embark upon a Soudanese war, resulted in a second disaster. Gordon himself, once settled in Khartoum, the principal town, soon began to have his doubts whether after all it would be necessary to withdraw, and in any case he felt it to be his first duty to provide for the safety of every man of the scattered garrisons. He therefore sealed his doom and theirs by delaying his return until the Mahdi's forces had closed every avenue of escape. To abandon so popular a hero to his fate was manifestly impossible, and when at last it was realised in England that there was no other way of saving him, the British government found itself compelled to go back upon its

previous determination. In September, 1884, a considerable force was despatched to Egypt. Wolseley, who commanded it, pushed up the Nile with extraordinary speed considering the difficulties of transport and the number of his opponents. In January, 1885, a small advanced party fought its way ahead of the main body, and after terrible exertions reached Khartoum, only to find it in the hands of the Mahdi. Gordon and his faithful followers had been slain. Nothing remained for Wolseley but to retrace his steps, for even now the force at his disposal, acting at an immense distance from its base, was inadequate for the work of reconquest. The British authorities, returning, after a further period of hesitation, to their original resolve, refused to reinforce him, and the Soudan was left for the time in the hands of the Mahdi.

Reorganisation of Egypt.—For the next ten years the efforts of the British representatives in Egypt were confined to the task of defence and internal reorganisation. In every important department of the government was placed an English official, nominally subordinate to an Egyptian minister, but practically directing his action, and looking to the Consul-General as the chief of the administration. Despite the difficulties of this situation and the open jealousy of France and other European Powers, astonishing progress was made. Order was soon restored, and under the able direction of Baring, shortly to be known as Lord Cromer, the government before long found itself able to pay its way without any increase in taxation. Egypt, a practically rainless country, had always been dependent for its water-supply upon the annual flooding of the Nile, assisted by dams and by a network of basins and canals. This irrigation system, which had recently fallen into disrepair, was now thoroughly restored and extended in all directions, with the result that the area available for cultivation was very greatly increased; and the country entered upon an era of material prosperity such as it had never known.

The Soudan Reconquered.—While the internal condition of the country was thus being restored, the necessity of eventually recovering the Soudan was never forgotten. The native army, which had had to be disbanded after Tel-el-Kebir, was replaced by a new force officered by English and far superior to its predecessor in training and discipline. Such progress was made in this direction that by 1897 it was felt that the long-postponed advance southward was no longer beyond the powers of the Egyptians themselves, with a stiffening of British troops. The Mahdi was now dead, and his place had been taken by a savage chieftain who called himself the Khalifa, or Successor. With the approval of the British government, an expedition was led up the Nile by Sir Herbert Kitchener, the commander of the Egyptian army. The progress made was slow, for it was necessary to construct a railway behind the advancing troops to keep them supplied, but in September, 1898, the hordes of the Khalifa were destroyed at the battle of Omdurman, close under the walls of Khartoum. The complete success of these operations restored an immense area of the basin of the upper Nile to civilised rule, and since that date, in spite of the curiously irregular position of the British officials, the progress of both Egypt and the Soudan towards material comfort, and even wealth, has been unchecked.

The Fashoda Incident.—The reconquest of the Soudan, however, had the effect of provoking the sharpest as well as the last of the series of disputes which had kept alive ill-feeling between England and France ever since the original occupation of Egypt. Throughout the period the French had been actively developing and extending not only their possessions in Algeria and Tunisia, but also those, to the south of the Sahara, on the Niger, Congo and Senegal rivers. The advance of their explorers eastward through the centre of the continent brought them out upon the waters of the upper Nile during the autumn of 1898. Just as Kitchener reached Khartoum he was informed of

the presence of a European force at the village of Fashoda some three hundred miles further south, in territory to which the Egyptian government had strong claims. Hurrying to the spot, he found that the French flag had been hoisted, in token of occupation; and Major Marchand, the leader of the expedition, declined to haul it down. Negotiations on the spot were conducted courteously but with great firmness on both sides, but the question was obviously one that could be settled only by the home governments. The rights of the case were disputable, but England was clearly in a position to insist. The Anglo-Egyptian army was on the spot with an assured line of communications behind it, while Marchand's little band was cut off from assistance by vast tracts of pathless wilderness. The French fleet was scarcely in a position to turn the tables on the English in home waters, and the Russians were at the moment fully occupied in the Far East. England therefore stood firm, and though for a time the relations between the countries remained in a critical condition the French eventually gave way. In 1899 the two governments came to an agreement, the French withdrawing from the Nile valley in return for a recognition of their extended rights elsewhere in Africa.

The Relations between Great Britain and France.—This settlement was the forerunner of a not less important understanding between the same countries with regard to another North African district, where France aimed at securing privileges similar to those which England enjoyed in Egypt. The independent kingdom of Morocco had long been in a state bordering upon anarchy, which threatened to spread across the frontier into French Algeria. In 1901 a treaty was made with the Sultan of that country by which France undertook to assist him in maintaining order in return for "the privilege of transforming Morocco into a modern state." During the next three years an important change came over the relations between France and England. The old grudges, as bitter as ever during

the early part of the Boer War, in spite of the agreement of 1899, began rapidly to disappear. For one thing, the growing suspicion of Germany was leading England to doubt the wisdom of her policy of isolation in Europe and to look round for friends. This new attitude was the more easy, in that time was familiarising public opinion in France with the English occupation of Egypt, while the genuine appreciation of France and of the French people shown by King Edward VII since his accession in 1901 was gradually capturing the national affections. Thus by 1904 the way was clear for a comprehensive settlement of outstanding differences. In that year a treaty was signed by which France acquiesced at last in England's position in Egypt, in return for an undertaking to support her special claims in Morocco.

The Algeciras Conference.—The events of the following year turned this settlement into a definite understanding, for by this time it had become obvious to both countries that the similarity of their aims and interests in North Africa were the best foundation for joint action. The German Emperor, himself busy with schemes of colonial expansion, chose to regard the extension of French influence in Africa as a challenge, and certainly viewed with disapproval the growth of an understanding between his two principal competitors in the markets of the world. With a view to testing the strength of the new-made friendship between them, he landed in person at Tangier, and insisted upon the dismissal of Delcassé, the French Foreign Minister, and the abandonment of his Moroccan policy. But for the self-restraint shown by France these demands might have had serious consequences. As it was, a conference of the Powers was held at Algeciras, where France, supported by England, successfully maintained her claim to special authority in Morocco, while disavowing all intention either of annexation or of establishing a commercial monopoly. It was generally understood that Britain, as well as Russia had promised to stand by

France in case of unprovoked attack, and the suspicion that this was the case undoubtedly gave Germany pause.

The Triple Entente.—The political privileges of France in Morocco were confirmed by an agreement with Spain in 1907, and two years later Germany also recognised them, on the condition that France formally undertook to leave the country open to the enterprise of German traders. In 1911, however, the occupation of Fez by French troops reawakened German suspicions. A warship was despatched to the Moroccan port of Agadir, and again a situation of a most critical nature was provoked. By this time the Triple Entente had come into being as the natural counterpoise to the Triple Alliance, for a friendly understanding had been concluded between Great Britain and Russia, settling the various points of dispute in Asia which had hitherto kept those Powers apart. France was therefore able to count even more surely than at Algeciras upon their joint support, and Germany, after pushing matters to the verge of war, decided to draw back. She obtained considerable concessions of territory in other parts of Africa, but the situation in Morocco itself remained unaltered..

Abyssinia.—While France and England were steadily extending their influence in North Africa with considerable advantage to themselves, a third Power was attempting a similar policy, but with less fortunate results. The formation of the Triple Alliance in 1882 had been too late to prevent the occupation of Tunisia by France, and the Italian hopes of establishing a protectorate there were necessarily given up. Nevertheless, secured as they were from land attack by their understanding with Germany and Austria, and from the sea by their traditional friendliness with Great Britain, the Italians were still bent upon a forward policy in North Africa. In 1882 a port was secured near the outlet of the Red Sea, and the next twenty years were spent in a desperate endeavour

to build up a colonial empire alongside of the Egyptian Soudan. After a series of wars, treaties and negotiations with local chieftains, a considerable area was occupied, but in 1895 a claim to exercise a protectorate over Abyssinia brought the powerful King Menelik into the fray, and an attempt to occupy his country with quite inadequate forces led to an overwhelming disaster at Adowah, which thwarted all their hopes. By a treaty signed with Abyssinia in 1900 the Italian possessions in Africa were limited to a strip of land along the coast, to which was given the name of Erythrea. Two years later a second coastal region further south was turned into a protectorate known as Italian Somaliland, but it may be said that their adventures in that part of the continent have brought to the Italians no advantages commensurate with the labour and expense involved.

Tripoli.—Meanwhile the attention of the Italians had also been directed to Tripoli, the coastal district next to the eastward of Tunisia. This country, a natural market for their goods, had long been regarded by the Italians as their destined share of the Turkish Empire, especially since the French occupation of Tunisia, and for many years a policy of "peaceful penetration" was steadily pursued. The country was still under the rule of the Sultan of Turkey, and until 1911 no obvious reason or legitimate excuse could be found for political interference. In that year, however, an ultimatum was sent to the Turkish government, complaining of the state of disorder and neglect in which Tripoli had been allowed to fall, and protesting against the interference to which Italian merchants were subjected. As no redress was forthcoming, the Italians proceeded at once to extreme measures. The Italian preponderance in naval power prevented the Turks from throwing an army into their threatened province by sea, and the Egyptian government declined to allow the passage of troops through their territory, although in strict law it might still be regarded as belonging

to the Sultan. The fighting, therefore, resulted in Turkey's last possessions in Africa being placed under the full sovereignty of Italy, a treaty to that effect being signed in Lausanne in October, 1912.

The Weakening of the Triple Alliance.—It may be noted that this war, besides completing the process by which the whole African coast of the Mediterranean was transferred to the control of European Powers, afforded a clear indication of the instability of the Triple Alliance. Germany and Austria, for purposes of their own, had long since constituted themselves the protectors of the Turkish Empire, and it was in spite of pressure from them that Italy embarked upon a policy which could hardly fail to weaken the prestige and power of their protégé. In order to placate them, Italy was obliged expressly to discountenance any tendency amongst the Balkan states to combine against Turkey, and considerable uneasiness was caused in Austria by the action of the Italian fleet in bombarding Turkish ports in Europe. Yet the Italian success undoubtedly contributed to the formation of the Balkan League of 1912, whose policy, as we shall see, was most unwelcome to the other two members of the Triple Alliance.

Thus, while the Mediterranean enterprises of France and England were proving the means of linking them together with close bonds of union, Italy, pursuing a similar line of action, found herself drifting steadily away from allies with whom she had never had any real community of interests.

CHAPTER XXIII

THE BALKAN STATES, 1893-1914

- 1894. Armenian massacres.
- 1897. Greco-Turkish War.
- 1908. "Young Turk" revolution. Austrian annexation of Bosnia.
- 1909. Deposition of Abdul Hamid.
- 1912. The Balkan War.
- 1913. Treaty of Bucharest.
- 1914. Murder of Francis Ferdinand.

Unrest in Turkey.—The close of the Nineteenth Century and the early years of the Twentieth saw no diminution in the spirit of unrest prevailing in the Turkish Empire. Crete, Macedonia and Constantinople itself, as well as some parts of Asia Minor, were a prey to disorder and misgovernment which at times amounted to actual anarchy. The reforms granted at the Congress of Berlin remained a dead letter, and the parliamentary experiment of 1877 had not been repeated. The more enlightened party of the "Young Turks," though known to favour a policy of reorganisation throughout the empire, were generally regarded as dreamers who could never be expected to wield much influence upon the actual course of events.

Austrian Policy in the Near East.—The incapacity of the Turk to provide good government or to maintain order in what was left of his European dominions now proved just as strong a temptation to Austria as it had been to Russia fifty years before. After 1867, when the disputes between the Austro-Germans and the Hungarians were settled by the creation of the Dual Monarchy, the tendencies towards separation which had previously threatened

the unity of Francis Joseph's kingdom seemed, for the time at least, to gain no further ground, and in consequence his government was less disturbed than before by serious internal dissensions. In spite of the discontent among the Slavs of southern Hungary and the Roumans of Transylvania, who both looked longingly towards their independent kinsmen, the feeling of personal loyalty towards Francis Joseph gradually increased in strength, and served as a bond of union between the Slav, Magyar and Germanic populations of the Dual Monarchy. Moreover, after the formation of the German Empire, the complete detachment of Austria-Hungary from the internal affairs of Germany transformed the Dual Monarchy into a purely eastern Power. Even the schemes for the recovery of Lombardy and Venetia were abandoned in favour of an advance into the Balkan peninsula, the first step in this direction being the occupation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina in 1878 and of Novibazar in 1879. It is true that a hold was still maintained upon the Italian-speaking districts round Trieste and Trent, without which the union of Italy was still incomplete, but after the formation of the Triple Alliance in 1882 nothing more was to be feared from the hostility of the Italians, and the way was clear for a vigorous prosecution of the new policy.

Macedonia.—Through the tangle of mountains separating Hungary from the Ægean Sea the map showed two natural highways, both of which reached their goal, the port of Salonica, along the valley of the Vardar (see map on page 93). Of the two, one ran through Bosnia, Novibazar and the Turkish province of Macedonia, and the other, a more suitable route for railway construction, through the heart of the independent kingdom of Serbia, by way of Belgrade and the valley of the Morava. Now Novibazar, which was inhabited mainly by Serbs, lay between Serbia and Montenegro, and was naturally coveted by both, for all patriots looked forward to the eventual creation of one kingdom which should include the whole

Serbian race. Since 1879 it had been garrisoned by Austrian troops, whose presence, separating Serbia from Montenegro, was bitterly resented in both countries and was a perpetual hindrance to friendly relations between them and the Dual Monarchy. Macedonia was a district where dwelt Serbs, Greeks and Bulgars in such inextricable confusion that it was, and is, impossible to draw any definite boundary-line between them. Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria each regarded it as her own destined heritage, and by all three the subject races were encouraged to look forward to eventual reunion with the motherland. The task which the Austrian statesmen now set before themselves was therefore one of considerable delicacy. On the one hand Turkish misgovernment kept Macedonia in a state of constant agitation and unrest, by which the Austrians stood to gain, for at any time it might provide an excuse for interference and even occupation. On the other hand, to foment this unrest unduly might result in a conflagration by no means calculated to assist their schemes, for out of the ruins of the Turkish Empire might arise formidable national states which could hardly be coerced, such as that which had been threatened by the Treaty of San Stefano in 1878. The creation of a strong Serbian kingdom from Belgrade to the Adriatic, for instance, would bar their advance to Salonica by either of the alternative routes, besides provoking unrest among the South Slavs of Hungary and the Serbs of Bosnia, while the division of Macedonia between Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria or, above all, the formation of a league between these states under the protection of Russia, would be equally fatal to the Austrian ambitions. For the moment, therefore, having established herself in Bosnia and Novibazar, Austria was content to secure what influence she could over the affairs of the peninsula and to preserve the existing situation while awaiting a suitable opportunity for further progress. Thus in 1886, as we have already seen, she interfered to prevent the annihilation of Serbia at the

hands of Bulgaria, because further success would have meant a dangerous increase in the power of the latter; and in 1887 she dealt a severe blow at the influence of Russia in South-East Europe by securing the election of Ferdinand of Coburg to rule Bulgaria.

German Influence in Turkey.—While Austria was thus striving, for her own purposes, to keep the rising nationalities of the peninsula in leading-strings and to supplant Russia in the position of arbiter between them, Germany also was preparing to take advantage of the situation. After the Congress of Berlin German influence at Constantinople steadily increased. At first it was mainly used as the means of obtaining important commercial concessions. In 1888 a German syndicate secured control over a short line of railway from the Bosphorus to a port on the Sea of Marmora, and in 1893, as the Anatolian Railway Company, it acquired the right to extend the system through Asia Minor and down the Tigris to Baghdad. This extension reached Konia in 1896, and in 1902 leave was obtained to prolong it to the head of the Persian Gulf. These concessions, and the consequent opening to commerce of the important areas affected, resulted in a great increase of German trade with the Levant, and it was only natural that with the growth of their commercial interests in the country their wish to exercise some form of political control should increase in proportion. It seemed possible, therefore, that in time Germany might acquire in Asiatic Turkey a position similar to that enjoyed by the English in Egypt. Indeed, there were not wanting German statesmen who looked forward to the eventual creation of a great Teutonic Empire in the Near East, which should rival, if not supplant that of Great Britain. Their immediate task, however, was to secure a predominant influence over the Sultan's government, and for this purpose Germany and Austria worked hand in hand.

The Armenians.—In addition to Macedonia, there were two other districts still under the direct sway of the Sultan,

where Turkish misrule had aroused oppressed nationalities to demand their liberation. The Armenians, a Christian race having their original home on either side of the Russo-Turkish frontier to the south of the Caucasus, were scattered widely over the Turkish Empire in pursuit of commerce. Disappointed that the reforms promised in 1879 had come to nothing, they had agitated and conspired to procure for the districts of Asia Minor where they predominated a separate national existence. In 1894, as an answer to the Armenian unrest, Abdul Hamid let loose upon them the savage Mohammedan Kurds, who dwelt among them, and during the next two years, with the connivance of Turkish soldiers and officials, a series of cold-blooded massacres was organised and carried out wherever Armenians had made their homes. Driven to desperation, some of the Armenians resident in Constantinople made an attempt to avenge their kinsmen by an insane attack upon the premises of the Ottoman Bank. This was the signal for a systematic slaughter of Armenians in the streets of the capital itself. In England opinion was profoundly stirred, but when the government proposed to the Powers that force should be used to compel the Sultan to mend his ways, the suggestion was nowhere warmly received. France was now tied to Russia, and the tsar, who had had trouble with his own Armenian subjects, and was in addition busy in the Far East, would do nothing which might encourage political agitation in his own country. For their own selfish purposes, Germany and Austria, the former with unblushing directness, seized upon the proposal as a means of dealing a final blow to British influence at Constantinople. Anxious for further concessions in Asia Minor, Germany avowedly supported the Sultan, and reaped the reward of her inhuman policy. The British statesmen realised that no separate action was possible in the face of such opposition, and the upshot of their efforts to protect the weak was a diplomatic triumph for the Germans which in effect constituted them the protectors of the Turkish Empire.

Crete.—No sooner was this unfortunate episode concluded than the attention of Europe was attracted to the island of Crete. Here the promised reforms had been partially carried out, but the Turkish governors failed to keep the Christian and Mohammedan elements of the population from constantly flying at one another. Between 1889 and 1895 several outbreaks occurred, and the appointment of a Christian governor at the instance of the Powers did little to check the disorder. The Mohammedan minority had no desire to live peaceably upon an equal footing with their Christian neighbours, and in 1896 a series of murders led to a sanguinary conflict in the streets of Canea. The Sultan, when called upon by the Powers to institute further reforms, showed by his policy of evasion and delay that little improvement could be anticipated as long as he held sway in the island. Meanwhile, the majority of the Cretans being predominantly Greek, there had arisen amongst them a strong desire for annexation to what was regarded as the mother-country. The inhabitants of Greece itself, moreover, held it to be a sacred duty to work for the liberation of their kindred who still remained under the Turkish yoke, whether in Macedonia, in Asia Minor, in Crete, or in the other islands of the Eastern Mediterranean. In 1897, therefore, during a revival of the revolt, the Greek government was compelled by popular excitement in Athens to despatch a force to the island, while the fleet put to sea to prevent the landing of Turkish troops. The Powers attempted to intervene in the interests of peace, but nothing would now content the Greeks but permission to annex the island, and this the Turks, relying on German support, steadily refused to grant. Before long bands of Greek irregulars crossed the frontier into Macedonia and Turkey had no choice but to declare war.

The Greco-Turkish War.—The fighting proved very one-sided. The national enthusiasm of the Greeks had as yet been unaccompanied by any serious military prepara-

tion, and after a month of almost unbroken disaster they were obliged to sue for peace, abandoning their claim to Crete and consenting to pay a considerable indemnity. The completeness of their defeat was due not only to the high quality of the Turks as fighting men, but also to the fact that the latter had been carefully trained by German officers, who actually accompanied them into the field. In permitting this, as in his whole policy of protecting the Turks from the consequences of their misdeeds, the German Emperor showed himself singularly callous both to the dictates of humanity and to the interests of the country of which his sister was one day to be queen. German schemes of aggrandisement, however, demanded that Turkey should be kept in the position of a grateful client, and if that was the Emperor's aim, he certainly succeeded.

The Liberation of Crete.—The issue of the war on the mainland did little to settle the immediate fate of Crete. The country districts were in the hands of the Christian insurgents; and in the coastal towns, where the Mohammedans took refuge, order was only with difficulty maintained by landing parties from the fleets of England, France, Russia and Italy. After eighteen months of discussion between these Powers, it was finally agreed that Prince George, the second son of the King of Greece, should govern the island as their Commissioner, under the suzerainty of the Sultan. The Turkish garrison was withdrawn and a large proportion of the Mohammedan inhabitants emigrated. Prince George held his office until 1905, when another nationalist attempt to bring about union with Greece by violence led to the fresh intervention of the Powers and his own resignation. He was succeeded by a Greek statesman of his choosing named Zaimis, who occupied the post of Commissioner for the next five years. Under his rule, and subsequently, the connection between Crete and Greece became steadily stronger. In 1908, at the time of the Turkish revolution and the annexation of Bosnia and the

Herzegovina by Austria (see page 283), the Cretans feared that the "Young Turks" would wish to resume control of the island. To prevent such a disaster, union with Greece was formally proclaimed. The Powers refused at the time to approve this step, but four years later, upon the outbreak of the Balkan War of 1912, Cretan deputies were admitted to the Greek parliament, and the island ceased to be, even in name, a dependency of Turkey.

European Intervention in Macedonia.—Meanwhile, the unrest in Macedonia was rapidly developing into anarchy of the wildest description. The Greek and Bulgar inhabitants fell upon one another in turn. Both resisted any attempt on the part of the Turks to control them, while the latter retaliated by encouraging attacks by the Albanians, most of whom were Mohammedans, upon the Macedonian Christians. Here also the Powers were at last compelled to intervene, but they found it difficult to agree upon any common line of action. The obvious solution—to partition the whole district between Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia, the states most closely interested—was impossible, for Germany refused to imperil her influence at Constantinople by consenting to such a humiliation of Turkey. Nor was it any part of Austria's policy to allow the territory upon which she had designs to be handed over to enlarged and strengthened national states. After several ineffectual attempts to arrive at a compromise, a scheme was devised in 1908 by which an Inspector-General appointed by the Powers, with the assistance of an international staff of officers and civil and financial agents, was to undertake the pacification of the entire area.

The "Young Turk" Revolution.—Such was the situation when the whole problem of the future of Turkey was radically altered by the revolution which took place in Constantinople. The "Young Turks," or party of reform, though playing hitherto no prominent part in

politics, had carried on an active secret propaganda, and had obtained in the army a predominating influence, which they proposed to use for the purpose of galvanising the empire into new life. They were led by a group of able but unscrupulous men, whose enthusiasm for the national cause and for constitutional reform may very well have been second to their desire to seize upon the chief power in the state and to use it for their own ends. In July, 1908, these leaders, who had formed themselves into a body known as the "Committee of Union and Progress," resolved to forestall the imminent intervention of the Powers, which would mean in practice the final loss to Turkey of the whole of Macedonia, by taking vigorous public action. Calling upon the Turkish nation to rally to the support of the Empire, they seized the reins of power, and compelled Abdul Hamid to restore the institutions of 1877. A parliament was summoned, and it was announced that the Macedonian question, and all other problems of state, would be dealt with constitutionally by the reformed government. Democratic Europe, which by this time might have known better than to take Turkish promises of reform at their face value, loudly welcomed the new régime, and stood aside to watch its operations. The British government, charmed by the magic word "constitution," declared that "the Macedonian question and others of a similar nature will entirely disappear." The schemes for international control in Macedonia were abandoned, and the foreign officials recalled. "Young" Turkey, in a word must be left to work out her own salvation.

Austrian Entente with Bulgaria.—There were two governments, however, which viewed the situation in another light. A real regeneration of Turkey would seriously hinder the well-laid Austrian schemes for an advance towards Salonica. Not only would the Sultan renew his hold upon Macedonia, but also he might very well claim to resume possession of the various provinces,

such as Eastern Roumelia, Bosnia and the Herzegovina, which on various excuses had been removed from Turkish control by Bulgaria and Austria during the last thirty years. Accordingly the governments of these states, after a meeting between Francis Joseph and Ferdinand at Buda-Pesth, resolved to advance their own interests by immediate action. On October 5, 1908, the patient Ferdinand repudiated the last claims of the Sultan to suzerainty over him, and declared himself "Tsar of the Bulgars"—a title suggestive of his ambition to bring the whole Bulgarian race beneath his sceptre. Two days later Austria-Hungary proclaimed the formal annexation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina.

The Austrian Annexation of Bosnia.—This step aroused the deepest resentment in Serbia and Montenegro. They were required to stand by and watch the extinction of their long-deferred hope of uniting the Serbian nation, for these provinces, inhabited almost exclusively by Serbs, were now to be incorporated, apparently for ever, in the dominions of the Dual Monarchy. Nor could the Serbian principalities expect external assistance. Their only hope lay in Russian interference, and Russia was deterred from supporting them by the attitude of the German Emperor, who declared his intention of standing by his ally "in shining armour." There was some clamour amongst the Italians that they should be compensated elsewhere for the extension of the dominions of Austria, but the government decided for the moment to remain faithful to the Triple Alliance. Turkey, now deep in the throes of constitution-making, did indeed issue a formal protest, but a year later she also recognised the annexation, and, in return, the Austrians withdrew their garrisons from the Turkish province of Novibazar.

The Deposition of Abdul Hamid.—Meanwhile the aged Abdul Hamid had engineered a counter-revolution at Constantinople for the purpose of overthrowing the Com-

mittee of Union and Progress. The bulk of the army, however, sided with that body. Constantinople was occupied after some severe fighting, and by the authority of the newly elected parliament Abdul Hamid was deposed in favour of his younger brother (April, 1909). The new Sultan, a man of no political experience, was of some use to the Committee as a figure-head, but he proved a mere tool in their hands. The parliament also, as might have been expected in a country so newly converted to democracy, showed no signs of being able to exercise any real authority over the Committee. The destinies of Turkey, therefore, remained henceforth in the hands of a small group of ambitious men, many of them soldiers, and under their rule the Empire was soon plunged into war. The seizure of Tripoli by the Italians in 1911 has already been noticed, and it is necessary now to say no more than that among their motives for that step were the claim to be compensated for the expansion of Austria three years earlier, and the need to strike quickly before the Turks had completed the task of reorganising the Empire.

Venizelos.—One of the results of the close connection between Crete and Greece was the appearance in 1910 upon the European stage of a statesman who was to wield an immense influence upon the events of the next four years. Ever since the war between Greece and Turkey in 1897 an important part in the government of the island had been played by an able Cretan named Eleutherios Venizelos. Early in 1910 he resigned his position in Crete in order to take part in the politics of Greece, where he was already well known, and where his ability and force of character soon won for him a commanding position. By the end of the year he was able to control an overwhelming parliamentary majority. The king now appointed him Prime Minister, a post which he still held at the outbreak of the Balkan War of 1912.

The Reform of Turkey.—Once installed in office Venizelos quietly set to work to promote an understanding with

the other Balkan states, a task which the policy of the Young Turks was making less difficult. The methods adopted by the Committee of Union and Progress to arrest the decay of the Turkish Empire were hardly such as to content the Christian inhabitants of Macedonia. The idea was to prevent the collapse of the tottering state by introducing a highly centralised system of administration, thus exactly reversing the policy by which, during the last century, district after district had been left to its own devices, if not actually granted some form of self-government. The outlying provinces were now to be governed by Turkish officials sent from Constantinople and controlled directly by the Committee. The various races and regions were all to be dealt with alike, and were thus to be reduced to a dead level of uniformity. Religious freedom was to be permitted, but it was clear that the controlling influence was everywhere to remain in the hands of the Turks. The new rulers certainly set about their work with a vigour that stood out in marked contrast to the dilatory methods and corrupt inefficiency that had characterised the government of Abdul Hamid. Their system, if honestly conducted, might in time have reduced what was left of Turkey in Europe to an orderly condition, and might even have led, as the Young Turks hoped it would, to the eventual consolidation of the Empire. On the other hand, their policy was very disappointing to the inhabitants of Macedonia, and the very chance that it would succeed made it highly unwelcome, not only to Italy, but also to Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece, whose patriots saw slipping from them another chance of liberating their Macedonian kinsmen from the Turkish yoke.

The Balkan League.—A new opportunity, however, soon presented itself. The outbreak of war between Turkey and Italy in 1911, and the loss of prestige which the Young Turks suffered as a result of their impotence to save Tripoli, suggested that the time had come to drive the Turks from Europe altogether. In 1912, therefore,

before Turkey was free from her embarrassments, the Balkan kingdoms, including Montenegro, laying aside for the moment their mutual jealousies, combined at last to attack the common enemy. The necessary negotiations were conducted with such rapidity and secrecy that, before the Turks or their backers realised what was coming, the Balkan League, the dream of the centuries, was in actual existence. The credit for this achievement may confidently be ascribed to two far-sighted statesmen, the Greek Premier and the astute Tsar of the Bulgars.

The Balkan War.—As soon as the news of this unexpected, and, in many quarters, unwelcome, combination leaked out, the Powers attempted to prevent the coming conflict. The states of the League were informed that in no case would they be permitted to acquire fresh territory. It was obvious, however, that the mutual jealousies of the Powers themselves made any active intervention impossible, and in any case their efforts were too late. On October 13, the members of the League addressed notes to the Turkish government demanding far-reaching reforms in Macedonia of a nature so humiliating to Turkish sovereign rights in that district that their acceptance was out of the question. By October 18, a state of war had been declared between Turkey and all four of her enemies. In the meantime, negotiations between Turkey and Italy, which had been dragging on at Lausanne for some months, were quickly concluded, Turkey consenting to cede the last of her African possessions so as to be free to face the new danger with her whole resources.

Successes of the League.—The struggle which followed was full of dramatic surprises. It soon became clear that the military power of the Balkan states, especially that of Serbia and Greece, had been seriously under-rated. Their armies had been wholly reorganised and rearmed during the last three years. Superior in numbers, in equipment and in leadership to their former conquerors,

they won during the first few weeks a series of rapid successes. The Montenegrins advanced into Albania and laid siege to the city of Scutari. The Serbs, overthrowing the Turkish forces in Macedonia in two great battles, occupied Uskub, once the capital of the mediæval Serbian kingdom, and Monastir. Salonica fell to the Greeks, who had this time carried everything before them in Thessaly, while their fleet made short work of the Turkish islands in the Ægean. The Bulgars poured down from the mountains into Thrace, drove the Turks past Adrianople, which was closely invested, defeated them in a five days' battle at Lule Burgas, and shut them up behind the fortified lines of Chatalja hardly twenty miles from Constantinople. Within three weeks of the commencement of hostilities, the whole of European Turkey, but for a few fortified cities and the capital itself, had been triumphantly liberated, and even Constantinople was seriously threatened.

The Second Period of the War.—At this point, however, the sequence of victories was checked. Behind the Chatalja lines and the fortifications of Adrianople, the Turkish soldier, beaten in the field, showed all his old stubbornness in defence. A serious epidemic of cholera among the Bulgarian forces made further attacks upon the Turkish strongholds impossible for the moment, and it seemed a matter of common prudence for the allies to make peace before the Powers, recovering from their surprise, stepped in to rob them of what they had already won. On December 3, an armistice was signed between all the combatants but the Greeks, who continued the war by sea. A fortnight later a conference of all five was opened in London, while at the same time the ambassadors of the Powers met near by to discuss the situation. The terms proposed by the allies included the surrender of Adrianople, which still held out, and of the whole of European Turkey except Constantinople and its suburbs, and the Powers, acting together with at least outward unanimity advised the Turks to accept these conditions.

After a series of delays, intentionally protracted in the hope that Germany or Austria might come to the rescue, the Turks were already showing a disposition to yield, when, at the end of January, 1913, a fresh revolution was organised in Constantinople by some of the younger and more active members of the Young Turk party, who were resolved not to abandon Macedonia and Thrace without a further struggle. The older members of the government were murdered or compelled to resign, and the direction of affairs fell into the hands of Enver Pasha, who had won a considerable reputation by his defence of Tripoli against the Italians during the previous year. In February, under his active guidance, the war was renewed, but no impression could be made upon the allies. The Greeks defeated the Turkish fleet outside the Dardanelles, and Adrianople fell to the onslaughts of the Serbs and Bulgars. The Turks now abandoned their fruitless efforts, and in the spring negotiations for peace were reopened on the understanding that the allies' terms would be accepted.

The Difficulties in the Way of a Comprehensive Settlement.—It was to be anticipated that the conquered territory would be divided amongst the victors in accordance with the principle of nationality—that Bulgars, Serbs and Greeks would each take such districts as were inhabited by their own kin. In many parts of Macedonia, however, these races were so inextricably mingled that it was impossible to devise any frontier that would separate Bulgars from Serbs and both from Greeks and that would prevent future disputes between the races. Nor was this the only obstacle to a peaceful resettlement of the conquered districts. Before the war, the Powers had forbidden the Balkan states to think of acquiring fresh territory. In face of the astonishing series of victories that had been witnessed, this prohibition could scarcely be enforced. These victories, however, constituted a serious defeat for another state besides Turkey. The growth of strong military states in the Balkans, and the division of Macedonia

between them, meant the shattering of the Austrian dreams of expansion to the Ægean. The statesmen of the Dual Monarchy, utterly callous to the welfare of Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece, resolved at all costs to prevent the foundation of a greater Serbian kingdom right across their path, and for this purpose schemed to embroil the states with one another by fomenting the racial disputes which were certain to arise. In their machinations against Serbia the Austrians soon found support. The Serbs and Montenegrins had occupied Albania during the war, and clearly intended to keep it as part of their share of the spoil. Now Italy had long looked covetously across the Lower Adriatic at that district, and readily joined Austria in demanding that the allies should withdraw from it. The Powers, wishing above all things to prevent an extension of the war, concurred, and since neither Austria nor Italy would allow it to pass into the possession of the other, Albania was declared an independent state. Later in the year a German prince was selected to rule it.

The Third Period of the War.—As compensation for their loss, the Serbs now demanded a larger share of Macedonia, including some districts whose population was predominantly Bulgarian. To this demand the Bulgars, stirred up by the Austrians, naturally demurred. Neither party would abandon what it considered its sacred rights, and fuel was thrown upon the flames by a quarrel between Bulgaria and Greece for the possession of Salonica. These disputes, involving the break-up of the League, soon brought about a resumption of hostilities in all directions. The Serbs and Greeks combined, and fell upon the Bulgars, while the Turks, who all the while had been awaiting their opportunity, reoccupied Adrianople. Meanwhile, Austria was prevented from actively supporting her new protégé by the attitude of Russia. The tsar, always interested in the progress of the Slav states, had rejoiced in the successes of the Balkan League, and correspondingly deplored its collapse. He solemnly called upon Serbia

and Bulgaria to compose their differences, and when they ignored his summons he used his influence to restrain Austria from attacking the Serbs. It was impossible, therefore, for any of the Powers to intervene except at the risk of a general conflagration, and for this the Germans, without whose support the Austrians could hardly dare to act, decided that the times were not yet ripe. Thus Austria was obliged to stand by, while Bulgaria was attacked on every side.

The Treaty of Bucharest.—The Bulgars resisted heroically, but their defeat was already certain when they were assailed by yet another foe. Roumania had as yet played no part in these momentous events, but she now stepped in as the arbiter between the combatants. Taking advantage of the utter helplessness of Bulgaria, she advanced an irresistible claim to a slice of Bulgarian territory to the south of the Dobrudscha. Roumanian troops marched unopposed upon Sofia, and when the time came to renew the negotiations for peace, it was at Bucharest, and under Roumanian auspices, that the conference assembled. Before the close of 1913, the Treaty of Bucharest was signed. By its terms the bulk of the spoil of the whole struggle remained in the hands of the final victors—Serbia and Greece. The latter secured Epirus and a portion of Macedonia, including the coveted port of Salonica. Serbia recompensed herself for the loss of Albania by retaining not only that part of Macedonia which was indisputably hers but also a considerable area upon which, by the principle of nationality, Bulgaria had the better claim. Bulgaria, it is true, received a stretch of coast upon the *Ægean*, but, with Adrianople again in the hands of the Turks, she obtained a share of the spoils far smaller than she had originally anticipated and hardly commensurate with the sacrifices which she had made in the first two periods of the war.

The Result of the War.—An arrangement so unsatisfactory could hardly be regarded as a final solution of



TREATY OF BUCHAREST, 1913.

the Balkan question. The Turks still retained control over a considerable number of European Christians. Bulgaria nursed a keen resentment against Serbia, and grievances only a degree less bitter against Russia, Greece and Roumania, while the two Serb states displayed an almost open hostility towards Austria and some irritation with Italy. This unfortunate state of affairs, for which the competition between Russia and the Central European Powers for influence in the Balkans was fundamentally responsible, could hardly fail before long to bring about a still greater conflagration. For the moment the advantage lay with Germany and Austria. Serbia and Montenegro had widened their frontiers, but the former had hardly been strengthened against the Austrian designs by the inclusion of subjects of Bulgarian nationality and sympathies, while the latter considered herself to have been defrauded of Scutari, which she had captured during the war. The humiliations and loss of territory suffered by the Turks had made them more than ever subservient to German influences, and the railway through Baghdad to the Persian Gulf, with all the threats that it implied to British influence in Asia, was nearing completion. Finally, not only had the Balkan League been effectually broken up, but a combination of the Slav states against Austria had been made impossible. Bulgaria, whose gratitude to Russia for her efforts in 1877 had been seriously weakened by the events of 1885, was now at hopeless variance with her former champion.

The Murder of Francis Ferdinand.—The agitated months that followed the Treaty of Bucharest were marked by incessant bickering between Austria and Serbia; and the tension was only increased when, to punish the latter, Austria refused to allow Serbian exports to pass across the Danube into Hungary. In June, 1914, the crisis was reached when the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, the heir to the Austrian throne, was assassinated during a state visit to Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia. The murderers were undoubtedly of Serbian blood, there was some

evidence to show that the foul deed was the outcome of a conspiracy hatched upon Serbian soil, and the Serbian government itself was accused of complicity. The war party in Vienna, taking advantage of the national anger aroused by the crime throughout Austria and Hungary, decided that the time had come to crush out the independence of the Serbs for ever. On July 23, the Austrians presented to the government at Belgrade a series of drastic demands, which, if conceded in full, would have installed Austrian officials as directors of the administration, and reduced Serbia almost to the position of an Austrian dependency. A favourable reply could hardly have been expected, and as if to show that it was not desired, only forty-eight hours were allowed for a decision. This provocative attitude naturally awakened the hostility of the Russians, who had always held it to be their privilege to protect the Slav peoples from undue interference, and as soon as it became known that a preparatory concentration of Austrian troops upon the Serbian frontier was being effected, the tsar ordered a partial mobilisation of his army.

Slav versus Teuton.—During the following week the march of events became rapid and irresistible. The war-like mood of Austria provided the Germans with the opportunity which they had long been awaiting. For the realisation of their dreams of world-power the assistance of Austria was necessary. Yet with those dreams, Austria, a purely European Power, had never shown much sympathy. By supporting their ally against Russia at this juncture they would insure her participation in a war which had for its real object not the subjugation of Serbia but the domination of the world. It had become increasingly evident, moreover, that sooner or later the conflict of Slav and Teuton interests in the Balkans and elsewhere must be settled by a trial of strength between Germany and Russia, and for such a contest the present occasion seemed suitable. Russia had never altogether recovered from the disasters of the Japanese War, and was still a

prey to acute internal disorder. The Slav states were divided against themselves, for after the events of 1913 Bulgaria could be counted on at least to stand aloof. Lastly, the Dual Monarchy, itself containing a considerable Slav population, was largely held together by the loyalty of its varied races to their aged Emperor. If then the Slav and Teuton were bound to fight, it were well that the struggle should arise out of a dispute in which Austria was vitally interested, and that it should take place while the Russians were unable to exert the whole strength of their vast empire, while the Slavs were still envenomed against one another, and while Francis Joseph still lived. Germany therefore assured Austria of her support, called upon Russia to disarm the forces already mobilised, and finally required France to define the attitude that she would adopt in the event of war between the Central Powers and Russia.

Austria Plunges into War with Serbia.—Meanwhile Serbia, on the advice of the tsar, had sent a conciliatory reply to the Austrian demands to the effect that she was prepared to concede every claim upon her that did not imperil her territorial integrity and her position as an independent state. Instead of treating this answer as a basis for future discussion, the Austrians immediately declared war upon Serbia and actually began the bombardment of Belgrade. Bent upon finishing the matter out of hand, and strongly supported by Germany, they refused to listen to the suggestion that an international conference should assemble to discuss the situation, or even to allow time for further parleying between the Powers.

The Attitude of Italy.—General hostilities could not now be long postponed, for both sides had gone too far to draw back without intolerable humiliation. Russia, though sincerely desiring peace, refused to abandon Serbia to her fate. France, driven by the fear of further German aggression rather than by any desire for revenge upon her

own account, declared her determination to stand by Russia, and mobilisation was everywhere hurried on. Only the attitude of Italy and England remained to be ascertained. The Italians soon made their position clear. Sympathising neither with the Austrian designs in the Balkans nor with the wider ambitions of Germany, they decided for the moment to stand aloof. The Triple Alliance had been seriously weakened by the events of 1911, when Italy, against the wish of Germany, had fallen upon Turkey. The Italians now argued that its terms provided only for mutual defence, and that as, in their view, the whole policy of the Central Powers had been wanton and provocative, no reason existed for their intervention.

The Attitude of Great Britain.—The position of Great Britain during these fateful days was more doubtful, and was not altogether clear even as late as August 2, when both France and Russia were at war with Germany. The problem with which the British cabinet was faced resolved itself into two questions. What steps were best calculated to maintain the peace, and, next, what should be the attitude of England in case of a general conflagration? As long as there seemed a chance of bringing the protagonists in the original dispute to their senses, the British statesmen, putting aside any consideration of national interests, and carefully avoiding giving any direct encouragement to either party, directed all their efforts to the task of preserving peace. It is possible that a decided policy translated into vigorous action before the situation had become critical—an unqualified statement of our sympathies with France and of our determination to draw the sword in her defence—might have postponed or even averted the catastrophe, for Germany was hardly ready yet to face our naval power. Such a policy, however, our statesmen, for reasons that redound to their honour, found it impossible to formulate. The recent trend of our diplomacy in dealing with international

disputes had always been to exhaust all the arts of argument and persuasion before proceeding to the use of threats—to rely upon arbitration and conferences rather than the final judgment of the sword. As the crisis approached, our ministers acted according to their traditions, sincerely believing that therein lay the best chance of bringing the disputants to reason. While Europe stood upon the brink they reiterated the suggestion that Germany and Austria should submit the questions at issue to a new conference of the Powers. Their proposals, however, met with nothing but evasive answers, clearly designed to gain time for further military preparations, and on August 1, when Germany finally threw away the scabbard by declaring war on Russia, the attitude of England was still in doubt.

The Question of British Neutrality.—As soon as it was clear that all efforts to maintain the peace must end in failure, the cabinet transferred its attention to the second problem, the momentous choice between neutrality and active intervention. It is true that motives of self-interest seemed to prompt an immediate onslaught upon Germany. As we have already seen, there were not wanting indications that the first object of the German Emperor's policy was to isolate England from the Dual Entente, so that the opponents of his schemes of colonial expansion could be dealt with separately, and, in the opinion of many competent observers, it was against Great Britain that those schemes were chiefly aimed. Now to remain aloof might mean the crushing of France and the humiliation of Russia, and even if it did not, nothing was more certain than that after abandoning them we could never look for their support in any future conflict between ourselves and Germany. On this showing, the mere instinct of self-preservation seemed to urge us to throw our weight into the scales, and it was felt besides that, although we were bound by no treaty to go to the assistance of the French, the support which we had given

them in 1906 and 1911 had so far committed us to their cause that we could not now stand aside except at the risk of our honour.

Difficulties in the Way of Intervention.—On the other hand it was arguable that neither with Germany nor with Austria had we any immediate dispute, and that to pick a quarrel on the unproved assumption that one of them intended in the future to fall upon us would be both unworthy and unjust. Moreover, the internal condition of Great Britain was scarcely such as to warrant an entry into a first-class war except in a cause which commanded general support. A series of industrial disputes had been but recently concluded, and further trouble of this nature was believed to be imminent, while Ireland appeared at that moment to be drifting rapidly towards a state of civil war. Now with the fate of Serbia, as Germany well knew, England had little direct concern, and it was, to say the least of it, doubtful whether a plunge into a world-wide war on behalf of such a cause would commend itself to public opinion, without the support of which no British government can wage a war at all. Thus the choice that lay before the cabinet was one fraught with every imaginable difficulty. It had no desire to be dragged into the conflict, and an unpopular war might well be the beginning of revolution. Yet both ministers and nation were in equal fear of a dishonourable peace, which might after all serve only to postpone the coming trial of strength between England and Germany.

Meanwhile both sets of disputants were asking our intentions, for while the French believed themselves to have the right to count upon our support, the Germans suspected that our internal difficulties would drive us to seize upon any excuse for standing aloof, and accordingly had hopes of securing our neutrality. As a bid for it they even offered, in case of victory, to forgo any territorial acquisitions at the expense of France itself, though they

naturally refused to give any similar undertaking in respect of French colonies.

The Invasion of Belgium.—Before any irrevocable step had been taken, however, a new consideration arose which convinced public opinion in England that a policy of neutrality was impossible, and thus freed the cabinet from its dilemma. For centuries past it had been a traditional feature of British policy to prevent the establishment of any likely antagonist or rival in Belgium. In 1839 the European Powers, including Prussia, had agreed to guarantee the permanent neutrality and independence of that state. During the Second French Empire the supposed design of Napoleon III to lay hands upon it had earned for him the suspicion of England, and in 1870 its neutrality had been strictly respected both by the French and their adversaries. In recent years, however, it had been generally recognised that the space between Belgium and Switzerland, extensive though it was, was nevertheless too narrow for the deployment of the vast armies that Germany would be able to put into the field for her next onslaught upon France. That space, moreover, was largely occupied by hilly country, and partly by actual mountain ranges, such as the Vosges, which provided natural defensive positions and which had been additionally protected by a series of artificial barriers. It was obvious that the German superiority in numbers could best be turned to advantage upon a wider front and that the flat land to the north of the Belgian Ardennes would provide not only an ideal manœuvring ground for the German hosts, but also a highway by which the whole of the French defensive lines could be outflanked. There were good reasons for believing that the Germans would be unable to resist the temptation—that a swift march through Belgium had actually been planned as an essential preliminary to an onslaught upon France. None of the countries concerned had been blind to the danger, least of all Great Britain, for it would be disquieting to the English to see Germany in

possession of Antwerp and other Belgian ports across the narrow seas. It was hardly to be doubted that, once the Germans were firmly established there, they would never willingly withdraw, and the idea of their continued presence there, in defiance of every public right, was hardly to be tolerated. An understanding had been arrived at some years previously between the British, French and Belgian governments, providing for military co-operation in case of any infringement of the treaty of 1839. Accordingly, as soon as war in the west became probable, the Belgians appealed to England to assist them in maintaining their neutrality, and the British government at once invited France and Germany to declare their adhesion to the treaty. France unhesitatingly assented. The Germans at first attempted to evade the question, but on August 4, when the British ambassador in Berlin demanded a plain answer under threat of war, he was soon able to ascertain their intentions. On the same day Prussian troops crossed the Belgian frontier, thereby compelling Great Britain to fulfil her treaty obligations. The last trace of English indecision now vanished, for above the whisper of self-interest was heard the clear call of honour, and it was with the consent of a united nation that its leaders resolved to intervene.

CHAPTER XXIV


THE GREAT WAR, 1914-1918

German Strategy.—The Central Powers possessed one great military advantage over their opponents, which from first to last did much to make up for any inferiority in total numbers. Threatened on two fronts, they could throw their main strength, as occasion demanded, on this side or on that. In August, 1914, remaining on the defensive against Russia, they hoped to be able to concentrate sufficient numbers against France to obtain a quick decision in the West. Russia, it was thought, could not be dangerous for many weeks, for she would need that time to mobilise her forces and to transport them over her indifferent railways to the frontier. By the time she was ready, their armies in the West would have done their work and could be transferred eastwards to deal with her.

The Invasion of Belgium.—Yet to attack France directly from Germany would be difficult and dangerous, for all the way from Belgium to Switzerland, wherever it was not covered by mountain and forest, the frontier had been elaborately fortified. On the other hand the French, expecting that Belgian neutrality would be respected as it had been in 1870, had neglected their north-eastern frontier. Thus by marching through Belgium, whose resistance was expected to be negligible, the Germans could turn the left flank of the French defensive line, separate the main French armies from British help, and by swift action might even seize Paris itself. During August this bold plan was carried out, and narrowly missed success.

That the Belgians, with forces entirely inadequate to stem the torrent poured against them, should have decided to resist at all was an act of heroism. Less than three weeks, however, were required to destroy their fortresses, to occupy Brussels and to bring the German columns by way of Liège and Namur over the unfortified part of the French frontier. The remnants of the Belgian army were driven northward towards Antwerp, where they could easily be masked by German reserve troops detached for the purpose from the main advance. The Belgian resistance, however, had the effect of delaying the German progress for a few precious days, during which all the available divisions of the British regular army, under Sir John French, had been successfully transported across the Channel and moved forward to the French frontier. On the other hand, desperate French attempts to penetrate the German defence in Lorraine and Alsace were frustrated.

The Retreat to the Marne.—During the next fortnight events moved rapidly. The British forces placed at Mons on the left wing of the French northern armies were confronted with an impossible task. On August 23 the Germans were in sufficient numbers, over and above those who were engaging the French, to attack the British positions in great force and at the same time to work round their unprotected left flank. In these circumstances, although the frontal attack was beaten off, the British could avoid envelopment only by retreat, and as it was found that the French armies to the south were rapidly falling back under heavy pressure the only chance of keeping in touch with them was to follow suit. From August 24 to September 4 the whole of the defending forces wheeled backwards in a south-westerly direction, pivoting, as it were, upon Verdun, a retreat involving heavy losses and broken only by occasional attempts at a stand, such as that of the British at Le Cateau on August 26. By this time, however, much of the sting had been taken out of the German onslaught by its very rapidity, and on



NORTHERN FRANCE AND BELGIUM IN THE GREAT WAR.

September 4 the Allies, whose steadiness had never been shaken by the retreat, were able to take their stand upon a line stretching from Paris to Verdun. During the next six days, in a series of engagements known as the Battle of the Marne, it was the turn of the Germans to be driven back. They also retained their steadiness in defeat, and though desperate fighting continued until the end of the month the Allies failed to drive them beyond the line of the River Aisne. Exhausted by continuous marching and fighting, the armies on both sides now entrenched themselves where they stood, and the line thus established, in spite of all that either side could do, remained immovable, but for minor fluctuations, for upwards of four years. The main aim of the German strategy, the separation of the British from the French and the complete rolling up of the latter southward, had been decisively frustrated, and in that sense the operations could be considered as an allied victory.

Stalemate in the West.—Each side now turned its attention to attempts to outflank the other in the north. Nothing decisive, however, was accomplished by either. Freshly landed British troops tried to succour the hard-pressed Belgians at Antwerp, now threatened with bombardment and siege, but nothing more could be achieved than to enable the Belgians to extract themselves from the trap into which they had been driven and then to cover their retreat westwards into France. The main British force, whose trenches on the Aisne were taken over by the French, was now moved northwards so as to be nearer its sources of supply, and arrived just in time to defend Ypres and the Channel ports from a fresh German advance. By the middle of November the stalemate already established in the south had been extended to the sea at a point just within Belgian territory between Dunkirk and Ostend.

Tannenberg.—The successful defence of France, decisive on the whole course of the war as it ultimately turned out

to be, had been greatly assisted at its most critical moment by the vigorous action of the third party of the alliance. Mobilising more rapidly than had been anticipated, the Russians poured westward, and at first overwhelmed the German defensive in East Prussia. By the end of August, however, the German veteran, Hindenburg, had restored the situation by a great victory at Tannenberg, but only at the expense of transferring to the east large bodies of reserves whose presence in France during the early days of September might well have finished the war in the west before the end of the year. Moreover, Russian successes against Austria in Galicia laid Hungary open to invasion and showed the Germans that it was high time to abandon their original strategy of obtaining a quick decision in the west and to turn the weight of their offensive in a new direction. Nor had any real progress as yet been made with the punishment of Serbia, ostensibly the prime object of the War. As long as they had only the Austrians to deal with, the Serbs held their own, and although twice driven temporarily out of Belgrade they had cleared their country of invaders before the end of the year.

The War Extends.—It was now clear to both sides that no quick decision such as had been achieved in 1870 was to be looked for. The Central Powers were in a state of siege, held on the west and south and seriously threatened on the east. Their communications by sea had been cut from the beginning, and though such German cruiser forces as were in foreign waters at the outbreak of the war did much damage to British shipping during the autumn, they had all been rounded up and destroyed by the end of 1914. The overwhelming superiority of the British Navy had prevented any attempt to interrupt communications between England and France or to re-open communications with the outside world, and the German overseas colonies lay at the mercy of what allied forces could be spared to deal with them. In one direction, however, it was possible for the Central Powers to create

a series of diversions which, by extending the area of the War, might have awkward consequences for the Allies, and particularly for the British Empire. In the years previous to 1914, as we have seen, Turkey, practically ruled by Enver Pasha and his friends, had come increasingly under German influences. Her defeat in 1913 by the Balkan States had been a blow to Germany as much as to Turkey, and since she had been left thirsting for revenge very little pressure would be needed to induce her to enter the War, with the prospect of recovering not only what she had recently lost, but also what Russia and Britain had filched from her during the previous century. Her territories, stretching from Constantinople to Arabia and the Caspian, gave her bases for attacks upon South Russia, upon Egypt and upon the valuable commercial interests which Great Britain held in Mesopotamia. British communications with India might be interrupted by the seizure of the Suez Canal, and the transport of English munitions to Russia, where they were vitally needed, could be prevented by the closing of the Dardanelles. In the event of victory, a revitalised Turkish Empire would provide an avenue for the Germans into Asia by way of the Baghdad Railway, and into Africa by way of Egypt, while Austria would be able to pursue her plans for advancing to the Ægean, which had been so rudely interrupted in 1912. Bulgaria's ancient feud with Serbia, reawakened by the events of 1913, made her also an easy prey to German diplomacy, while the Kaiser's relations, the King of Roumania and the Queen of Greece, were relied on at least to keep those countries neutral. These schemes were at first successful. Turkey entered the War in November, 1914, and after a pause, during which the astute King Ferdinand was carefully scanning the horizon, Bulgaria did the same.

Italy.—To balance these accessions of strength to the Central Powers, Italy joined the Allies in May, 1915. Her aims were simple. The Italian-speaking districts which had not been wrested from Austria in 1866 were still

awaiting recovery. Whether Italy entered the War was merely a question whether these districts, including Trent and Istria, together with Trieste and Pola, Austria's only seaports, could best be obtained from the Central Powers peacefully as a reward of neutrality, or by the sword. As soon as it became clear that nothing would induce Austria to surrender them entire, Italy's decision was made. Her adhesion to the Allied cause was taken at the time as making the common victory secure, but so exclusively were her efforts directed to her own interests, and so little progress did she make towards achieving them, that years elapsed before her entry as a combatant afforded any perceptible relief to her allies. And further, her jealousy of Serbia and Greece created serious difficulties both during the War and after.

The Dardanelles.—During 1915 the main interest of the War lay in the east of Europe. Making ample provision for holding their trench lines in France, the Germans moved masses of troops to the east and prepared a staggering blow which it was hoped would drive Russia out of the war. Enormous successes were achieved. The Russian armies, short of artillery, of ammunition, and even of rifles, were thrust back from the frontiers, and by August they had left almost the whole of Poland, Lithuania and Kurland in the hands of the Central Powers. Their retreat, however, had been for the most part orderly, and there was as yet no lack of confidence in ultimate victory. If only some route could be found for the transport of munitions purchased in England and America, of which the Russian armies were in sore need, they could be expected to return to the attack. It was partly to gain such a route, and partly because the best defence of Egypt from Turkey lay in attack, that Great Britain attempted the forcing of the Dardanelles. Large armies raised from volunteers in Great Britain and the British Colonies became available early in the year, and the question arose whether these should be employed in a frontal attack upon the German lines in

France or in an attempt to destroy Turkey. A resolute decision to do either might have borne rapid fruit, but no such decision was ever reached. As the troops became available, they were used partly in futile attempts to break through in France and partly in weak attacks on Turkey, with the natural result that success in both fields was delayed until after Russia had fallen out from the ranks of the Allies and her place had been taken by the United States of America. Yet the prizes to be won by a successful forcing of the Dardanelles were immense. Besides the possible seizure of Constantinople and the opening of a sea-way to Russia, it would mean the checkmating of the German schemes of penetration to the East and the diversion of the Turkish attention from Egypt and the Suez Canal, against which weak attacks had already been made. Relief could also be given to hard-pressed Serbia, and influence brought to bear on hesitating Bulgaria and neutral Roumania and Greece. With these ends in view, in April, 1915, after a preliminary attempt to rush the Straits with naval forces alone, a landing was made on the Gallipoli Peninsula. Some successes were achieved, which would have had decisive results if sufficient forces had been available to follow them up, but fresh troops which might have been used for this purpose were swallowed up in premature attacks in France at Neuve-Chapelle in April and at Loos and in Champagne in September. Thus, after much desperate fighting in Gallipoli, a deadlock was reached, from which, in December, the Allied forces were withdrawn. It was the same in Mesopotamia, where considerable but inadequate numbers, drawn from India and elsewhere and advancing from the Persian Gulf, made a premature attempt to take Baghdad. After a series of brilliant victories, a British force was blockaded at Kut, and, in spite of attempts to relieve it, was compelled to surrender in April, 1916.

Salonica.—Meanwhile the German successes reached a climax. As soon as the danger from Russia had been

averted, the main onslaught was directed upon Serbia. For nearly a year the Serbs had maintained themselves against Austrian attacks, but overwhelming numbers were now brought against them under German leadership, while their undefended flank was suddenly assailed by the Bulgars, whose King, encouraged by the British failure at Gallipoli, had made his decision. The Serbs fled in helpless rout through the mountains to the Adriatic, there to take refuge upon British ships. Their collapse involved also that of the little Kingdom of Montenegro, which lost its thousand-year record of inviolability. An Allied relieving force was landed on Greek territory at Salonica, in order to effect a diversion, but it was too small and too late to be of any use, and only by hard fighting maintained itself upon the shore. Ultimately, however, this force served two useful purposes, in that it proved a nucleus round which the fragments of the Serbian army could be re-assembled, and that its presence, reinforced by the threat of naval blockade, ensured the neutrality of Greece. The year closed in the east at least with the prospect of a complete triumph for the Central Powers, while in the west they seemed to have indefinitely postponed the reckoning.

Verdun.—The German plans for 1916 involved an attempt to recover in the west the initiative which they had abandoned since the autumn of 1914. In February a determined attack was opened on the French at Verdun, a strongly fortified position where no ground had been yielded even in the worst days of 1914. In spite of heavy losses, however, no spectacular success was achieved, even though the pressure was maintained right through the spring and summer. The stubborn defence put up by the French was undoubtedly their most glorious achievement until the closing months of the War. They received material assistance from July onwards from a British counter-offensive on the River Somme, directed by Sir Douglas Haig, who had taken over the command from Sir John French. This attack, costly as it was, and productive of

little direct advantage, nevertheless diverted many German divisions during the later stages of the struggle farther south.

Roumania.—Meanwhile Russia was making her last effort on the grand scale. Munitions in great quantities had been sent by sea to Archangel in default of a better route, and thence they filtered slowly southward to the seat of war. With re-equipped artillery and refilled ranks the Russians fell upon the Austrians in Galicia with startling results. The Austrian armies were broken, whole divisions, largely composed it is true of unwilling recruits from the subject races of the Empire, deserting entire. In August, Roumania, whose pro-German King had died in 1914, and whose sympathies had long lain principally with the western Allies, entered the War with the intention of invading the Austrian province of Transylvania alongside the victorious Russians and of rescuing their fellow nationals from the Hungarian yoke. These high hopes, however, were short-lived. German divisions were hurried back from before Verdun and the Somme, and Austrians from Italy, where they had been pressing the Italians back towards Venice. After a brief period of success among the Carpathians, the Roumans were held on this front, while from across the Danube they were assailed by the Bulgars, who, under German leadership, gladly seized the chance to avenge the Roumanian attack upon them in 1913. By the end of the year the capital had fallen, and though the Roumanian army suffered no overwhelming defeat, more than half their country had been overrun. As for Russia, whose last success, like her first, did immense service to the western Allies, she was spent. Partly through exhaustion and partly through the treachery of some of her leaders, who were manœuvring for a separate peace with Germany, she was incapacitated from further effort. As some compensation for the destruction of the third of the small nations which had dared to rely upon the Allies to help them against the Central Powers, the year ended

with a brilliant success for the British forces in Mesopotamia. The fall of Kut was avenged and a serious blow dealt to the Turk by a victorious advance up the Tigris, led by Sir Stanley Maude, this being followed up in the spring by the capture of Baghdad.

America.—The new year opened with a further gleam of hope for the Allies, for they were joined by a new nation, potentially stronger than any of the combatants as yet engaged. The entry of the United States of America into the War seemed to put the result beyond doubt, even though many months must elapse before they could exert any perceptible influence upon it. Ever since 1914 the sea blockade of Germany had been maintained. In its early stages the British interference with the right of neutral nations, such as the United States, to trade with Germany caused great resentment, especially as not only war-like stores but articles of ordinary trade, and even foodstuffs, were seized and confiscated on the high seas. The Allied Governments had a difficult course to steer, for while the blockade, especially as it concerned copper and food, was a powerful weapon in their hands, too thorough a use of it might lose them friends and even gain them enemies. Early in 1915 popular feeling between Great Britain and America on this subject was rising to dangerous heights, when the Germans themselves came to the rescue of the Allies. Regarding the naval situation as in other respects hopeless, the Germans determined to use their submarines to sink merchant shipping, allied or neutral, approaching British shores, without regard to the lives of non-combatant passengers or crews. In its early stages this action had no vital effect upon British trade, but the sinking of several British liners, among them the *Lusitania*, involving the drowning of many American citizens, followed by the destruction of a number of American ships, changed the whole current of transatlantic opinion. Regardless of this the Germans pursued their submarine policy and during 1916 even concentrated their

whole naval activity upon intensifying it. This was especially the case after the battle in the North Sea on May 31, 1916. This engagement, the only meeting between the main Fleets during the War, was interrupted at night-fall before it had become general, and though Sir John Jellicoe's fleet suffered the heavier losses the Germans avoided the renewal of the action next day. They had realised that their inferiority in capital ships made success impossible, and they never again risked battle on the sea. It remained, therefore, to build submarines in sufficient numbers to establish a regular blockade of Great Britain, and to use them without any kind of restrictions against the ships of all nations. For in spite of their victories in the east, the German leaders knew very well by the end of 1916 that final triumph could only come after the destruction of Great Britain, and to achieve that they were prepared to risk the intervention of the United States. On February 3, 1917, after a brisk interchange of notes with Germany, Wilson, the American President, broke off diplomatic relations, and two months later, on discovering that Germany was trying to stir up trouble for his country in Mexico, he was able to persuade Congress to declare war.

The Collapse of Russia.—During 1917, therefore, since America required time to train her man-power and to transport any considerable portion of it to Europe, the main interest of the struggle was a race between American preparations and the German submarine effort, for it was upon the result of this race that the issue of the War depended. Almost simultaneously with the intervention of America came the final collapse of Russia. The strain and exhaustion of the War had by this time undermined the determination not so much of the Russian army as of the Government and of the nation. All parties, peasants, artisans, middle class and aristocracy, turned upon the leaders, whose record was one of corruption and incompetence in every department but that of military leadership. During March, 1917, except amongst the troops at the

front, all discipline, order and organisation broke down. The Tsar abdicated, and was carried off to his fate. During the year a succession of middle-class leaders, men who had little following among the unorganised masses of the Russian peasantry, attempted to stay the avalanche. By the end of November, however, after many months of chaos, power had fallen into the hands of a group of self-appointed adventurers, headed by a Socialist dreamer named Lenin, who claimed to represent the masses of the Russian nation. As far as the War was concerned, his policy was that of peace at any price. Meanwhile the military leaders at the front, seeing that the only chance of preserving discipline among their troops lay in attack, launched a new offensive against Austria and Germany. During July they achieved some successes, but without stores or reinforcements the attempt was hopeless. By October the Russian armies had evaporated and nothing stood between the Germans and the capital. During the following month Lenin's emissary signed an Armistice with the Central Powers. The one bright spot in the situation on this front was that the Roumans, abandoned by Russia, held their own in what was left to them of their country, and by heroic fighting even recovered some of the ground lost in 1916.

Despair.—On the western front the spring and summer of 1917 were spent in tremendous but expensive attempts to penetrate the German defence in Champagne, at Arras, and before Ypres. Encouraging local successes were won, especially at Cambrai in November, and something was done to exhaust the apparently bottomless resources of German man-power. No break through, however, was achieved, and whatever the German losses may have been they were more than compensated by the transference back to the west of masses of troops freed by the cessation of serious fighting in the east. Further, the dashing of the high hopes placed in this series of offensives produced in the French armies a dangerous reaction, which threatened

the discipline and cohesion of the whole. This reaction had also its counterpart in England in the misgivings occasioned by the steadily increasing success of the German submarine campaign. A widespread feeling that the time had come to end the useless slaughter by negotiated peace was not wholly dispelled when in the autumn, by a series of brilliant actions, the French recovered at Verdun all that they had lost during 1916.

Caporetto.—The year ended in gloom, only relieved by a flicker from the east. In October the Austrians, stiffened by a number of German divisions from Russia, robbed the Italians of all that had been gained by two years of hard fighting. One of the three Italian armies, permeated by pacifist propaganda, fled before an Austrian attack at Caporetto without resistance, and the other two only saved themselves from envelopment by precipitate retreat. For a few weeks it seemed as if all discipline and even the last hope of victory had vanished and that Italy was doomed to the fate of Russia. The situation was only restored on the line of Piave, almost within sight of Venice, and even there only by the arrival of French and British divisions which could hardly be spared from France. In the east, however, a distinct success was recorded. For some time past British troops advancing from Egypt into Palestine had been held up by the Turks in front of Gaza, but in November the Turkish positions were turned and a rapid advance was begun, which a month later took the British armies under Allenby into Jerusalem, after a Mohammedan occupation of 730 years.

The Crisis.—The last act of the drama opened disastrously for the Allies. The Peace of Brest-Litovsk was signed between Russia and Germany on March 2, 1918, and was closely followed by that of Bucharest, where Roumania, isolated but undefeated, submitted to humiliating terms. The Central Powers were now free to concentrate their whole forces in Italy and northern France, and to attempt

a decision before the American millions were upon them. The coming blow was expected by the Allies, but its direction was wrongly guessed. It fell upon the British front near St. Quentin on March 21, in a section which had only recently been taken over from the French, and was but thinly held. Reserves which might have been used to reinforce this part of the line had been retained in England, partly to safeguard the home country against possible invasion, and partly, it was hinted, because the home authorities would no longer trust their generals not to waste their man-power in premature attacks. Larger masses of German troops were engaged in this onslaught than had been employed in any previous offensive on the western front, and at first the results seemed commensurate with the effort. During ten days of hard fighting the British lines sagged back towards Amiens, losing heavily in prisoners, guns and stores, and it was not until April 5 that the very real danger of a complete break-through and of a severance between the British and the French had been averted. These ten days may be regarded as the last great crisis of the War, for the Germans were never again so near decisive success. They next tried farther north. Between April 9 and the end of the month a series of onslaughts was made upon the British positions covering the ports of Dunkirk and Calais. Here also ground was yielded, but the blow was far less forcefully delivered than that of March and was to that extent a sign of increasing exhaustion. Next it was the turn of the French. On May 27 their line between Soissons and Rheims was broken in, and for three days the Germans advanced at a rate of ten miles a day, reaching the same line—the Marne—as had been the limit of their advance in 1914. Here, however, their success ended for good. The next attack, on July 15, directed against the French on either side of Rheims, was almost a complete failure. Four months of continuous efforts on a gigantic scale to force a decision before the arrival of the Americans had at last exhausted the German reserves of men. The leaders of the Central Powers knew

by now that their gamble had failed and it only remained for their followers to find it out as well. Three days later, reinforced by large American contingents, the British and French opened a counter-offensive, which, continued for the next three months, finally broke the German resistance. Events on the Italian front took a similar course. On June 15, while the last great German onslaught was preparing in France, the Austrians attacked the Italian lines on the Piave. There, as in France, however, the defence prevailed. Nor could the Germans take comfort from the submarine situation, for, thanks to the convoy system devised by the Admiralty, the monthly British shipping losses were much lower in 1918 than during the previous year. A brilliantly organised naval attack upon Zeebrugge on April 23, during which block-ships were sunk in the harbour entrance, did something to hamper the submarine operations from that port, while the German losses of submarines in the British mine-fields were so heavy that the surviving crews were showing an increasing unwillingness to put to sea.

The Great Offensive.—The numerous American troops now coming into action enabled the Allied offensive, once begun, to be carried on without intermission over the greater part of the front. On July 18 the French and Americans successfully struck from Compiègne upon the flank of the Germans on the Marne. On August 8 the British began the recovery of what had been lost in March in front of Amiens. Ten days later another series of attacks forced the Germans back towards Cambrai, while far to the south an independent American force was driving northwards from Verdun along the Meuse and threatening the communications of the whole of the German forces in France and Belgium. During September and October the pressure was steadily maintained with ever-increasing numbers. Lille, Ostend and Bruges were recovered towards the end of the latter month, and by the beginning of November there was scarcely a German left in France. The only

questions outstanding were whether they could extract their armies from Belgium along routes choked with transport towards an ever-narrowing exit, and what sort of a stand they would be able to make on their own frontier in the following spring.

General Success.—The reaction of these triumphs was equally clearly seen in other fields. The Salonica force, composed of British, French and Serbs, and now reinforced by the Greeks, whom the veteran Venizelos had at last stirred into action, was faced only by the Bulgars. The Bulgarian line was attacked and broken on September 15, and within ten days their resistance had wholly collapsed. They accepted an Armistice on the 30th, and Ferdinand's dramatic career was cut short by his abdication. After this complete triumph the victorious army divided. The Serbs, disappointed at having to stay their vengeance upon the Bulgars, turned northwards into their own country, from which they had been exiled since 1915. Here their march became a triumphal procession, for there was no one to resist them, and on October 12, after reaching Belgrade, they made ready for an advance into Austrian territory. Meanwhile the British and French contingents marched unopposed towards Constantinople, which they would have taken had not the general cessation of hostilities forestalled them. Similar triumphs were won farther east. In northern Palestine, Allenby, aided by the Arabs, whom Colonel Lawrence had raised against their former masters, routed the Turks on September 19 and pushed on to Damascus and Aleppo. In Mesopotamia, the British resumed their advance up the Tigris, and forced the last of the Turkish armies to surrender. On October 31 an Armistice was signed with Turkey. The last straw was the total collapse of the Austrians in Italy. On October 23 their lines on the Piave were broken by the Italians, assisted by two British divisions, and in four days their whole army was in disorderly flight. On November 3 the Austrian Empire submitted to armistice terms, and during

the next few days British troops from the Italian front had penetrated the Tyrol to the frontier of south Germany, where there was not a man to oppose them.

The German Revolution.—Finally, when as a counsel of despair the German leaders ordered the Fleet to sea, the spirit of revolt, already strong in the submarines, spread to the whole navy. The crews mutinied against the futile sacrifice. From them the infection reached Kiel and other ports, and thence throughout the whole of Germany. The central nations had long since been reduced by the blockade to a state bordering on famine, but as long as their leaders had been able to buoy them up by spectacular victories they had been content to endure. Now, however, the logic of events became apparent to all, and the German people, so long acquiescent in the rule of the militarist aristocracy, at last determined to be rid of them. To effect this there was no means but revolution. The Kaiser abdicated and fled to Holland, and was followed by most of his advisers. It was only fitting that the Empire which had been founded by Bismarck on the basis of military triumph should collapse as soon as that foundation was removed. German unity indeed was not seriously threatened, but it was by representatives of the people that an Armistice was sued for. The terms imposed were severe, involving the withdrawal of all troops beyond the Rhine and the surrender of the greater part of the navy, together with so much warlike material as to preclude any renewal of hostilities. It was signed at 5 a.m. on November 11, and hostilities ceased six hours later.

CHAPTER XXV

THE PEACE OF VERSAILLES, 1919

A New Europe.—The next six months were spent by the Allies in preparing the foundations upon which a new Europe was to be erected. There was to be no Treaty in the strict sense of the word, for no discussion of terms with the Central Powers was contemplated. A new map of Europe was to be drawn to the liking of the victors and imposed upon the defeated. Unfortunately there was no unanimity of opinion between the allied statesmen as to the principles upon which the re-settlement was to be based. Was it to be an attempt to secure goodwill among the nations, based on justice for all, or was it, like the Vienna Settlement of 1814, to be in large measure punitive and vindictive, with every open question decided by the victors in their own favour and a crop of Alsace-Lorraines left over to be avenged in future wars? These vital questions were never really answered, for although lip service was done to the principle of equal justice, some of the details of the settlement were obviously at variance with it.

The Fourteen Points.—Early in 1918 President Wilson had published to the world the terms upon which America was prepared to make peace. The fundamental notes of this document, which became celebrated as "The Fourteen Points," were those of oblivion to the past and the establishment of a new world order in which the causes of war should have been removed. It demanded the evacuation of all territories which the Germans and their allies had occupied, and reparation for damage done therein. It provided that frontiers throughout Europe should be re-

adjusted exclusively on the lines of nationality, and that each nation, such as Poland and the subject races of the Austrian Empire, should be given the right to determine its own allegiance and political future. On behalf of the victors it disclaimed the right to demand war indemnities from the defeated. Finally, for the peaceful settlement of future differences between nations a permanent international League was to be established which should embrace the whole civilised world. It was on the understanding that these fundamentals were to be the basis of the peace that the Germans had surrendered. Yet to lay down definite principles for the settlement was one thing; to interpret them fairly and to secure their acceptance amid the passions and fears of the months that followed the Armistice was quite another. Clémenceau, who had been the Prime Minister of France since 1917, only voiced the opinion of his country when he claimed that the first necessity was to secure France against future German aggression and that every other consideration must give way to that necessity. The Italians, not content with recovering Italian-speaking districts from Austria, demanded, for purely military reasons, that their northern frontier should run along the main ridge of the eastern Alps, though that meant including many Germans in Italy. In order to make the Adriatic an Italian Lake, they also claimed the whole of the old Venetian possessions east of the Adriatic, although this district was inhabited largely by Serbs. Lloyd George, who represented Great Britain in the discussions, had just won an election by dangling before ignorant and excited voters the prospect of securing the punishment of the Kaiser and his advisers and of making Germany pay the whole cost of the War. In these circumstances Wilson strove in vain to uphold his principles. The Fourteen Points were ignored in more than one vital particular where they conflicted with the immediate interests of the victors, and the Germans were given some ground for their complaint that they had been tricked into surrender.

The League of Nations.—In spite of his failure to secure a strict interpretation of the whole of his Fourteen Points, the American President enjoyed one notable triumph, for a scheme for a permanent League of Nations was incorporated as an integral part of the terms of peace. The powers of this League were to be exercised through a number of permanent Committees and an International Council, which should meet regularly at Geneva and could be called upon to arbitrate upon disputed questions. It was to be given no force to compel obedience to its decisions, but it was hoped that the mere opportunity of focussing public opinion upon such questions by open discussion, before they became the subject of international bitterness, would lessen the likelihood of war. The League began its operations under considerable handicap, for not only were the defeated nations necessarily excluded to begin with, but also the United States, unwilling to be permanently involved in European politics, disowned the President and refused to join it. Further, conditions in Russia made her admission impossible. In its early stages, therefore, the League, like its predecessor the Holy Alliance of a hundred years earlier, took the appearance not of an international arbiter aiming at nothing but justice but of an Alliance bent upon enforcing the will of the victors. Nevertheless, even during the first few years of its existence it did very valuable work. Its arbitration prevented a war between Sweden and Finland, stopped one that had already begun between Jugo-Slavia and Albania, and appeased some of the bitterness between Poles and Germans in Silesia. The assistance which it gave in the financial reconstruction of Austria and Hungary certainly saved those young republics from utter chaos. What power it may ultimately wield it is too soon to guess. We may safely say, however, that the best hope for the peace of Europe lies in some such institution capable of bringing the focussed public opinion of the civilised world to bear on all international disputes.



EUROPE AFTER THE PEACE OF VERSAILLES,

Germany.—During the summer of 1919 the decrees of the victors were presented to the defeated nations one after another. In vindication of the principle of nationality, Alsace and Lorraine were recovered by France, and Schleswig, torn from Denmark in 1864, was restored. Poland, partitioned over a century before, was re-established as an independent State, and recovered from Germany, Austria and Russia all districts where Poles predominated. The fate of certain parts of Silesia, where both Poles and Germans dwelt, was left to be settled later by popular vote. These arrangements, involving the extension of Poland to the Baltic, severed the communications between the purely German province of East Prussia and the main area of Germany. The situation was further complicated by the fact that the port of Danzig, though inhabited chiefly by Germans, lay in the middle of the strip of coastline now awarded to Poland. It was claimed by the Poles as being necessary as an outlet for their trade down the Vistula. It was, however, declared a free city under the permanent protection of the League of Nations, and arrangements were made for the free passage through it both of German trade going east and west and of Polish trade going north and south.

Russia.—Further east than Poland and East Prussia, the establishment of settled conditions had perforce to wait. The adventurers, known as Bolshevists, into whose hands power over Russia had fallen in 1917, set up a Communist State which declared itself at war with the world. The Russian public debt was repudiated and all private property, including that owned by foreigners, was seized. During 1919, urged on partly by their horror at the atrocities perpetrated by the Bolshevists, and partly by the clamour of the owners of confiscated property in Russia, the Allies decided upon armed intervention on behalf of the various native leaders who were trying to save Russia from Communist control. The effects of this intervention, however, were similar to those which had

followed the attempt of Europe to interfere with the course of the French Revolution in 1793. The Bolshevists were enabled to pose as patriots defending their country against a foreign attempt to inflict a reactionary Government upon them. After the failure of a foolish and costly British expedition to Archangel, the Allies abandoned the endeavour and left events to take their course. The Russian Baltic provinces, however, decided their own fate. Out of these four new States emerged : Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The Finns had a good right to be considered a distinct nationality, and had only lost their independence to Russia during the eighteenth century. The claims of the others were less clear, but all four were duly recognised.

Austria.—Heavily as Germany had suffered in population and territory by the loss of her Polish provinces, her unity, the real work of Bismarck, remained undisturbed. To the Austrian Empire, however, as Metternich had foreseen, the principle of nationality proved fatal. Galicia was restored to Poland. A new State, to be called Czecho-Slovakia, was formed out of what had been known as Bohemia and Moravia, and included a large Slav population, together with some millions of Germans who had the misfortune to live on the wrong side of the mountains. Hungary was detached from Austria, and its province of Transylvania was annexed to Roumania. What had been Serbia was greatly enlarged, under the name of Jugo-Slavia, by the addition of the old south Slav population of the Austrian Empire, together with Bosnia, Herzegovina and Montenegro. The Italian-speaking districts of the Austrian Tyrol were transferred to Italy and with them, for purely military reasons, went also the German-speaking district of Bozen and Istria. On the other hand, Italy's claim to the east of the Adriatic was disallowed. After much friction between the Allies, the province of Dalmatia, south of Fiume, was awarded to Jugo-Slavia, which thus acquired a valuable frontage on the sea at the expense of the inveterate hostility of Italy.

The possession of Fiume remained a vexed question until it was established in 1922 as a free city by the League of Nations. Shorn of all her subject races, Austria remained but a fragment. Francis Joseph, after a reign of nearly seventy years, had died in 1917, and with the abdication of his heir in 1918 the ancient dynasty had disappeared. In logic the tiny Republic should have been allowed the same right to determine her own future as had been granted to her former subjects ; but when the question was raised of her reunion with her fellow nationals in Germany the Allies vetoed the proposal on the principle that no accession of strength could be permitted to Germany. Bulgaria was forced to yield territory both to Jugo-Slavia and to Greece, though it is probable that the handing over of the whole of the Ægean coast to the latter increased rather than diminished the number of the population under alien rule. To Greece also was awarded considerable territory round Smyrna on the coast of Asia Minor, where many of their compatriots had always dwelt. The Turks, however, never accepted this arrangement, and three years later, guessing that the Great Powers of Europe would be unwilling to take up arms again, they fell upon the Greeks and drove them out of Asia altogether. As for Constantinople, the prize for which so many nations had contended during the past fifty years, though the British occupied it in 1919, it was regained by the Turks almost at the point of the sword in 1923.

Indemnities.—But if the territorial rearrangement of Europe was open here and there to criticism and left behind it bitternesses which only time could heal, there were other details of the settlement that caused no less hardship. President Wilson had deprecated war indemnities, but the victors, not content with demanding reparation for damage illegally done in occupied territory and to allied shipping, presented Germany with a bill swollen by all sorts of other claims. They did not, indeed, attempt to bring up the total to the sum which the war

had cost them, but by including such items as pensions to the wounded and to the dependents of the dead they raised it to a figure which it would have been impossible for Germany to pay, even at the cost of beggaring herself for half a century. And even if such a bill could ever have been met, the payment must necessarily take the form of coal and manufactured articles, and the export of such goods in such quantities would, of course, have wrecked the export trade of England and, in a less degree, that of the whole world, for many years to come. In after years, quite apart from the justice of trying to make Germany bear so large a portion of the whole cost of the war, it began to be recognised that such payments were hardly less damaging to the paid than to the payer, and the demands upon Germany were greatly modified. Even to our own day, however, such payments as are being made are one of the principal causes of the stagnation of the British coal and steel trades.

Security for France.—Finally, in order to meet the French demands for security against future attack, the German army was to be limited to 100,000 men, her armaments and munitions being correspondingly reduced, and conscription was forbidden in any of the defeated countries. The surrendered ships of the German navy were not to be returned and no new submarines or battleships were to be built. The German overseas colonies were declared forfeit, most of them being handed over to the victorious Powers, not as owners but as Mandatories responsible for the government of them to the League of Nations. The line of the Rhine, together with important districts to the east of it, was to be occupied by allied troops for a period of fifteen years. These terms, together with an admission forced from them of Germany's guilt in provoking the war, were accepted under protest by the representatives of the German Republic at Versailles on June 28.

The Future.—It was realised, of course, that the infliction of such penalties upon Germany, however well deserved,

would tend to keep alive a spirit of bitterness in the hearts of her people, whose main fault was that for fifty years they had acquiesced in the sins of their rulers. How to prevent this bitterness from ultimately developing into a war of revenge has been a problem which has divided the statesmen of Europe from 1919 to the present date. How long, it was asked, could the frontiers laid down at Versailles be expected to endure, and who would maintain them against future German aggression? Was it fair, after imposing harsh terms upon them, to expect the German people to repent and better their behaviour? One school of thought, strong in France, declining to place any confidence in German promises, has relied upon keeping Germany isolated and weak. Some, indeed, have looked to making permanent the occupation of the Rhineland. In order to guarantee the existing state of affairs, a series of defensive alliances sprang up between the new States, such as Poland, Czecho-Slovakia and Jugo-Slavia, under the auspices of France. And it has been on these, rather than on agreements and discussion, that the security of France has been held to depend. England and America also were invited to bind themselves in perpetuity to come once more to the assistance of France whenever the Settlement of 1919 should be challenged. On the other hand, British statesmanship, while willing to guarantee the permanence of the new frontiers of France, has always regarded the rearrangement of Eastern Europe as a matter open to future discussion. Those who have faith in the gradual growth of Germany's goodwill have dared to hope that any outstanding differences between her and her neighbours will be settled without resort to war. They believe that the security of France will in the long run depend not on defensive alliances but on the contentment of Germany. Above all, they look upon the League of Nations as a means not merely of enforcing the Peace of Versailles but of modifying it as the calls of justice and common sense may demand. As one of the British representatives at Versailles remarked, the best hope for the future

of Europe lay not in the justice of the peace terms, but in the machinery set up for altering them. Yet even in the League of Nations, to which would fall this task, Germany, the nation most vitally concerned, was not to be represented until seven years had elapsed. Fortunately, however, the heat of passion rapidly died down, and as good sense returned to the mass of the German nation as well as to her adversaries, it has been possible to remove some at least of the sources of friction between them. For example, the western European frontiers were freely accepted by Germany and guaranteed for ever by all the nations concerned at a Conference held at Locarno in 1924. In 1926 Germany was admitted to the League of Nations and since then, taking her place on equality with France and England, has played a valuable part in its deliberations.

Nationality.—Between the outbreak of the French Revolution and the Peace of Versailles 130 years elapsed. Reviewing that period, what progress can we record towards the fulfilment of the aspirations awakened by the Revolution and the War of Liberation? The principle of nationality, the ideal by which men are inspired to supplement the ties of blood and language by those of political unity and common freedom from foreign control, has made great strides towards general recognition. The gradual break-up of Turkey in Europe and the catastrophic disruption of the Empires of Russia and Austria have released no less than ten considerable nations from the thralldom under which for centuries they groaned. The genius of Bismarck and Cavour bestowed upon the great majority of Germans and Italians the unity so long desired, and won for great nations the power and influence that their numbers and traditions demanded. The history of Norway and of Belgium showed the same principle at work. The seizure of Schleswig in 1864, however, and the fate of Belgium and Serbia in 1914 suggested the melancholy reflection that until almost the end of the period the rights of small States and of nations too weak to protect

themselves were little more secure against wanton aggression than they had been in the days of Frederick the Great or of Napoleon. It is, moreover, too soon to be sure that the task of restraining the animosity of some of these States to one another will not tax to the uttermost the resources of the League of Nations. And even when that animosity falls short of war it may take the almost equally disastrous form of impassable customs barriers, which, by interrupting trade, dissipate the wealth and lower the standard of civilisation in them all. It has yet to be seen whether the passion for national independence has not in some directions been carried too far : whether, for example, southern Ireland can exist alone, or whether the Austrian Empire may not have to be re-created in some form or another to provide trading facilities in central Europe. Lastly, there are still too many Germans under foreign rule in modern Poland, Italy and Czecho-Slovakia for us to pronounce that the principle of nationality has even yet had full play.

Democracy.—On the other hand, by 1919 the ideal of democracy appeared to have met with more general recognition. At that time the sovereign right of the people, acting through their representatives, to control all decisions that affect their destiny, seemed to be universally accepted. Since that date, however, events in Italy, Russia and Spain have shown that confidence in democracy is not universal. In each of these countries a determined minority has seized and wielded power, based to a greater or lesser degree upon the principle of terror. Nor could it be stated with any degree of finality right up to the closing weeks of the Great War which system, that of full popular sovereignty as exemplified in France, or that of limited despotism as it had existed in Germany, was the better calculated to promote material progress, efficiency and happiness. In view of the imposing advance of wealth and power of modern Germany, as compared, say, with France, it was at least arguable in 1914 that the liberty

of the individual had in some countries been pushed so far as to endanger the national discipline and power of co-operation which were essential to success in the struggle for existence. It was significant, however, that each of the countries which collapsed under the strain of war was one in which, short of revolution, no means existed of getting rid of unpopular leaders or of controlling their policy, whereas in England and France, where the democratic principle was most fully put into practice, governments might come and go, but the national determination remained unimpaired.

Militarism.—Lastly, the efforts made during the early years of the twentieth century to bring about a general limitation of armaments, so far from meeting any success, served only to show the grave difficulties with which the subject was hedged about, for as long as any one country remained a slave to the militarist ideal it was impossible for the others to call a halt without imperilling their national existence. The war removed some, at least, of these obstacles, for although there are to-day as many men under arms in Europe as in 1914, militarism as an ideal has certainly received a staggering blow. The steps in the direction of disarmament which are being taken under the auspices of the League of Nations, if urged forward by sane public opinion, may well lead to an era of progress such as Europe has never known.

The interplay of these three great forces, militarism, democracy and nationalism, has provided the central feature of the period with which we have been dealing. In 1914 their future was still in doubt, for it depended in a great measure upon the issue of the last and greatest of the wars. The triumph of German organisation and discipline would have surely meant the shattering of the nationalist and democratic dream. The German defeat, it is legitimate to hope, will as surely leave the European nations free to work out their destiny untrammelled by foreign control and unburdened by armaments.

INDEX

The figures in brackets refer to maps.

- ABDUL HAMID**, 204, 206, 210, 212, 278, 282-4
Abyssinia, 272, [261]
Acre, 25
Adowah, 272, [261]
Adrianople, 94, 101, 208, 209, 287-90, [92, 93, 291]
Adrianople, Treaty of, 100, 101
Adriatic Sea, 319, 323
Ægean Sea, 95, 203, 209, 210, 275, 289, 290, 305, 324, [92, 93, 291]
Africa, 53, 112, 253. See **North Africa**
Agadir, 271, [221]
Aisne, 303, [302]
Albania and Albanians, 95, 209, 210, 212, 287, 289, 290, 320 [92, 93, 291, 321]
Alexander of Battenberg, Prince of Bulgaria, 213-6
Alexander I, Tsar of Russia, 33, 35, 36, 87-90, 98, 99
Alexander II, Tsar of Russia, 161, 218-21, 223, 224, 240
Alexander III, Tsar of Russia, 229, 241
Alexandria, 25, 264, [49, 261]
Algeciras, 270, 271, [261]
Algiers and Algeria, 53, 60, 262, 268, 269, [49, 261]
Ali Pasha, 97
Allenby, Lord, 313, 316
Alphonso XII, King of Spain, 110, 111
Alphonso XIII, King of Spain, 111
Alsace, 198, 232, 239, 245, 301, 322, [197]
Amiens, 30, 314, 315, [302]
Anatolia, 297, [261, 291]
Antwerp, 62, 64-6, 299, 301, 303, [197, 302]
Archangel, 309, 323
Ardennes, 298, [197]
Armenians, 277, 278, [261]
Arras, 312, [302]
Arta, Gulf of, 91, [92, 93, 291]
Austerlitz, 32, [39]
Austria, 16, 29-33, 35, 36, 46-8, 67-77, 90, 91, 96, 99, 106, 124-32, 134-9, 142-9, 158, 159, 163, 164, 169-77, 179-89, 193, 202-5, 208-11, 215, 246-8, 273-97, 300-24, [39, 49, 69, 73, 92, 93, 141, 291, 321]
Baden, 74, 204, [49, 69]
Baghdad, 277, 292, 305, 307, [261]
Balkan League, 273, 285, 286, 289, 292
Balkan War of 1912, 266-90, 305, [291]
Baring, Sir Evelyn (Lord Cromer), 265-7
Bastille, 13
Batak, 203, 204, [93, 291]
Bavaria, 67-76, 184, 185, 199, 244, [49, 69]
Belfort, 232, [69, 197]
Belgium, 44, 61-6, 166, 187, 193, 298-303, 315-6, 327, [49, 69, 197, 321]
Belgrade, 91, 164, 205, 275, 276, 294, 304, 316, [73, 92, 93, 291, 321]
Berlin, 32, 135-7, [39, 49, 69]
Berlin, Congress of, 208, 210-15, 224, 240, 246, 274
Berlin Decrees, 32
Bernadotte. See Charles XIV of Sweden
Bessarabia, 209, 210, 212, [92, 93]
Biarritz, 183, [49]
Bismarck, 138, 179-88, 191-9, 220, 239-53, 257, 317, 323, 327
Black Sea, 101, 158, 161, 162, [49, 321]
Bohemia, 71, 125-9, 136, 185, 188, 189, 323, [49, 69, 73]
Bolshevists, 322-3
Bonaparte, Jerome, 33
Bonaparte, Joseph, 33, 80
Bonaparte, Louis, 33
Bonaparte, Napoleon. See Napoleon the Great
Bonapartists, 52, 58, 110, 235, 236

- Borodino, 35, [39]
 Bosnia, 154, 202-6, 209, 275, 276,
 283, 292, 323, [73, 92, 93, 291]
 Bosphorus, 96, 102, 162, [49, 93,
 291]
 Boulogne, 31, 59, [39, 197, 302]
 Bozen, 323, [321]
 Bremen, 255, [69]
 Brest-Litovsk, Peace of, 313
 Bruges, 315, [302]
 Brussels, 63-5, [197, 302]
 Bucharest, Convention of, 164, [291,
 321]
 Bucharest, Peace of (1918), 313
 Bucharest, Treaty of (1913), 290
 Bulgaria, 154, 201-5, 209-16, 276,
 281, 283, 285-92, 308, 316, 324,
 [93, 291, 321]
 Bulgars, 94, 99, 200-16, [92]
 Byzantium. See Constantinople.
- Cairo, 25, 264, [261]
 Calais, 314, [302]
 Cambrai, 312, 315, [302]
 Campo Formio, 23
 Canea, 279, [291]
 Caporetto, 313, [321]
 Carbonari, 56, 82, 83, 85
 Carpathians, 91, 309, [93]
 Catholic Church, 13, 16, 28, 63, 89,
 152, 177. See Papal States
 Cavour, 144, 145, 149, 161, 167-76,
 327
 Champagne, 307, 312, [302]
 Charles of Hohenzollern, Prince
 (afterwards King) of Roumania,
 164, 305, 309
 Charles X, King of France, 52-4
 Charles XIII, King of Sweden, 103
 Charles XIV, King of Sweden, 103,
 104
 Charles Albert, King of Sardinia,
 83-6, 144-7
 China, 224-7, 255, 256
 Clémenceau, 319
 Committee of Public Safety, 18, 19,
 22
 "Committee of Union and Pro-
 gress," 282-5
 Communards, 233, 234
 Compiègne, 315, [302]
 Confederation of the Rhine, 32, [39]
 Constantinople, 95-102, 204, 208,
 274, 281-8, 305, 307, 316, 324,
 [49, 92, 93, 291, 321]
 Corday, Charlotte, 19
 Corunna, 34, [39]
 Crete, 274, 279-81, 284, [49, 291]
 Crimean War, 89, 160, 161, 217, 224
- Croatia, 125, [92]
 Croats, 72, 125, [73]
 Custozza, 145, [141]
 Czecho-Slovakia, 323, 326, 328,
 [321]
 Czechs, 71, 72, 125-9, [73]
- Dalmatia, 323
 Damascus, 316
 Danton, 17-20
 Danube, 71, 95, 96, 159, 164, 204-9,
 309, [49, 69, 73, 92, 93, 291, 321]
 Danzig, 322, [321]
 Dardanelles, 96, 102, 162, 203, 305,
 306-7, [49, 93, 291]
 Delcassé, 270
 Democracy, 328-9
 Denmark, 47, 48, 66, 75, 105, 106,
 136, 184, 322, [49, 197, 321]
 Directory, 21, 23, 26
 Dobrudscha, 209, 212, 290, [93,
 291]
 Drave, 72, 91, [73, 92, 93]
 Dual Alliance, 240, 241, 247, 258
 "Dual Monarchy," 188 (and see
 Austria)
 Dunkirk, 303, 314, [302]
- Eastern Roumelia, 211, 213-5, 283,
 [93, 291]
 East Prussia, 304, 322, [321]
 Egypt, 25, 154, 247, 260-70, 305,
 [261]
 Elba, 37, [39]
 Elbe, 185, [69, 73]
 England. See Great Britain
 Enver Pasha, 288, 305
 Epirus, 290, [93, 291]
 Erythraea, 272, [261]
 Estonia, 323, [321]
- Fashoda, 268, 269, [261]
 "February Revolution," 115, 127,
 133, 143
 Ferdinand of Coburg, Prince (after-
 wards Tsar) of Bulgaria, 216, 277,
 283, 286, 305, 316
 Ferdinand, Austrian Emperor, 124,
 130
 Ferdinand II, King of Naples, 82,
 83, 144-9, 172
 Ferdinand VII, King of Spain, 109,
 110
 Fez, 271, [261]
 Finland, 48, 87, 103, 105, 320, 323,
 [49, 321]
 Finns, 87
 Fiume, 323-4, [321]
 "Fourteen Points," 318-20

- France, 45-7, 50-60, 64, 65, 90, 114-23, 150-62, 166-71, 175, 187, 190-99, 231-41, 245-7, 255, 262-4, 280, 294, 295, 297-317, 319, 322, 325-9, [49, 197, 302, 321]
- Francis, King of Naples, 172, 174
- Francis II, Austrian Emperor, 67, 124
- Francis Ferdinand, 292
- Francis Joseph, Austrian Emperor, 131, 158, 159, 170, 171, 188, 208, 275, 283, 294, 324
- Franco-German War, 196-9, 304, [197]
- Frankfurt, 75, 76, 181, 182, [69, 197]
- Frankfurt, Parliament of, 134-9
- Frederick the Great, 328
- Frederick III, German Emperor, 250
- Frederick William III, King of Prussia, 32, 76, 77
- Frederick William IV, King of Prussia, 77, 78, 106, 134-9, 179
- French Revolution, The Great, 41, 107, 119, 323, 327
- French, Sir John (Earl of Ypres), 301, 308
- Friedland, 33, [39]
- Galicia, 48, 71, 74, 189, 304, 309, 323, [49, 73]
- Gallipoli, 307, 308, [321]
- Garibaldi, 147-9, 170-7
- Gaza, 313
- Geneva, 320
- Genoa, 29, 47, 82, 85, 173, 184, [39, 69, 73, 141]
- George, King of Greece, 163
- George, Prince of Greece, 280
- German Confederation, 74, 133-9, 179
- German Empire, 199, 242-59
- Germany, 67-78, 133-9, 179-88, 192-9, 231, 232, 239-41, 270, 271, 277, 278, 281, 292-329, [69, 197, 302, 321]
- Girondins, 19
- Gordon, 265-7
- Great Britain, 20-6, 30-4, 37, 47, 48, 64, 65, 96, 99-102, 155-62, 174, 203-6, 208, 210, 212-14, 223-7, 239, 240, 253-8, 263-71, 278, 280, 282, 295-317, 319, 323, 325, 329
- Greco-Turkish War, 279, 280
- Greece, 101, 163, 210-12, 276, 279-81, 284-92, 305, 308, 324, [92, 93, 291, 321]
- Greeks, 89, 94, 96-102, [92]
- Hague, The, 62, 63, [49, 197]
- Haig, Sir Douglas (Earl Haig), 308
- Hamburg, 255, [69, 197]
- Hanover, 48, 75, 184, [49, 69]
- Hapsburgs, 67, 125, 137, 138, 179, 188, 189
- Hardenberg, 68
- Heidelberg, 134
- Heligoland, 48, 253, [69, 197]
- Henry, Prince of Prussia, 255, 256
- Herzegovina, 201-6, 209, 275, 283, 323, [92, 93, 291]
- Hesse, 184, [69]
- Hetairia, 97, 98
- Hicks Pasha, 266
- Hindenburg, 304
- Hohenlinden, 30, [39]
- Holland, 30, 31, 33, 47, 58, 61-6, 75, 317, [39, 49, 69, 197, 321]
- Holstein, 75, 105, 106, 183, 184, 186, 192, [49, 69, 197]
- "Holy Alliance, The," 45, 46, 320
- "Holy Places, The," 152
- Hundred Days, The, 37, 38
- Hungarians. See Magyars.
- Hungary, 71-4, 126-32, 188, 304, 320, 323, [69, 73, 321]
- Ibrahim Pasha, 99, 101, 262
- Ireland, 328
- Ismail, 262, 263
- Ismailia, 264, [261]
- Istria, 177, 189, 306, 323, [69, 73, 141, 321]
- Italy, 23, 25, 29, 30, 33, 35, 79-86, 140-9, 166-78, 183-6, 247, 248, 271-3, 275, 283, 286, 289, 294, 295, 305-6, 309, 313, 315, 319, 323, 328, [39, 49, 73, 141, 321]
- Jacobin Club, 18
- Janina, 97, [93, 291]
- Japan, 225-8, 255
- Jellachich, 130
- Jellicoe, Admiral, 311
- Jena, 32, [39]
- Jerusalem, 313
- Jugo-Slavia, 320, 323-4, 326, [321]
- "July Revolution," 43-5, 63, 77, 84, 90
- Khalifa, 268
- Khartoum, 266, 269, [261]
- Kiao Chau, 226, 255
- Kiel, 317
- Kitchener, 268, 269
- Konia, 277, [261]

Königgrätz, 185, 188, 189, [73]
 Korea, 223, 225, 227, 228
 Kossuth, 127, 130-2
 Kotzebue, 75
 Kurland, 306
 Kut, 307, 310

Latvia, 323, [321]
 Lausanne, Treaty of, 273, 286
 La Vendée, 18, 26, 29
 Lawrence, Colonel T. E., 316
 League of Nations, 320, 322, 324,
 326-9
 Le Cateau, 301, [302]
 Legion of Honour, 29
 Leipsic, 32, 37, [39]
 Lenin, 312
 Leopold II, Emperor, 16
 Leopold of Coburg, King of the
 Belgians, 65, 66
 Leopold of Hohenzollern, 110, 194
 Liao Tung, 225, 228
 Liberation, Wars of, 44, 70, 109
 Liège, 301, [302]
 Lille, 315, [302]
 Lisbon, 113, [49]
 Lithuania, 306, 323, [321]
 Lloyd-George, 319
 Locarno, 327
 Lombardy, 29, 79-85, 143-8, 171,
 172, 247, [49, 73, 141]
 London, Conferences of, 64, 102, 287
 London, Treaty of, 65, 298, 299
 Loos, 307, [302]
 Lorraine, 198, 232, 245, 301, 322,
 [197]
 Louis XVI, King of France, 10, 11,
 15-19, 20, 21
 Louis XVIII, King of France, 46,
 50-3, 55
 Louis Napoleon. See Napoleon III
 Louis Philippe (Duke of Orleans),
 King of France, 54-60, 64, 65,
 90, 114-16, 235
 Louvain, 65, [197]
 Lule Burgas, 287, [291]
 Lunéville, 30
Lusitania, 310
 Luxembourg, 65, 66, 75, [69, 197,
 321]
 Lyons, 19, 56, 57, [39, 49]
 Macedonia, 94, 98, 210, 212, 274-6,
 279, 281, 282, 285-90, [92, 291]
 Magenta, 170, 172, [141]
 Magyars, 71, 72, 124-32, 188, 189,
 275, [73]
 Mahdi, 265-8
 Main, 186, [197]

Malta, 30, 31, 48, 210, [39, 261]
 Manchuria, 225-8
 Manuel, King of Portugal, 113
 Marat, 18, 19
 Marchand, 269
 Marie Antoinette, 12, 16-19
 Marmora, Sea of, 208, 209, [93, 291]
 Marne, 301-3, 314, 315, [302]
 Marsala, 174, [141]
 Marseilles, 16, 57, [39, 49]
 Maude, Sir Stanley, 310
 Maupas, 120
 Maximilian, 191
 Mazzini, 84-6, 140-9, 172, 173, 175
 Mehemet Ali, 99, 101, 102, 262, 265
 Menelik, 272
 Mesopotamia, 305, 307, 310, 316
 Messina, 143, [141]
 Metternich, 46, 73, 75, 76, 79, 83,
 88, 99, 124, 128, 135, 143, 323
 Metz, 198, 232, [49, 197]
 Mexico, 191, 311
 Midhat Pasha, 206
 Milan, 23, 29, 48, 143, [39, 73, 141]
 Military Service, 44, 70, 180, 186,
 193, 238, 248, 329
 Mirabeau, 12, 15
 Missolonghi, 99, [93]
 Modena, 80, 144, 146, 171, 172, [49,
 141]
 Moldavia, 91, 95-7, 101, 154, 155,
 158, 163 (see Roumania), [92, 93]
 Moltke, 180, 186, 196
 Monastir, 287, [92, 93]
 Mons, 301, [302]
 Montenegro, 91-5, 202, 204, 205,
 208-12, 275, 283, 286, 287, 292,
 308, 323, [49, 73, 93, 291]
 Montesquieu, 9
 Moore, Sir John, 34
 Morava, 275, 276, [92, 93, 291]
 Moravia, 71, 323, [73]
 Morea, 98-100, [93]
 Moreau, 30
 Morocco, 269-71, [261]
 Moscow, 35, 36, [39]
 Murat, 33
 Namur, 301, [302]
 Nantes, 19, [39]
 Naples, Kingdom of, 33, 80-5, 88,
 144, 172-6, [39, 49, 141]
 Napoleon the Great, 21-37, 42-4,
 47-50, 58, 59, 62, 67-70, 79, 260,
 328
 Napoleon III (Louis Napoleon), 58,
 59, 118-23, 147, 150-61, 166-71,
 175, 183, 186-8, 190-8, 220, 231,
 298

- Nationality, Principle of, 43, 166, 327-8
 Navarino, 100, 101, [93]
 Netherlands, 47, 61-6, [49]
 Netherlands, Austrian, 47
 Neuve-Chapelle, 307, [302]
 Nice, 171, 176, [141]
 Nicholas, King of Montenegro, 202
 Nicholas I, Tsar of Russia, 88-102, 131, 153-61, 217, 218
 Nicholas II, Tsar of Russia, 229, 312
 Nihilism, 219, 221
 Nile, 25, 266-9, [261]
 North Africa, 240, 247, 260-73, [261]
 North German Confederation, 186
 Norway, 48, 64, 103-5, 327, [49, 321]
 Novara, 147, [141]
 Novibazar, 211, 275, 276, 283, [93, 291]
 Odessa, 97, 229, [49]
 Omdurman, 268, [261]
 Orleans, Duke of. See Louis Philippe
 Orthodox Church, 95, 98, 152, 162, 201
 Osman Pasha, 207
 Ostend, 303, 315, [302]
 Otto of Bavaria, King of Greece, 101, 163
 Palermo, 172, 174, [141]
 Palestine, 313, 316
 Papal States, 81, 144, 146-9, 171, 172, 175-7, [49, 141]
 Paris, 50, 54, 55, 58, 77, 114-21, 198, 236, 300, 303, [49, 197, 302]
 Paris, Congress and Treaty of, 161, 162, 168, 223
 Parma, 80, 144, 146, 171, 172, [49, 141]
 Peninsular War, 25
 Pepe, 82
 Persian Gulf, 223, 277, 292, 307, [261]
 Pesth, 126-31, [49, 69, 73]
 Philippopolis, 214, [93, 291]
 Piave, 313, 315, 316, [321]
 Piedmont, 47, 81-5, 140, 143-9, 168-71, [141]
 Pius IX, 142-8, 178
 Plevna, 207, 208, [93, 291]
 Pola, 306
 Poland, 35, 36, 44, 48, 56, 64, 74, 77, 89-91, 219-21, 229, 306, 322, 323, 326, 328, [49, 69, 73, 321]
 Poles, 71, 72, 87, 125, 132, 322, [73]
 Pomerania, 48, [69]
 Port Arthur, 225-8, 255
 Portsmouth, Treaty of, 228
 Portugal, 34, 112, 113, [39, 49]
 Prague, 126-30, [69, 73]
 Prague, Peace of, 186
 Pressburg, 72, 126, [69, 73]
 Prince Imperial, 235, 236
 Prussia, 16, 23, 32-8, 46-8, 67-78, 106, 133-9, 171, 177, 179-88, 192-9, 242-4, 250, 257, 258, [39, 49, 69]
 Pruth, 91, 159, [92, 93]
 Radetzky, 145
 Rheims, 314, [302]
 Rhine, 47, 166, 183, 187, 195, 198, [49, 69, 197, 321]
 Rhineland, Occupation of, 326-6
 Rights of Man, 14, 20, 26
 Robespierre, 19, 20
 Rome, 120, 146-8, 175-8, [49, 141]
 Roon, 180, 186
 Rotterdam, 65
 Roumania, 163, 164, 207, 209-12, 290, 292, 307, 309, 313, 323, [93, 291, 321]
 Roumans, 71, 95, 96, 125, 132, 189, 275, [73, 92]
 Rousseau, 9
 Russia, 25, 31, 35, 36, 46-8, 87-102, 105, 185, 186, 202-30, 239-41, 246-8, 255, 270, 271, 278, 280, 289-96, 300-12, 320, 322-3, 327, 328, [39, 49, 93, 261, 321]
 Russo-Japanese War, 226-8, 240
 Russo-Turkish War, 206-8, [93]
 Sadowa, 185, [73]
 St. Arnaud, 120, 158, 160
 St. Helena, 38
 St. Quentin, 314, [302]
 Salonica, 94, 209, 275, 282, 287, 289, 290, 307, 308, 316, [92, 93, 291, 321]
 San Stefano, Treaty of, 208-11, 224, 246, [93]
 Sarajevo, 292, [73, 92, 93]
 Sardinia, 91, [49, 141]
 Sardinia, Kingdom of, 47, 81-6, 143-9, 161, 168-75, [49, 141]
 Savoy, 81, 169, 171, 172, [141]
 Saxony, 47, 48, 67-77, 185, 242, 244, [49, 69]
 Scharnhorst, 70, 180
 Scheldt, 62, 65, 66, [197]
 Schleswig, 105, 106, 136, 183, 184, 186, 192, 322, 327, [49, 69]
 Scutari, 287, 292, [93, 291]

- Sebastopol, 160, 161, 229, [49, 261]
 "Second Empire," 122, 150-2, 231, 298
 Sedan, 198, [197, 302]
 Serbia, 91, 154, 164, 202-5, 208-11, 275, 276, 281, 283, 285-95, 297, 304, 306, 316, 323, 327, [49, 92, 93, 291]
 Serbs, 72, 95, 96, 201-4, 212-15, [92]
 "Seven Weeks' War," 185, 192
 Siberia, 89, 220, 225, 241
 Sicily, 81-3, 143, 172-6, [49, 141]
 Silesia, 138, 185, 320, [69]
 Sinope, 157, [49]
 Slavs, 72, 87, 89, 124-32, 188, 189, 275, 293, 294, [73, 92]
 Slobitza, 215, [93, 291]
 Smith, Sir Sidney, 25
 Smyrna, 324
 Socialism, 56, 57, 116-21, 237, 248-51
 Sofia, 215, 290, [92, 93, 291]
 Soissons, 314, [302]
 Solferino, 170, [141]
 Somaliland, 272, [261]
 Somme, 308, 309, [302]
 Sonderbund, 107
 Soudan, 265-8, [261]
 Spain, 33-5, 37, 43, 61, 82, 88, 89, 109-12, 194, 271, 328, [39, 49]
 Spanish-American War, 111
 Stambulov, 213-16
 States-General, 11, 15
 Stein, 68
 Strassburg, 59, 198, [69, 197]
 Submarine Campaign, 310-11, 315
 Suez Canal, 203, 223, 262, 305, 307, [261]
 Sweden, 48, 64, 103-5, 320, [49, 321]
 Switzerland, 29, 35, 106-8, 298, [39, 49, 69, 73, 321]
 Syria, 25, 101, 102, [261]
 Tangier, 270, [49, 261]
 Tannenberg, 303-4, [321]
 Tel-el-Kebir, 264
 "Terror," The, 17-20, 26
 Tewfik, 263
 Thessaly, 98, 209, 287
 "Third Republic," 236-41
 Thrace, 287, 288, [92, 93]
 "Three Emperors' League," 246
 Tigris, 277, 310, 316, [261]
 Tilsit, 33, [39]
 Toulon, 22, 25, [39]
 Trafalgar, 31, [39]
 Trans-Siberian Railway, 225, 227
 Transylvania, 71, 132, 188, 275, 309, 323, [73]
 Trent, 177, 189, 275, 306, [69, 73, 141, 321]
 Trieste, 72, 177, 275, 306, [69, 73, 141]
 Triple Alliance, 240, 241, 246, 247, 253, 271
 Triple Entente, 271
 Tripoli, 272, 284, [261]
 Tunis, 247, 268, 271, 272, [49, 261]
 Turin, 170, 172, [69, 141]
 Turkey, 91-102, 152-65, 201-16, 247, 255, 272-92, 305-7, 310, 316, 324, 327, [49, 73, 92, 93, 261, 291, 321]
 Turko-Greek War, 279, 280
 Turko-Italian War, 272, 273, 285
 Tuscany, 80, 143-8, 171, 172, [59, 141]
 Ulm, 31, [39]
 United States of America, 111, 192, 226, 228, 254, 306, 307, 310-11, 314-5, 320, 326
 Uskub, 287, [92, 93, 291]
 Utrecht, Treaty of, 61
 Vardar, 275, [92, 93, 291]
 Varennes, 16
 Venetia, 71, 79-84, 143, 171, 176, 177, 185, 247, 275, [49, 69, 73, 201]
 Venice, 23, 48, 144, 149, 309, 313, [39, 69, 73, 141, 321]
 Venizelos, 284, 286, 316
 Verdun, 301, 303, 308, 309, 313, 315, [302]
 Versailles, 14, 199, 234, [39, 302]
 Versailles, Peace of, 318-27
 Victor Emmanuel, King of Sardinia, 83
 Victor Emmanuel, King of Italy, 110, 147, 149, 161, 167-78
 Victoria, Queen of England, 240
 Vienna, 31, 37, 71, 72, 76, 126-32, 135, 143, 156, 188, [39, 49, 69, 73]
 Vienna, Congress of, 44-9, 62, 74, 79, 88, 89, 103, 124, 318, [49]
 Villafranca, Treaty of, 171, 180, [141]
 Vistula, 322
 Vladivostok, 223, 225, 227
 Volo, Gulf of, 101, [92, 93, 291]
 Voltaire, 9
 Vosges, 298, [197]
 Walachia, 91, 95-7, 101, 154, 155, 158, 163, (see Roumania, [73, 92, 93])

- Walloons, 61
Warsaw, 48, 90, 220, [49]
Waterloo, 38, [39]
Wei-Hai-Wei, 226, 255
Wellington, Duke of, 37, 46
Westphalia, 33
William I, King of the Netherlands, 62-6
William I, King of Prussia (afterwards German Emperor), 179-88, 194-9, 240, 243, 250
William II, German Emperor, 250, 251, 254-6, 270, 283, 296, 317, 319
Wilson, President, 311, 318-20, 324
Windischgrätz, 129-31
Wolseley, Sir Garnet, 264, 267
Württemberg, 67-76, 184, 242, 244, [49, 69]
"Young Italy," 85, 86
"Young Turks," 274, 281, 282, 285, 288
Ypres, 303, 312, [302]
Ypsilanti, 97
Zaimes, 280
Zanzibar, 253
Zeebrugge, 315
Zollverein, 76, 77, 179

